COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

Volume IV SUMMER 1952 Number 3

El *Libro de Buen Amor* del Arcipreste de Hita. By Américo Castro 193

Ficino and the Platonism of the English Renaissance. By Sears Jayne.... 214

Two Champions of a New Christianity: Lamennais and Mickiewicz. By Manfred Kridl 239

The Italian Renaissance in the Estimates of Emile Gebhart and Dilthey 268

Book Reviews 277

Forschungsprobleme der vergleichenden Literaturgeschichte (R. W.). *A poesía épica italiana do século XVI na literatura portuguesa*, by Giuseppe Carlo Rossi (Francisco López Estrada). *La Revue de culture européenne* (W. P. F.). *La letteratura comparata nella storia e nella critica*, by Antonio Porta (W. P. F.). *La Canción petrarquista en la lírica española del Siglo de Oro*, by E. Segura Covarsí (Gustavo Correa). *Music and Poetry of the English Renaissance*, by Bruce Pattison (Joseph Kerman).

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, EUGENE, OREGON

With the Cooperation of the Comparative Literature Section of the Modern Language Association of America

Issued quarterly. Entered as second-class matter, April 5, 1949, at the postoffice at Eugene, Oregon, under act of August 24, 1912.

Comparative Literature

Editor

CHANDLER B. BEALL
University of Oregon
Eugene, Ore.

Associate Editor

WERNER P. FRIEDERICH
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C.

Editorial Board

FRANCIS FERGUSSON
Indiana University
Bloomington, Ind.

VICTOR LANGE
Cornell University
Ithaca, N. Y.

HELMUT HATZFELD
Catholic University
Washington, D. C.

HARRY LEVIN
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

RENÉ WELLEK
Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

FOUNDED at a time when the strengthening of good international relations is of paramount importance, *Comparative Literature* provides a forum for those scholars and critics who are engaged in the study of literature from an international point of view. Its editors define comparative literature in the broadest possible manner, and accept articles dealing with the manifold interrelations of literatures, with the theory of literature, movements, genres, periods, and authors —from the earliest times to the present. They particularly welcome longer studies on comprehensive topics and on problems of criticism.

Manuscripts, editorial communications, and books for review should be addressed to: Comparative Literature, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

The subscription rate is $3.50 a year. The price of single copies is $1.00. Correspondence concerning subscriptions should be addressed to: University of Oregon Publications, Eugene, Oregon. Correspondence concerning exchanges should be addressed to: University of Oregon Library, Eugene, Oregon.

Autres livres à télécharger sur le site
https://abbassa.wordpress.com

COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

VOLUME IV SUMMER 1952 NUMBER 3

EL *LIBRO DE BUEN AMOR* DEL ARCIPRESTE DE HITA

AMERICO CASTRO

EXPONGO a continuación mi actual modo de pensar y de sentir acerca de una obra capital de la literatura hispánica y europea. Creo que la interpretación dada en *España en su historia* sigue siendo históricamente verdadera; pienso también que algunas de mis ideas ganarán en precisión al ser expuestas como ahora lo hago.

Bajo las burlas, junto a la fragmentación de tanta divertida anécdota, es perceptible una constante de sentido. Los motivos didácticos, paródicos, o de la índole que sean, se ordenan según una cierta visión estructurante de la realidad poetizada. Ese es el *quid* distintivo del *Libro de Buen Amor* respecto de los *Carmina Burana*, de los *fabliaux*, de las imitaciones ovidianas *(Pamphilus, Nuntius sagax)*, o de cualquier poesía de *clerici vagantes*. El Arcipreste tomó de todo ello cuanto le plugo, pero lo recreó en una forma poética sin análogo, y, en realidad, sin continuación. Ni siquiera cabría decir, rigurosamente, que sea el Amor la única cima hacia donde converjan los demás valores. El Amor es aquí punto de partida, sin duda alguna, y también luz que alumbra otros aspectos en sí mismos valiosos: la versificación, el lujo verbal, el son de los instrumentos, el dinamismo creador del dinero, el arte incitante de las alcahuetas, el juego-pelea entre las huestes del placer y de la abstinencia, o el universal alegrarse de cuanto posee expresión en la vida. Mas no obstante todo eso, el tema primario y orientador sería, más bien, la tensa y animada actividad del vivir voluntarioso, atraída por el amor y espoleada por la alegría. Tiene conciencia Juan Ruiz de

que todo ello acontece *en* y *a* su *Libro*, centro y *primum mobile*, órgano de múltiples resonancias para quien sepa oírlas. Veamos en qué consiste ese acontecer:

> Como dize Aristótiles, cosa es verdadera,
> el mundo por dos cosas *trabaja*: por la primera
> por aver mantenençia; la otra cosa era
> por aver juntamiento con fenbra plazentera...
> Omes, aves, animalias, toda bestia de cueva
> *quieren*, segund Natura, conpañía *sienpre nueva*,
> e quanto más el ome que *a toda cosa se mueva* [71-3].

El texto anterior está inspirado en la *Política* de Aristóteles (libro I, capítulos I y III), según ya observó Erasmo Buceta (*Revista de Filología Española*, XII [1925], 56-60). Algo análogo se halla también, aunque mucho menos próximo, en la *Física* del mismo filósofo; "cada ser natural tiene en sí mismo un principio de movimiento o de estabilidad"; la golondrina fabrica su nido llevada por un impulso natural, las plantas echan raíces hacia abajo para procurarse alimento; "la naturaleza significa movimiento y cambio" (libros II y III). La diferencia entre el Filósofo y Juan Ruiz no sólo consiste en el tono humorístico, que falta en el griego, sino en que Aristóteles escribe para explicar el ser de la naturaleza, en tanto que el Arcipreste se sirve del vital impulso de la existencia humana para construir su obra poética sobre un frenético y omniabarcante dinamismo. Lo que en Aristóteles es teoría aparece aquí como esforzante vitalidad: el hombre *trabaja, quiere*, se mueve incitado por *toda cosa*. A Juan Ruiz no le interesa qué sea el hombre; le fascina, en cambio, sentirlo afanándose, queriendo, o incluso pecando:

> el ome quando peca, bien ve que desliza;
> mas non se parte ende, ca natura lo *entiza* [75].

Afanes y cuidados aguijonean al hombre y le preocupan. La busca de la mujer deriva de su básico estar en el vivir afanoso:

> partíme de tristeza, de *cuidado dañoso*,
> busqué e fallé dueña, de qual so deseoso [580].

El libro de Juan Ruiz es más que un *Ars amandi*; su tema radical sería más bien el trabajo e inquietud anejos a la necesidad de amar:

> en servir dueñas todo tiempo non cansé...
> ¿quál fué la raçón negra por qué non recabdé? [577].

Las dificultades se acrecientan justamente por existir otras junto a las creadas por el amor:

> Como dize el Sabio, *cosa dura* e *fuerte*
> es dexar la *costumbre*, el *hado* e la *suerte;*
> la costumbre es otra que natura ciertamente [166].[1]

[1] Nótese cómo vitaliza Juan Ruiz la idea que, como trillado lugar común, corría desde Aristóteles. Cf. "Lo que demanda las costumbre es más fuerte que lo que demanda la natura" (*Bocados de oro*, ed. H. Knust, pág. 375).

La naturaleza, la costumbre y el hado a la vez impulsan y obstaculizan la marcha del vivir. La conciencia de ser así la vida interviene auténticamente en la compleja estructura de la obra del Arcipreste, pese a todas las bromas de su irrefrenable humorismo. El *Libro* se mueve dialécticamente, menos entre las nociones de virtud y pecado, que entre las vivencias de impulso vital (esfuerzo, ligereza, alegría, etc.) y del obstáculo encontrado (rechazo, desengaño, tristeza, etc.). La interpretación del *Libro* como obra burlona y salaz (goliardismo) impedía captar lo que hay de seriamente humano tras su estilo alegre, juguetón y juvenil.

El tema del *Libro* enlaza con las posibilidades de la vividura hispana. El lector familiarizado con el *Roman de la Rose* (terminado hacia 1280 por Jean de Meun) medirá la distancia entre su racionalismo muy sobre aviso[2] y el vitalismo de Juan Ruiz, envuelto en las peripecias del vivir dificultoso, en continuo vaivén entre anhelos y caídas. El *Libro de Buen Amor* no cabe en los límites de la poesía didáctica, en la cual la vida es contemplada desde fuera de ella, puesta entre paréntesis y vista en la firme realidad ideal del deber ser, no en la realidad problemática de su existir. Junto a la usual literatura didáctica hubo en la literatura hispano-árabe otra forma de literatura a la vez moralizante y vitalizada, de la cual es máximo ejemplo Ibn Hazm. En su libro *Los caracteres y la conducta* la moral se presenta como una función del vivir, ilustrada mediante experiencias autobiográficas:

> Yo he buscado con empeño un fin para las acciones humanas que todos los hombres juzgasen unánimemente como bueno y que todos apetecieran, y no encontré sino uno tan solo: el fin de evitar *la preocupación*... Nadie *se mueve* a obrar, ni se decide a pronunciar palabra alguna, si no espera con sus actos o palabras desechar la preocupación y ahuyentarla de su espíritu... El hombre llega hasta exponer su vida para arrancar de su alma la preocupación que le abruma [traducción de M. Asín, págs. 4, 145].

Una de las mayores preocupaciones presentes en la textura del vivir de Ibn Hazm fué la de corregir lo que él juzgó defectos, por ejemplo, su "inclinación irresistible a la burla en son de chiste, porque el hablar en serio me parecía fastidioso y propio de gente soberbia" (*op. cit.*, pág.

[2] *Bel Accueil* afea el que *Raison* se sirva de palabras tan sucias como *coilles* "Qui ne sont pas bien renomees / En bouche a courteise pucele" (vv. 6930-1, ed. E. Langlois). La *Raison* replica que "Coilles est beaus nons e si l'ains; / Si sont, par fei, coillon e vit; / Je fis les moz e sui certaine / Qu'onques ne fis chose vilaine; / E Deus, qui est sage a fis [de *fiar*], / Tient a bien fait quanque je fis" (vv. 7116-22). No hay espontaneidad en el uso de esos vocablos, como la hay entre árabes, o en Juan Ruiz cuando desea que la mujer tenga los "sobacos mojados" (445). Jean de Meun piensa y calcula cuanto dice, no se zambulle en el vivir.

44). Ibn Hazm, por tanto, no define el hombre como ser racional, como criatura divina, o en cualquier otro modo conceptual: el hombre es para él un ser dotado de una "vida preocupada," y en ella queda así totalmente incluso. No interesa ahora rastrear antecedentes a tal modo de entender al hombre; más nos importa hacer ver que Juan Ruiz también lo enfoca, como totalidad, desde el punto de vista de sus afanes y cuidados. Las menciones de sus fuentes ("díxolo Catón," copla 44; "dize Aristóteles," 71; "dize el Sabio," 166; "diz Tholomeo e dízelo Platón," 124) no son rasgo anecdótico y abstractamente medioeval; son manifestaciones de su manera de ver al hombre, apretado por sus cuidados y trabajos, y por los designios del hado y la suerte. Algo como esto sería la estructura literaria de la creación del Arcipreste, bien explicable dentro de las posibilidades y preferencias de la vividura hispánica, y sin encaje en las formas poéticas de la Europa cristiana. El efecto cómico del *Libro de Buen Amor* no deriva únicamente de que el vicio fracase frente a la virtud; las acciones humanas están vistas en tanto que eficaces o inoperantes, y se sitúan entre un afán vital, basado en una *preocupación*, y la finalidad que se pretende conseguir. El pintor don Pitas Payas emprende un largo viaje, toma ciertas precauciones ingenuas para evitar que su mujer le engañe y, como era de esperar, no lo logra (474-84): "mujer, molino e huerta siempre quieren grand uso" (472). Don Pitas Payas fué engañado por alguien "más sotil" que él, y que siguió el consejo de que quien "levanta la liebre," si "non la sigue nin la toma, faze como cazador vil" (486).

Las personas y las cosas que moran en este libro viven en tensión, entregadas a la tarea de atraer y ser atraídos. Para cautivar a la mujer hay que decir palabras, "fazer ligerezas e fazer valentías" (518), tan eficaces todas ellas como el dinero. El "Ensiemplo de la propiedad que el dinero ha" (490-513) no figura aquí para insistir sobre fuerza corruptora, según tantas veces se había hecho[3] y se seguiría haciendo. El dinero crea y fomenta el mal, pero también grandes valores; nadie puede pensar que sean un mal "las mejores moradas, / altas e muy costosas, fermosas e pintadas, / castillos heredades e villas entorreadas" (501); o "los nobles paños, doradas vestiduras, joyas preciosas, nobles cabalgaduras" (502). El dinero corrompe a los clérigos, pero "do son muchos dineros, ý es mucha nobleza" (508). El dinero es una de tantas fuerzas impulsantes en el caminar por la vida; su función se armoniza con la estructura total del libro, pues quien no tiene dineros que dar, puede ser "franco de palabra," o tañer instrumentos, o cantar hermosas canciones (514-5). No son éstas simples recetas ovidianas para lograr el amor de una mujer; al poeta le subyuga la visión del

[3] Ver Félix Lecoy, *Recherches sur le Libro de Buen Amor*, pág. 237.

proceso vital, incitado e incitante, capaz de vencer las resistencias que al hombre le salen al paso: "Con una flaca cuerda non alçarás grand tranca . . . / a la peña pesada non la mueve una palanca, / con cuños e almadanas poco a poco se arranca" (517). La intención artística se expresa en esas imágenes de fatiga sudorosa y eficaz, seguidas en elegante contraste, de un destello rápido y bellísimo:

Prueva fazer ligerezas e fazer valentías [518],

a tono con estos otros versos de tema no erótico:

con buen serviçio vençen cavalleros de España [621]
más orgullo e más brío tienes que toda España ¿304].

El servicio de la mujer amada o deseada es un aspecto máximo, pero no único, del vivir del hombre, "que *a toda cosa se mueva*" (73), partiendo de sus cuidados y apetencias, y ayudado por la alegría, el brío, la ligereza, la valentía, la sutileza, el esfuerzo, las palabras, los cantares y las músicas.

Los motivos, los modos y los fines de las actividades primarias del vivir aparecen rápidamente intuidos y esbozados con un trazo. El autor carecía del arte y de la posibilidad de encauzar aquel torrente en vidas individuales; las figuras de *Libro* reiteran una y otra vez su vaguedad carente de espacio y tiempo, al impulso de un dinamismo que las arrolla. No es menos verdad, sin embargo, que la idea impersonalizada de los motivos naturales y el latir de aquel dinamismo en el ánimo del poeta toman aquí formas expresivas, eficacísimas, en fábulas y ejemplos, o en intensos destellos de poesía. La realidad más valiosamente poética del *Libro* aparece en aspectos sueltos, discontinuos: "Tomé senda por carrera, / como faz el andaluz" (116). O en la visión de doña Endrina cruzando, sola y esbelta, por medio de una plaza:

¡Ay Dios, e cuán fermosa viene doña Endrina por la plaça!
¡Qué talle, qué donaire, qué alto cuello de garça!
¡Qué cabellos, qué boquilla, qué color, qué buena andança!
Con saetas de amor fiere cuando los sus ojos alça [653].

He ahí en que se convirtió el verso del original latino inspirador de este episodio: "Quam formosa, Deus! nudis uenit illa capillis" (*Pamphilus*, v. 153). La vaga mención de una hermosa mujer en cabellos adquiere líneas, gracia, color y movimiento; por la plaza espaciosa va dejando un rastro de amores su grácil figura, adivinada a través del erguido y rítmico andar.

Surge así la paradójica impresión de ser la atmósfera de fuerzas y motivos que circunda a las personas más artísticamente real que éstas, nunca concretadas en auténtica individualidad. De ahí lo extraño y heterogéneo de la forma literaria creada por Juan Ruiz. Parece, en

ocasiones, que nos acercamos a un estilo de veras personal, novelístico, libre de toda ganga abstracta y genérica:

> ...ençima del puerto fazía orilla dura,
> viento con grand helada, rozío con grand friura.
>
> Como ome non siente tanto frío si corre,
> corrí la cuesta ayuso . . . [1006-7].

Inmediatamente, sin embargo, el mito reaparece:

> . . . al pie del puerto falléme con vestiglo,
> la más grande fantasma que vi en este siglo . . .
> En el Apocalipsi, sant Johan Evangelista
> non vido tal figura . . ." [1008, 1011].

El mismo contraste se repite una y otra vez:

> Acercándose viene un tiempo de Dios, santo;
> fuime para mi tierra por folgar algún cuanto;
> dende a siete días era cuaresma . . . [1067].

Pero la cuaresma se personifica en un ser mítico: doña Cuaresma y todas las abstracciones en torno a ella. Así pues, el marco y los accesos que conducen a la acción están vistos en una perspectiva literaria que no concuerda con la de las figuras en quienes el acontecer humano se concreta y perfila. Lo no individualizado cae más del lado de la experiencia de lo "convivible" que lo pretendidamente individualizado: el labriego, en enero, "Fazía çerrar sus cubas, fenchirlas con embudo, echar de yuso yelos, que guardan vino agudo" (1276). Los asnos, "fasta que pasa agosto non dexan de rebuznar" (1285). En julio, "la mosca mordedor faz traher las narizes a las bestias por tierra" (1293). Etcétera.

El mundo, la tierra, en cuanto motivo o escenario para las acciones humanas, están más próximos a la experiencia personal que los seres humanos situados en aquel escenario. La razón de ello es obvia: el frío de la sierra, las cubas de vino, el rebuzno de los asnos, o el andar rítmico de una linda muchacha por el ámbito de una plaza no eran realidades "categorizadas" literaria y tradicionalmente;[4] podían esos fenómenos de vida estar o no ahí, ser unos u otros, según fuesen la forma y la dirección del propósito artístico. Un personaje literario era, en cambio, una estructura con su vida ya hecha dentro de una trascendencia épica, religiosa, didáctica, alegórica o truhanesca. El Arcipreste intuyó libremente las circunstancias en torno al vivir personal, o los motivos que lo hacen posible; pero no podía aún sacar a los personajes literarios de los marcos en que se hallaban tradicionalmente encajados,

[4] No me refiero al marco tradicional de la descripción de los meses del año (F. Lecoy, *Recherches sur le Libro de Buen Amor*, págs. 276 y sigs.), sino a lo que Juan Ruiz pone de suyo en cuanto a intensidad vital y concreto detalle. La bella descripción de los meses en el *Libro de Alexandre* (ed. Willis, págs. 440-442) está enfocada desde otra forma de sensibilidad.

e individualizarlos dentro de un sistema de impulsos y circunstancias "secularizados" y no tradicionales. Esto no acontecerá sino en *La Celestina* (1499). En el *Libro de Buen Amor* hallamos estratos literarios de desigual extensión, densidad, época y sentido. La básica desarmonía de la obra impide resolverla en un género, o en fuentes agrupadas sin propósito; pero de ahí arranca también su poderosa originalidad, su ambigüedad cristiano-islámica. Las páginas que siguen permitirán confirmar lo ya dicho y contemplar algunos aspectos del *Libro* con más detalle.

Huellas de la literatura árabe

Las transformaciones observadas en el estilo del *Libro* emanan de una disposición formal y previamente activa en el ánimo del poeta, no de los temas que le llegan de la tradición europea. Ni en el *Pamphilus*, ni en la *Bataille de Caresme et de Charnage*, ni en todo lo demás, se encuentra la forma fluida y deslizante característica del estilo del Arcipreste. Ahora bien, este modo de entrar el poeta en su realidad literaria, y de instalarse en ella, es propio de la estructura oriental de vida y, por consiguiente, de la manera árabe de estar en la vida.[5]

Ya es significativo que el tema básico del *Libro* sea el amor y las experiencias amorosas de un personaje literario. Acontecimientos, moralidades, ideas sobre la vida o expresiones líricas se subordinan a la forma autobiográfica en que la obra se moldea. La preocupación, el cuidado de amor, hace que un personaje se sienta alternativamente atraído y repelido por la persona amada, encarnada en sucesivas y muy varias figuras. El amor, gran taumaturgo, muda la condición de objetos y personas, y da motivo a la ilusión y al engaño. Alguien, por ejemplo, cree poder casarse con tres mujeres, cuando la verdad resulta ser que con la mitad de una le bastaría (189-192). El amor lleva al pecado y al peligro, pero al mismo tiempo cultiva la amistad, no de "los presos y dolientes, / sinon [de] solteros sanos, mancebos y valientes" (373). Como antes en el caso del dinero, mézclanse también en el amor los pecados y los valores.

También en *El collar de la paloma* de Ibn Hazm aparece el amor como un sentimiento ambiguo y lleno de riesgos: "En él verás subsistentes todos los opuestos. Y así, ¿cómo podrás definir los conceptos contradictorios? ... Es el amor una dolencia rebelde, cuya medicina

5 El escritor cordobés Ibn Abd Rabbihi (860-939) "compuso gran número de poesías que coleccionó en una obra intitulada *Al-Mahasat*, en la cual cada una de las piezas eróticas iba seguida de otra composición moral o religiosa, con el fin, según decía, de *purificar* las ideas profanas de las primeras con los sentimientos religiosos que excitaban las últimas." F. Pons Boigues, *Historiadores y geógrafos arabigo-españoles* (Madrid, 1898), pág. 57. Esta es la tradición secular con la cual enlaza el Cancionero del Arcipreste, una tradición que inútilmente buscaremos en la Europa cristiana.

está en sí misma, si sabemos tratarla . . . Torna bello a ojos del hombre aquello que antes aborrecía, y le allana lo que antes le parecía difícil, hasta el punto de trastornar el carácter innato y la naturaleza congénita" (trad. de E. García Gómez, Madrid, 1952, pág. 82).

Los ascetas cristianos y musulmanes desestiman igualmente cuanto aleja de Dios; difieren, en cambio, en que el musulmán, sea o no asceta, se mueve en un mundo de apariencias deslizantes, que no conoce la literatura cristiana cuando no ha sido fuertemente afectada por la islámica, como en el caso del Arcipreste. Ante todo, se vacila entre si el amor es o no ilícito religiosamente: "¿Cuándo vedó Mahoma el Amor? ¿Consta acaso su ilicitud en el claro texto revelado?" (trad. cit., pág. 123). Es también significativo que la virtud brote en el corazón al descubrir éste lo que en él yacía oculto: "Ya era tiempo de que el corazón despertara, y se desprendiera de los velos que lo cubrían" (trad. cit., pág. 287).

Ese "desvelarse" es un motivo estructural en la poesía árabe, sea o no religiosa: "Tal vez el surtidor ha desenvainado un sable al salir del agua, en la cual se ocultaba a nuestra mirada como en una vaina."[6] O esto otro: "La vi desprenderse de su túnica, y abracé aquel sable que acababa de salir de su vaina" (*ibid.* pág. 403). Esta metáfora del siglo XI penetró en la tradición española, y Lope de Vega dice de la duquesa Casandra:

> Ya viene aquí
> desnuda la dulce espada
> por quien la vida perdí.
> (*El castigo sin venganza*, II, 7)

El surtidor se desenvaina del agua, la mujer de sus velos, en una alternancia entre exterior e interior, que no ignorarían los españoles del siglo XIV, mucho más ligados entonces a los musulmanes que Lope de Vega, o Góngora, en el siglo XVII. El arte de tales transiciones era familiar a Juan Ruiz, quien se sirve de él en la forma que puede:

> De prieto fazen blanco, volviéndole la pelleja [929].
>
> Vid blanca fazen prieta buenos enxeridores [1281].

Las razones de su *Libro* no están patentes y han de ser también desveladas:

> Si la razón entiendes, o en el seso aciertas,
> non dirás mal del libro que ahora rehiertas [repruebas] [68].

Del mismo modo se precavía tres siglos antes Ibn Hazm contra malas interpretaciones y por análogos motivos: "Bien sé que algunos de mis encarnizados enemigos condenará que yo haya compuesto una obra como ésta y dirá: '—Echóse fuera de su camino' o '—Se salió de

[6] De una poesía del rey sevillano Al-Mu'tamid, en H. Pérès, *Poésie andalouse*, pág. 203.

su campo'; mas no he de consentir que nadie me cuelgue lo que no me he propuesto . . . No eches a mala parte palabra ninguna que salga de boca de un muslim, siempre que puedas darle una buena explicación" (págs. 295-296).

El amor acerca y aleja a la vez el objeto de los deseos, sin que sea fácil saber si es el hombre o lo deseado quien se acerca o se aleja. Un célebre poeta contemporáneo de Ibn Hazm, Al-Ma'arri dice que "men of acute mind call me an ascetic but they are wrong in their diagnosis. Although I discipline my desires, I only abandoned wordly pleasures because the best of these withdrew themselves from me."[7] Y dice también en otro lugar que la poesía es esencialmente falsa, "because it follows human life and nature, which belong to the vanities of this world and are themselves radically false" (*op. cit.*, pág. 51). Nicholson cita de otro poeta: "It was said by a man of acute mind that gay poetry raises a laugh, while grave poetry is fiction: therefore the poet has no choice but to tell lies or to make people laugh" (*ibid.*). Según un autor persa, "poetry is that art whereby the poet arranges imaginary propositions, and adopts the deductions, with the result that he can *make a little thing appear great and a great thing small*, or *cause good to appear in the garb of evil and evil in the garb of good*. By acting on the imagination, he excites the faculties of anger and concupiscence in such a way that by his suggestion men's temperaments become affected with exaltation or depression; whereby [the poet] conduces to the accomplishment of great things in the order of the world."[8]

Unos dos siglos más tarde Juan Ruiz dice que "En dueña chica yaze muy grand sabor . . . En chica rosa está mucha color" (1612). El poeta es el artista de lo reversible y de lo ambiguo, de lo cómico y de lo evanescente. Las formas métricas de Juan Ruiz, exceptuando el zéjel, proceden de la tradición cristiana, pero la poética de su ánimo creador enlaza con la tradición islámica. Tardarán en percibir esto los aferrados en no aceptar mi idea de que pueden existir conexiones de "forma interior" compatibles con las diferencias de los contenidos poéticos. En el cancionero de Juan Ruiz se "desvelan," se deslizan uno en otro el bueno y el loco amor, sin que haga falta que coincidan en todos sus temas las obras de Juan Ruiz y de Ibn Hazm. Refiere éste que dos padres blancos tuvieron un niño negro, porque en la pared de su cuarto había "la imagen de un negro en la parte del muro en donde recaía la mirada de la mujer . . . Ha sido esta idea muy traída y llevada por los poetas afiliados a la escolástica en muchos poemas en que se dirigen a lo exterior sensible como si fuese lo interior intelligible" (trad. cit., pág. 81).

[7] R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge, 1921), pág. 125.

[8] *Chahār Maqāla* (cuatro discursos), por Nizāmī i 'Arudī i Samarkandī (hacia 1150), *apud* E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (1906), pág. 32.

Mucho antes de Góngora es perceptible en Juan Ruiz la tradición musulmana, la cual convivía con el arte cristiano de aquél como con tantos otros aspectos de la vida española. De ahí los juegos, o corrimientos de palabras de que luego hablo: *cruz-Cruz, pintadas-puntos, ciervo-siervo*, etc. Lo cual armoniza con el entrar y salir de la figura poética que habla en el *Libro*, en la figura de don Melón de la Huerta; así se encarna también la figura de la muchacha amada por Ibn Hazm en el sol que se pone, "un sol encarnado en esta doncella" (trad. cit., pág. 233). Los personajes se desdoblan, se encarnan unos en otros, como la imagen y lo imaginado.

Aunque Juan Ruiz carezca de la riqueza poética de Góngora, y se mueva en un plano mucho más elemental, su metaforismo posee una estructura tan árabe como el de aquél. Compárense estos dos pasajes:

Los estandartes de los jinetes se cernían como pájaros en torno a tus enemigos. Las lanzas puntuaban lo que escribían las espadas; el polvo del combate era la arenilla que secaba el escrito, y la sangre lo perfumaba.[9]

Las puestas de la vaca, lechones e cabritos
allí andan saltando e dando grandes gritos;
luego los escuderos, muchos quesuelos fritos,
que dan de las espuelas a los vinos bien tintos [1085].

Juan Ruiz interpretó temas de la tradición cristiano-europea con sensibililidad hispano-musulmana. Los quesos fritos espolean a los vinos tintos como las lanzas puntúan, o las espadas escriben. La diferencia es que las metáforas de Juan Ruiz son más prácticas, menos desinteresadas, que las árabes y gongorinas, porque el campo de su fantasía es más reducido. Lo que no significa que alguna de ellas no sea lindísima:

Estaba delante [de don Carnal] su alférez homil,
el hinojo fincado, en la mano el barril;
tañía a menudo con él el añafil;
parlava mucho el vino, de todos alguacil [1096].

El fondo de acción narrable y de figuras esculturalmente cerrada no es el de la poesía lírica de los árabes, cuyas imágenes—perlas sin enlace—piden ser contempladas como una discontinuidad, y en actitud extática:

La luna es como un espejo cuyo alinde han empañado los suspiros de las doncellas.
Y la noche se viste con la luz de la lámpara, como la negra tinta se viste con el blanco papel.

No hay en Juan Ruiz símiles en que, como en algunos árabes, el dato de nuestra experiencia casi queda en sombra: la berengena "Parece un corazón de cordero entre las garras de un buitre" (*Libro de las*

[9] *Libro de las banderas de los campeones*, trad. E. García Gómez, pág. 229.

banderas, pág. 171); las imágenes de nuestro autor enlazan con un acontecer más que con un parecer, y tienden a vitalizar la actividad de cuanto su fantasía le representa. En otras imágenes del árabe se suprime el enlace entre lo real y lo imaginado ("parece," "es como," etc.), y la metáfora animante se convierte en actividad de un objeto, o en cualidad, si el objeto es pasivo:[10]

Cada una de las flores abría su boca en la oscuridad buscando cada una de las ubres de la nube fecunda [pág. 183]; La mejilla de la tierra se ha cubierto del bozo de las hierbas [pág. 156].

En los dos últimos ejemplos hay una superposición de imágenes (flores-recentales, tierra-rostro, hierbas-bozo) que no aparece en Juan Ruiz. Pero éste hace del objeto algo activo y animado, y recela así su familiaridad poética con los moros; sus vitalizaciones son muy distintas de la abstracta personificación usual en la alegoría medieval europea. Al Amor

> rescíbenlo los árboles con ramos e con flores...
> rescíbenlo los omes e dueñas con amores...,
> el rabé gritador, con la su alta nota...
> La viuela de arco faz dulces devailadas... [1226-31].

Un frenesí verbal e imaginativo anima el estilo de Juan Ruiz, perfecta simbiosis artística de la tradición cristiana y de la árabe. Personas, animales y cosas conviven en una armonía poéticamente fecunda:

> Sey como la paloma, limpio e mesurado;
> sey como el pavón, loçano, sosegado [563].

La tendencia a animar cualquier objeto de la fantasía, lleva a concebirlo como expresión de sí mismos, como siendo realización de su propio existir, no como narrados o descritos desde fuera de ellos:

> Vino el cabrón montés, con corços e torcazas,

[10] La tendencia a equiparar el sujeto y el objeto es funcional en la poesía árabe y es auténtico aspecto de la estructura del vivir árabe:

"El corazón se vuelca por entero en favor [de los versos], y ellos se adentran en el corazón sin permiso."

"El amor está cansado de recorrer la distancia que nos separa, y de viajar de él hasta mí y de mí hasta él."

"Yo le hice caer [al vino] en mi boca, y él me ha hecho caer a mí" (*ibid.*, págs. 121, 136).

El tema del amor, por consiguiente, es expresión de la realidad del mundo en que el hombre se mueve; unifica en existencia lo que el pensamiento occidental unifica como esencia objetivada. La realidad en esta poesía se manifesta en la niveladora reciprocidad del sujeto y del objeto. Pero como ocasionalmente hubo ciencia de tradición helénica entre los árabes, algún verso de un desconocido poeta reaccionó contra la creencia habitual: "Los ojos tienen por diminuto al astro; pero la culpa de la pequeñez es del ojo y no del lucero" (pág. 124).

de ziendo *sus* bramuras e muchas amenazas [1091].[11]
Vino *su* paso a paso el buey, viejo lindero [1091].

El pulpo a los pavones non les dava vagar...
como *tiene* muchas manos, con muchos puede lidiar [1116].

Cada persona y cada animal existe según la condición y la posibilidad ínsitas en ellos: el andaluz fantaseando y dejándose seducir por el amor, el toledano siendo austero, y el pulpo luchando con sus numerosos tentáculos.[12] La vivificación del "dentro" lleva a presentar a personas y cosas realizándose en el "fuera" de su trabajo vital—doña Endrina, don Carnal, el buey, el pulpo, o los instrumentos de música. Y así está visto el *Libro* mismo, que vive mientras irradia sus versos bellos y ... "extraños" según su autor.

Seguro en cuanto a su fe cristiana, el autor discurre, al mismo tiempo, por los caminos literarios de los moros españoles, no muy seguros en cuanto a los límites entre unas cosas y otras. De ahí que "bueno" y "loco" amor reciproquen sus valores, y que el *Libro* pretenda dar lecciones de ambos; de ahí que nunca se sepa con claridad qué se dice en broma, y qué en serio. El "buen amor" de Dios se vuelve así el de Trotaconventos:

Por amor de la Vieja e por dezir razón,
Buen Amor dixe al libro [933],

lo cual ni es chiste, ni deja de serlo, porque no podemos aplicar a esta obra nuestros criterios racionales de hoy acerca de lo que es razón, comicidad y seriedad. Proponiéndoselo o no, la transposición a la zona románica de España de las formas de la imaginación y de la sensibilidad árabes producía efectos humorísticos o cómicos—se prestaba en todo caso a producirlos. ¿Cómo hubiera sido posible, por otra parte, que un escritor castellano poetizara en serio acerca del amor como impulso vital, a la vez delicioso y arriesgado? Para corregir nuestra perspectiva en este caso conviene tener presente algunas muestras de lo que se había poetizado y pensado sobre ello en la España árabe, abierta, sin duda alguna, al conocimiento de los cristianos.

Los textos árabes, como cualquier otra realidad, poseen sentido

[11] El *cabrón*, animal muy lujurioso, vino diciendo *bramuras* (no simplemente "bramando"); dice a Don Carnal que si *enlaza* con él a Doña Cuaresma, "non te podrá empescer con todas sus espinaças" (1091), frase que, como en otros casos, hay que completar con la imagen de una situación no expresada: Doña Cuaresma es una bruja que puede tener trato carnal con un cabrón.

[12] "El que conoce a fondo lo que son los temperamentos o complexiones morales de los hábitos humanos, así los laudables como los vituperables, sabe perfectamente que nadie es libre o capaz de hacer algo diferente de lo que hace, es decir, de lo que Dios crea en él... El hombre de feliz memoria no puede menos de recordar, como el de memoria torpe no puede menos de olvidar" (Ibn Hazm, *Historia crítica de las religiones*, trad. Asín, III, 277).

esotérico, lo cual guarda armonía con la posición total del musulmán frente al mundo y frente a su vida. Se comprende así que las ideas de la secta de los bātinīya, apegada al sentido oculto de los textos sagrados, penetraran en la literatura. Al-Mu'tamid, rey de Sevilla, roció con agua de rosas el cuerpo de una concubina, y un poeta dijo sobre ello: "Los rasgos de su belleza son seductores, y su piel es de extremada delicadeza: casi se podría percibir lo que es el interior (bātin) por el exterior (zahīr)."[13]

Dice Ibn Moqaffa' en su prólogo a *Calila e Dimna*, que los sabios de la India y de otras partes buscaron medios "para manifestar al exterior sus razonamientos," y por eso hicieron hablar a los animales salvajes. La ventaja de tal procedimento era "decir *encobiertamente* lo que querían," y fomentar así el gusto por la filosofía (i.e., el saber acerca de la conducta humana), habituando la mente a descubrir lo interior tras lo exterior, sin lo cual ningún saber es provechoso: "si omne levase nuezes sanas con sus cascas, non se puede dellas aprovechar fasta que las parta e saque dellas lo que en ellas *yaze*." El saber aquí vale menos como conocimiento que como guía para la acción, porque "el saber es como el árbol, e la obra es la fruta; *e el sabio non demanda el saber sinon por aprovecharse dél*" (pág. 7). No versa tal saber sobre la naturaleza sino sobre el vivir del hombre; su meta es la valoración de la conducta, y no trazar normas absolutas y rígidamente objetivables. Recordemos que en el Islam no hay separación entre la ley jurídica y la ley religiosa, y que Ibn Hazm mezcla el amor humano y su restricción moral. Vivir es caminar entre símbolos de símbolos; no entre apaeriencias de sustancias, sino entre "sesos" o significaciones.

Por este motivo los juegos de palabras en árabe son algo más que figuras retóricas o adornos supletorios; los juegos de los niños no son distracción, son su ocupación normal. Una forma de palabra se desliza en otra, como la figura negra de la pared se deslizaba en el color negro del hijo que tiene la mujer blanca. Un título de un libro reza: *Libro peregrino* (mugrib) *sobre las galas del Occidente* (Magrib)."[14]

La estructura del Libro consiste en una continua e interna transición

La acogida adversa o favorable que Don Amor recibe en diversos lugares de España no está enjuiciada como pecado o como virtud sino presentada como un acontecer. Por las confidencias de don Amor,

[13] H. Perès *Poésie andalouse*, pág. 405.

[14] Ver Dámaso Alonso, "Poesía arábigo-andaluza y poesía gongorina," en *Al-Andalus*, VIII (1943), 147, y E. García Gómez, traducción de *El libro de las banderas de los campeones*, pág. 121, para otro hecho análogo: "Versos (*šiʿr*) que sobrepasan en esplendor a Sirio (*al-Šiʿra*)."

hechas "con sospiro e como con coidado" (1303) al personaje que en el *Libro* se expresa, sabemos de sus andanzas:

> en la invernada visité a Sevilla,
> toda el Andaluzía, que non fincó y villa;
> allí toda persona de grado se me omilla,
> andando mucho vicioso, quanto fué maravilla [1304].

Don Amor dice, pues, que los andaluces eran sensuales, y antes se nos dijo que eran fantasiosos: "tomé senda por carrera, como faz el andaluz" (116). El éxito o el fracaso de Don Amor no va ligado a un propósito moral, pues depende de la condición de quienes se enfrentan con él, o sea, del modo en que el autor los caracteriza (tal caracterización era un hecho nuevo en la literatura española). Para hacer sufrir a Don Amor los rigores de la austeridad cuaresmal el poeta eligió la gente toledana; pocos lo recibieron, y, en cambio, vino a él

> mucha dueña, de mucho ayuno *magra*,
> con muchos pater nosters e con mucha oración *agra* [1306].

Las oraciones, aunque *agras* y dichas por mujeres *magras*, ahuyentaron al malquisto visitante:

> echáronme de la cibdad por la puerta de Visagra [1306].

Para consolarse de tanto desvío marchó Don Amor a Castro Urdiales, al puerto de mar desde donde la rigurosa Doña Cuaresma había iniciado su ofensiva (1073):

> Fui tener la cuaresma a la villa de Castro,
> recibiéronme muy bien a mí e a mi rastro [séquito] [1311],

lo cual prueba que no fué la cuaresma el motivo para el mal trato recibido antes por Don Amor. El motivo hay que buscarlo en el ritmo alternado de cuanto en el libro acontece. La moral, como todo lo demás, se subordina a la estructura de transición y deslizamiento en que el *Libro* consiste. La vida es aquí impulso y movimiento reiterado, no una sucesión de contenidos cerrados y fijos. El estilo cambiante y translaticio se manifesta en ciertas palabras, en la reiteración del relato, en el paso del amor a la austeridad, o de Doña Cuaresma vencedora a Doña Cuaresma fugitiva.

En la pelea de Doña Cuaresma y Don Carnal, el ciervo ofrece a éste sus servicios:

> Ahevos ado viene muy ligero el *ciervo*:
> "omíllome"—díz—"señor, yo el tu leal *siervo*,
> por te fazer servicio, ¿non fui por ende *siervo*?" [1089]

En la copla 121 la palabra *cruz* es, a la vez, nombre de persona y

nombre del símbolo santo ante el cual un cristiano se arrodillaba y santiguaba: "Cuando la *Cruz* veía, yo siempre me omillava."[15] En un pasaje importante para la intelección total del *Libro,* el autor juega con la alternancia entre *miente* y *verdat, pintadas* y *puntos:*

> Las del Buen Amor son razones encubiertas:
> trabaja do fallares las sus señales ciertas.
> Si la razón entiendes, o en el seso aciertas,
> non dirás mal del libro que ahora rehiertas [repruebas].
> Do coidares que *miente,* dize mayor *verdat;*
> en las coplas *pintadas* yaze la falsedat;
> dicha o buena o mala, por *puntos* la juzgat;
> las coplas con los *puntos,* load o denostat.
> De todos instrumentos yo, libro, so pariente;
> bien o mal, cual *puntares,* tal te dirá ciertamente;
> cual tú dezir quisieres, í faz *punto* y tente;
> si me *puntar* supieres, siempre me avrás en miente [68-70].

Pintadas significa "coloradas, falsificadas";[16] la forma de la palabra suscitó *puntos,* los usados en los libros de música para notar la melodía y el modo de tocarla o cantarla; de ahí *puntar* o *puntear* un instrumento de cuerda. El sentido técnico de *punto* me interesa ahora menos que la comparación del libro con un instrumento musical, como consecuencia de haberse deslizado el *punto* del libro de música en el *puntar* del instrumento, todo ello iniciado en el contraste *miente-verdat,* y en los múltiples sentidos inherentes en *coplas pintadas* "falseadas." Los sentidos del *Libro* variarán como las reacciones de las gentes de Sevilla, Toledo o Castro Urdiales frente a Don Amor. El autor juega con ello deliciosamente, e invita al lector a entrar en el juego. Conociendo esta obra, resultaría pueril dar sentido lógico a las palabras *miente* y *verdat,* y buscarles un contenido firme y objetivo. El autor no se lo ha dado, y al pretender buscarlo algunos falsean su obra totalmente, pues insisto en que los versos antes citados no encierran ningún sentido cerrado y objetivable. "Señales *ciertas,* mayor *verdat*" flotan en un inasible aire poético lo mismo que "miente, pintadas, cual puntares." Ni cabe dar ningún sentido preciso a "siempre me avrás en miente." ¿Qué vamos a guardar en la mente? Las palabras y lo que dicen flotan en un aire de *ballet,* en el cual se nos invita a participar: "cual tú dezir quisieres, í faz punto y tente." Que cada uno, pues, se detenga en su verdad... poética, de instrumento musical. Ya es significativa la correlación fónica entre "do coidares que *miente*" y "siempre me avrás en *miente.*"

[15] El nombre de la muchacha, *Cruz Cruzada* (116), era ya un deslizamiento de su nombre, una reiteración de sí misma, ampliada.

[16] Cf. el antiguo francés *peint,* "fingido, falso."

Al Arcipreste no le interesaba la verdad que buscaban los glosadores de la Biblia o de los textos legales.[17] Lo que claramente dice es que el *Libro* es como esos instrumentos que describe y anima en varios lugares de su cancionero, un instrumento creador de fluencias abiertas y reiterables, tan unidas al arte del poeta como al gusto interpretativo del lector. El Amor (¿loco?, ¿bueno?) es, por lo mismo, más una incitación reiterada, que una ocasión para dogmatismos moralizantes, incompatibles en absoluto con el tono y estilo de la obra. Las personas aman o desaman; los animales corren, luchan o nadan; los instrumentos tañen. Y el, lector, a su vez, ha de tañer el libro e interpretarlo. ¿Cómo? Juan Ruiz no lo dice; únicamente le interesa el movimiento interpretativo como tal, como función movediza y deslizante:

> Non tengades que es libro necio, de devaneo,
> nin tengades que es chufa algo que en él leo...
> El axenuz, de fuera más *negro* es que caldera:
> es de dentro muy *blanco*, más que la peña vera;
> *blanca* farina está so *negra* cobertera,
> açúcar *negro* e *blanco* está en vil cañavera [16-8].

Esta admonición entra, como todo lo restante, en la fluencia del *Libro*, y es reiterada una y otra vez,[18] aunque nunca diga el autor: "esto es bueno, y esto es malo" en modo claro y decisivo—y en serio, y sin contradecirse unas líneas más tarde. El pasaje citado ha de entenderse en concordancia con estos otros:

> A la raçón primera tornóle la pelleja...
> De *prieto* fazen *blanco*, volviéndole la pelleja [827, 929].
>
> Vid *blanca* fazen *prieta* buenos enxeridores [1281];
>
> Enxería los árboles con *ajena corteza* [1291].

Lo negro y lo blanco, la corteza propia del árbol y la corteza ajena no son mejores unos que otros, sino aspectos de la transición y alternancia de que son indicio. El injerto, los colores opuestos, mantienen viva y en eficaz movimiento la estructura del *Libro*; le son necesarios y poseen así auténtica validez artística. Salta a la vista la diferencia entre

[17] No cabe tampoco comparar a Juan Ruiz con los poetas provenzales del *trobar clus* (poesía cerrada a la fácil comprensión); aquellos adornaban y enrevesaban su arte para alejarse de la poesía de tono fácil y ligero *(trobar leu)*. Los enigmas de aquella oscura poesía no eran funcionales, no enlazaban con la estructura interior de la obra. El poeta, por lo demás, declaraba conocer la clave de los enigmas que proponía al lector: "Si alguien quiere replicar a este verso, yo no te dejaré de defender, verso, y de decir por qué me he permitido poner en ti tres palabras de diverso sentido" (tres motz de divers sens) (Alegret, en A. Jeanroy, *Jongleurs et troubadours*, pág. 6; Martín de Riquer, *La lírica de los trovadores*, pág. 133).

[18] Véanse coplas 46, 65, 67, 443, 892, 904, 908, 986, 1390, 1631.

esta forma poética y la de las disputas medievales entre el alma y el cuerpo, el agua y el vino o el clérigo y el caballero, pues los términos en ellas opuestos son sustancias fijas, no cualidades adjetivas o situaciones fluyentes y reversibles. Al Arcipreste le atrae lo movible y transmutable, en las plantas, en las pieles o en los amores. La muchacha *Cruz* se vuelve una *cruz*, del mismo modo que pasa de su primero a su segundo amador. El *Libro*, abierto en su fluir cambiante, proyecta esa su propiedad estructural en el vivir de quien lo lee:

> ... Faré
> punto a mi librete, mas *non lo cerraré*.
> Buena *propiedat* ha do quier que sea,
> que si lo oye alguno que tenga *mujer fea*,
> o si mujer lo oye que su marido vil sea,
> fazer a Dios servicio en punto lo desea.
> Desea oir misas e fazer oblaciones,
> desea dar a pobres bodigos e raciones [1626-8].

Así pues, tener mujer linda dispensaría de ir a misa; aunque más exacto sería pensar que el lector, de no piadoso, se hace piadoso, en virtud del mismo ritmo vital antes observado: "Vid blanca fazen prieta buenos enxeridores" (1281). Sólo que en este caso el "enxeridor" es el impulso irradiante del *Libro* vuelto y volvedor.

Por todo lo cual no me limitaría a llamar paronomasia, o juego de palabras, el deslizamiento del nombre de persona *Cruz* en el nombre común *cruz*; vería en ello un signo más de la estructura formal del *Libro*; a la luz de tal idea podemos recorrerlo desde uno a otro extremo sin perdernos en su, a primera vista, informe laberinto. Porque la transición consiste, en ocasiones, en brincar desde la palabra a la imagen no expresada de algo relacionado con aquélla. Por ejemplo: al decir *liebre*, para designar al animal que acude "presta e ligera" al alarde bélico (1090), salta el poeta a la imagen de una vestidura forrada con pieles de liebre, las cuales transmiten la sarna y pueden causar diviesos a quien roce con las tales pieles su cuello; la liebre entonces, hablando como animal vivo y como si ya fuese su futuro pellejo convertido en indumento, promete a Don Carnal comunicar sarna y diviesos a la vieja Doña Cuaresma. Cuando esos diviesos se revienten, la Vieja sufrirá tanto que "más quisiera pasar a ser yo, liebre, y a meterse en mi pelleja—a deslizar su existencia en la mía." La transición forma así un ciclo progresivo-regresivo, convertible y reversible. Con lo cual comprenderemos el hasta ahora ininteligible pasaje:

> Vino presta e ligera al alarde la liebre:
> "Señor,"—diz—"a la dueña yo le metré la fiebre;
> darle he sarna e diviesos que de lidiar non se miembre:
> más querría mi pelleja cuando alguno le quiebre" [1090].

El desdoble interior, en la fantasía, del animal presente como unidad en un *yo* o un *él* que habla o se mueve, presta vivacidad y encanto muy extraños a la obra de Juan Ruiz, muy distinta del alegórico *Roman de la Rose* de Guillaume de Lorris, o de la *Bataille de Caresme et de Charnage*. En nuestro *Libro*, la visión del animal expresado ha de integrarse en la aureola metafórica, aunque tácita, que lo ilumina. La ballena atacó a Don Carnal: "abraçóse con él, echólo en la arena" (1120). ¿Quiere decir esto que la ballena lo derribó en la arena con sus *brazos*? En modo alguno. Hay, desde luego, un abrazo metafórico, pero la realidad poética es que la ballena se encuentra, a la vez, en la orilla y en el mar, abrazando a Don Carnal y teniéndolo en su vientre como a otro Jonás, para luego lanzarlo en la orilla: "et evomuit Jonam in aridam" (*Jonas*, II, 11). *El Libro de Buen Amor* es, en tales casos, la primera manifestación de lo que un día será la poesía de Góngora.

La simultánea estancia en el mar y en la tierra—la una expresa y la otra tácita—se repite en el caso de las anguilas:

> De parte de Valencia venían las anguillas,
> salpresas e trechadas, a grandes manadillas:
> davan a Don Carnal por medio de las costillas;
> las truchas de Alverche dávanle en las mexillas [1105].

Como en el caso de la liebre, las anguilas, están muertas y vivas, lo mismo que Don Carnal está en la tierra y nadando en el agua, y como antes estaba la ballena. Se halla, además, en el mar de Valencia y a la vez en el río Alberche, vestido y desnudo; en otro caso, las anguilas no le darían "por medio de las costillas." La trucha brincadora le pega en la cara, que lleva fuera del agua. Poco después la *lixa*, con su "muy duro cuero, con mucho garavato, / a costados e a piernas dávales negro rato" (1109); la piel rasposa de la lija no habría causado mucho mal a una persona vestida.

Se pasa del pez en el mar al pez en la tierra; habla el poeta en primera persona en el episodio de sus amores con doña Endrina (596-891) y esa persona se convierte en don Melón de la Huerta (738) y luego en don Melón Ortiz (881). Escapa el poeta a la fantasía de imaginarse en amores con doña Endrina ("dixela por te dar ensiempro, non porque a mí avino"[19]—909), para inmediatamente infundir su conciencia de hombre de carne y hueso en la conciencia de otro ente di ficción:

> Siendo yo después de esto sin amor e *con cuidado*,
> vi una apuesta dueña seer en su estrado:
> mi coraçón en punto levómelo forçado [910].

El *cuidado* es la fuerza que impulsa a la actividad transiente del vivir,

[19] El poeta había seguido, en efecto, en sus líneas generales el diálogo *Pamphilus*, versificado en latín en el siglo XII. Véase la edición de Eugène Evesque, en *La "Comédie" latine en France au XII^e siècle*, II (Paris, 1931).

sentido por Juan Ruiz como un *salir de* para *entrar en*, sea cual fuere el motivo o la ocasión:

> Pues que de penitencia vos fago mención,
> repetir vos querría una buena lición [1131].

Lo cual lleva a pensar en la persona de quien ha de dar la lección:

> Esme cosa muy grave en tan grand fecho fablar...
> so rudo e sin ciencia[20] non me oso aventurar...
> escolar so mucho rudo, nin maestro nin doctor [1133, 1135].

De lo espiritual e invisible se pasa a lo material y visible. No basta con arrepentirse dentro de la conciencia, porque la Iglesia no tiene acceso a aquélla. Hace, pues, falta pasar del dentro del alma al fuera del cuerpo; el penitente "es menester que faga, por gestos y gemido, / signos de penitencia... sospiros dolorosos, muy triste sospirando... de los ojos llorando... la cabeça enclinando" (1138-9). Hay clérigos ignorantes que absuelven de sus pecados a quienes no son sus feligreses; el autor lo dice como algo general y abstracto, como una regla de derecho canónico. Mas de ahí pasa de golpe a la visión de una realidad concreta y tangible, para ejemplificar lo anterior:

> ¿Qué poder ha en Roma el juez de Cartagena,
> o qué juzgará en Francia el alcalde de Requena? [1146].

Esta frase, de un cómico sin precedente en España, enlaza, sin embargo, de modo normal con el estilo de entrar y salir, de subir y bajar, en el cual el *Libro* se funda y arquitectura. La fluencia y la transición son funcionales, y así carece de fijeza rigurosa la frontera entre el amor santo y el amor loco,[21] entre lo serio y lo burlesco, entre lo abstracto-genérico y lo concreto-sensible.

Precisaré bien que los términos de estos contrastes pueden hallarse en otras obras de la Europa cristiana, en las cuales coexisten la broma y la seriedad, la virtud y el pecado; pero en la obra de Juan Ruiz las posiciones extremas que señalo surgen como continuo deslizamiento de la una en la otra, según he hecho ver en los textos citados antes. Nos explicaremos ahora que aunque Juan Ruiz tome asuntos y motivos de la literatura juglaresca de Europa, éstos adquieran un sentido muy singular dentro del *Libro de Buen Amor*.

Conclusión

La relación que establezco entre la obra de Ibn Hazm y la de Juan

[20] Ya había dicho Brunetto Latino al comienzo de *Li Livres dou Tresor* (escrito entre 1262 y 1266): "Et si ne di je pas que cist livres soit estarais de mon *poure sens*, ne de ma *nue science*" (Y así no digo yo que este libro haya salido de mi pobre inteligencia, desnuda de ciencia).

[21] Dice Juan Ruiz: "Si algunos... quisieren usar del loco amor aquí fallarán algunas maneras para ello" (ed. Ducamin, pág. 6).

Ruiz en mi libro *España en su historia* y en las páginas anteriores, es una relación de estructura, no de contenido. Así está presente el *Quijote* en el *Tartarin*, de Daudet, o en *El Idiota, Le Rouge et le Noir, Madame Bovary*, etc.

E. García Gómez ha escrito unas excelentes páginas al frente de su admirable versión de *El collar de la paloma*, que ya era hora apareciese en español. En ellas se refiere amablemente a mis trabajos históricos, y a mi estudio del Arcipreste de Hita. De una parte asiente: "Creo, como Castro, que en la obra del Arcipreste hay muchísmos elementos árabes" (pág. 55); de otra, declara que "*El collar de la paloma* y el *Libro de buen amor* me siguen pareciendo obras distintas" (pág. 52). A mí también, y nunca he dicho otra cosa. Como no soy arabista, no he hecho incursiones en su campo, ni me he convertido "a las tesis árabes" (pág. 50), ni adoptado "las conclusiones de los arabistas españoles" (pág. 51). No me preocupa la cuestión de si la poesía provenzal deriva o no de la árabe, ni aspiro a realzar ni a rebajar la importancia de ninguna literatura. Estoy tratando de determinar con algún rigor qué sean, o cómo sean las gentes hispanas, y de poner sentido inteligible en el término "español." He hecho ver que los visigodos no pueden ser llamados españoles, y que éstos empiezan a manifestarse en conexión con la empresa de la Reconquista, y como una textura ya cristiano-islámica. La figura de esa vida no coincide ni con la de Toledo en el siglo VI, ni con la de Córdoba en el X. Sería absurdo pretender desgarrar tal complejo de vida en dos sociedades distintas, pues los hispano-cristianos de la Reconquista son como son por haberse forjado aquella su especial vida en lucha y convivencia con los musulmanes. Lo seguro es que los hispano-cristianos de los siglos X y XI (época en que he situado el origen de quienes hoy aparecen como españoles) no eran ya como los súbditos de los reyes visigodos. He hecho ver claramente la motivación islámica de la creencia en Santiago, de la guerra santa, de la tolerancia, del hecho de llamarse los nobles *fijosdalgo*, etc.

En el mismo sentido hablo de la presencia de *El collar de la paloma* en el *Libro de buen amor;* las anteriores páginas reiteran y aclaran lo dicho en mi *España en su historia*. No era fácil entender la peculiar estructura de la obra del Arcipreste insistiendo tercamente en su carácter cristiano-europeo, sin observar cómo funciona su contenido y sin preguntarse por las posibilidades de tal funcionamiento. Los lectores, algunos, reaccionan como quienes se niegan a reconocer que, sin el *Quijote*, no existiría la llamada novela moderna. De ahí que yo vaya prefiriendo decir "Literatura cotrastada" en lugar de "Literatura comparada."

Careciendo de antecedentes en que apoyarme, he tenido que hacer comprensible en alguna forma la existencia de analogías entre las obras

de Juan Ruiz y de Ibn Hazm. El *Libro de buen amor* es un despliegue de experiencias amorosas, reiteradas y fluyentes, centradas en una voz que va relatándolas, voz de una conciencia que deambula por varios personajes, en progreso y regreso constantes, en alternancia de tono más y menos poético (como en una *maqāma*), de tensión ascética y tensión erótica. Unos mismos tipos, propios de la literatura árabe, aparecen en ambas obras: el mensajero infiel, el guardián de la mujer, el mesturero, el divulgador del secreto, etc. El acorde de la ilusión y el desengaño dan a ambas obras un ritmo homogéneo; en ambas, la visión de la realidad es como he hecho ver en las anteriores páginas. Podría añadir muchas más. ¿Para qué? Si alguien no percibe de golpe el enlace entre *Madame Bovary* y el *Quijote*, es inútil insistir. ¿Cómo demostrar que la pobre Emma, sin jamelgo y sin lanza, debe su existencia literaria a haber reencarnado en ella Flaubert, genialmente, la figura del Hidalgo de la Mancha?[22]

Princeton University

[22] Rafael Lapesa me ha hecho el favor de leer las pruebas de este artículo y de hacer alguna atinada sugestión.

FICINO AND THE PLATONISM OF THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE

SEARS JAYNE

EVERY student of Sidney and Spenser or Colet and More knows roughly what is meant by the "Platonism" of the English Renaissance; the frequent recurrence of "Platonic" themes is one of the distinctive characteristics of sixteenth-century English literature. But neither Renaissance nor modern authorities like to be held to a precise definition of that Platonism.

For Renaissance authorities[1] there is no such thing as "Platonism"—there are only "Platonists"; and the term "Platonist" is applied equally to such diverse thinkers as Plato and Proclus, Macrobius and Apuleius. For the Renaissance, Platonism included every authority in the long history of the Platonic tradition from Zoroaster to Pico.

Modern critics,[2] on the other hand, have not always been careful to distinguish the Platonism of a More from the Platonism of a Spenser, and the result is that we commonly think of the Platonism of the English Renaissance as being really a flurry of interest in Neoplatonic metaphysics caused primarily by the Florentine Platonist, Marsilio Ficino.[3] According to this traditional explanation, English writers had to acquire their knowledge of Platonism from the continent because there was no formal school of Platonism in England; and, since the most influential Platonist on the continent was Ficino, he must have been widely read in England. The Neoplatonic coloring, according to this view, is a natural consequence of the fact that Ficino himself interpreted Plato as a Neoplatonist. This explanation of Ficino's responsibility for the Plato-

[1] See, e.g., the authors mentioned on pp. 221-222 below.

[2] There are four studies of the Platonic Renaissance in England: J. S. Harrison, *Platonism in English Poetry of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York, 1903); Kurt Schroeder, *Platonismus in der englischen Renaissance* (Berlin, 1920); Ernst Cassirer, *Die platonische Renaissance in England* (Leipzig, 1932); Friedrich Dannenberg, *Das Erbe Platons in England* (Berlin, 1932). Also helpful is W. F. Schirmer's *Antike, Renaissance, und Puritanismus* (Munich, 1924).

[3] As an example of the view see J. S. Harrison, *Platonism in English Poetry*, preface: "The idea of Platonism which these poets had was that which Ficino had made known to Italy of the fifteenth century, and from Italy to the rest of Europe." Ficino's influence has been qualified, of course, with respect to several individual authors, especially Spenser.

nism of the English Renaissance has usually been regarded as "a matter too generally agreed upon to need further comment."[4]

But, as Copernicus showed, the fact that a notion is "generally agreed upon" does not make it true, and this notion of Ficino's impact upon English Platonism does "need further comment."[5]

For one thing, the popularity of Platonism in English literature is an argument against rather than for the direct influence of Ficino; for the Platonism of the English Renaissance was a distinctly literary phenomenon, whereas Ficino himself was not a literary man but a physician, priest, and scholar. Though one can imagine a Spenser or a Chapman struggling through the commentary on the *Symposium* or even the *Theologia Platonica,* one can scarcely conceive the generality of English sonneteers and courtier-essayists deriving their Platonism from a source so esoteric. It would seem clear that Ficino must have had help in generating the popular literary Platonism of the English Renaissance.

The other principal argument for Ficino's influence, the Neoplatonic character of this Platonism, collapses when we realize that the Platonic tradition in England was not only strong but also basically Neoplatonic for centuries before Ficino was born. All mediaeval thought up to the twelfth century was Neoplatonic[6] rather than Aristotelian; and such popular authors of the Middle Ages as Augustine, Boethius, and the Pseudo-Dionysius[7] carried Christian Neoplatonism to England as they did to all other parts of Western Europe. The Chalcidius *Timaeus,* which was the basis of the Neoplatonic cosmology of the Middle Ages, was known in England at least as early as the tenth century. The most positive early contributions of individuals to English Platonism were probably those of John Scotus Erigena and Anselm of Canterbury, but the general association between English scholars and the Platonist schools at Chartres and Paris in the twelfth century firmly established the Neoplatonic tradition in English thought.[8] By the fourteenth cen-

[4] This is the view of Miss Irene Samuel, *Plato and Milton* (Ithaca, 1947), p. 42.

[5] The only comment in the most recent and authoritative study of Ficino is this: "In England John Colet shows some trace of Ficino's Platonism. But the Platonic trend, probably transmitted through French channels, becomes more tangible toward the end of the sixteenth century in poets such as Spenser. The Cambridge Platonists, whose activity extends far into the seventeenth century, carry on the philosophical tradition of the Florentines." P. O. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (New York, 1943), p. 19.

[6] See H. von Stein, *Sieben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus* (Göttingen, 1862); E. Hoffman, "Platonismus und Mittelalter," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1923-24), pp. 17-82; and R. Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages* (London, 1939).

[7] See Pierre Courcelle, *Les Lettres grecques en Occident* (Paris, 1943), and Paul Henry, *Plotin et l'Occident* (Louvain, 1934).

[8] This was first pointed out by John Burnet, "How Plato Came to England," *Essays and Addresses* (London, 1929). See also C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), and A. A. Clerval, *Les Écoles*

tury, Neoplatonism in the form of cosmological theory had become *materia litteris* and may be seen transmuted into poetry in such works as *The Cloud of Unknowing*[9] and *The Court of Sapience*. Even the unmetaphysical Chaucer acquired, through the influence of Alanus de Insulis, an interpretation of nature (as in the *Parliament of Fowles*) which goes back ultimately to the world soul of the Neoplatonic triad.[10] As for scholarly works, the general acceptance of Plato as a Neoplatonist in mediaeval England is seen in the Christian commentary on the *Phaedo* written about 1480 by the English humanist, John Doget. In this work Doget uses all the standard Neoplatonic authorities known to the Middle Ages—Plotinus as quoted in St. Augustine, Porphyry as translated by Boethius (the *Isagogue*), Apuleius' *De Deo Socratis*, the Pseudo-Dionysius, and the Hermetica.[11] Any work of literature in the English Renaissance involving theological or cosmological Platonism would probably have had all the marks of Neoplatonism even if Ficino had never lived.

I

What, after all, is the evidence of Ficino's direct influence in England? The evidence lies mainly in the works of five English authors: Colet, Spenser, Raleigh, Chapman, and Burton.

According to Erasmus, John Colet made his first acquaintance with Plato through Ficino's translation.[12] It is, moreover, at least possible that Colet heard Ficino lecture in Italy.[13] Colet's friend and teacher, Grocyn, owned a copy of Ficino's commentary on the *Symposium*;[14] and

---

de Chartres du moyen âge au XV^e-XVI^e siècle (Chartres, 1895).

[9] See D. J. McCann's 1924 edition. On Platonism in Chaucer and other Middle English authors, see R. R. Purdy's Vanderbilt dissertation, *The Platonic Tradition in Middle English Literature* (1943).

[10] See Purdy's dissertation and E. G. Knowlton, "Nature in Middle English Literature," *JEGPH*, XX (1921), 186-207.

[11] Cited by R. Weiss, *Humanism in England during the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 164-166, from an unpublished Oxford dissertation of Miss H. D. Hurnard, *Studies in Intellectual Life in England* (1935). See also *Abstracts of Dissertations for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Oxford*, VII (1936), 36-44.

[12] Erasmus, *Opera*, III, 456A, cited by J. H. Lupton, *Life of John Colet* (London, 1887), p. 43.

[13] See Lupton's *Life of Colet*, pp. 50-56, and his edition of Colet's *Treatises on the Hierarchies of Dionysius*, pp. xvi and xviii. Lupton suggests, however, that Robert Gaguin, ambassador in England of Charles VII and correspondent of Ficino and Pico, was a likely source of Colet's knowledge of these Neoplatonists.

[14] See catalogue of Grocyn's library in *Oxford Historical Society Collectanea*, II, 319-380; this library contained a copy of Ficino's commentaries on the *Symposium* and *Timaeus*, a Greek Plotinus, Proclus' commentaries on the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, and a volume entitled *Platonis Definitiones* (probably a work of Speusippus).

it is certain that Colet knew Ficino's theological works at first hand, since he quotes from the *Theologia Platonica* and the *Dialogus inter Paulum et Animam*.[15] Colet explicitly compliments Ficino's Latinity,[16] but nowhere discusses his theology. As we shall see later, the two men used common sources for different purposes. Colet's contemporary reputation as a Platonist[17] was for the most part independently won. His debt to Ficino might be compared to the debt of a Shakespeare scholar who owed all of his initial enthusiasm but few of his mature scholarly insights to George Lyman Kittredge.

No English author was so much indebted to Ficino as Spenser. Spenser's borrowings from Ficino in the *Fowre Hymnes* and the *Faerie Queene* have been discussed and disputed at great length.[18] The plethora of sources claimed for the *Fowre Hymnes* shows that many of Ficino's theories were in the intellectual atmosphere and could have reached England in a number of indirect ways; but there are also in Spenser verbatim quotations and sequences of ideas unquestionably taken directly from Ficino. In addition, Spenser owed to Ficino another direct debt not apparent in parallel passages. He could have borrowed his Platonic method, as it appears in Book III of the *Faerie Queene*, for example, from some Platonist other than Ficino, e.g., Ramus; and he could have borrowed many of his Platonic themes, such as the mutability and appearance-reality themes, from other Platonists, such as Du Bellay and Benivieni; but there is one distinctly Ficinian idea which Spenser caught more completely and fully than any other Platonist whom he could have known—Ficino's Christian vision of Platonic love and beauty. Spenser saw this vision clearly enough even in his youth to expound it, somewhat academically, in the first two *Hymnes*; but he later made it his own and developed it in the second two *Hymnes* and in the *Faerie Queene* in such a way as only an intimate familiarity with Ficino could make possible.

Like Spenser, George Chapman had a poet's interest in Ficino; but Chapman also had a good deal of the amateur philosopher in him and was too eclectic ever to surrender himself wholeheartedly to the spirit of what Ficino was saying, as Spenser did. Chapman was most interested

[15] See Lupton's edition of Colet's *Hierarchies of Dionysius*, p. 36, note 1, and his *Life*, p. 52.

[16] See Lupton, *Life*, p. 52, note 1.

[17] Erasmus, for example, said in a letter, dated Dec. 5, 1498, to Robert Fisher, "When I hear Colet it seems to me that I am hearing Plato himself." See P. S. Allen, *Selections from Erasmus* (Oxford, 1908), Epist. XIV.

[18] The most convenient summary of the evidence on this tangled problem is that in Appendix V of Vol. I of the variorum edition of Spenser's *Minor Poems*. Sources other than Ficino suggested for the *Fowre Hymnes* include Castiglione, Bruno, Bembo, Lucretius, Empedocles, Benivieni, Pico, Calvin, and others.

in Platonism in his early years, the period of his nondramatic poetry, when he seems to have thought of himself as composing under the influence of a Platonic *furor poeticus*.[19] He undoubtedly used Ficino's translation of the *Opera* of Plato, and used Ficino's appended commentaries as a paradise of dainty devices for the ornamentation of his own poems.[20] He rarely bothers to convert his thefts from Ficino's prose into poetic imagery; and the result is that, except for the rather ambitious allegory of "Ovid's Banquet of Sense" and "Andromeda Liberata,"[21] most of the borrowings from Ficino are simply stuck into his poems as cloves are stuck into a ham.

Of English prose writers, so far as quotation is concerned, by far the most indebted to Ficino are Robert Burton and Sir Walter Raleigh. Raleigh draws heavily upon Ficino's religious works in the *History of the World* (1614),[22] quoting and citing him extensively as an authority on morality and religion. Nowhere, however, does Raleigh appear to esteem Ficino as a Platonist. Burton, too, in the *Anatomy of Melancholy* disregards Ficino's reputation as a Platonist, calling him a "priest and a physician" and citing him along with Bright, Cardan, and Montanus as an authority on melancholy;[23] of all Ficino's writings Burton draws most heavily upon the medical work, *De Vita*. Both Burton and Raleigh borrow from Ficino's translation of the Hermetica, and both seem to regard the name of Ficino, like that of Plato or of Aristotle, as calculated to lend a note of authority to their own works; but neither author is interested in him as a Platonist.

In addition to these five authors known to have been directly influenced by Ficino, there are a few others, whose work suggests some direct influence. It would be surprising if there were no evidence of Ficino in the works of the man who took as his modest province all knowledge; and, in fact, Bacon did know something about Ficino's theory of beauty.[24] Ben Jonson also might be expected to have been familiar with

[19] See Leslie R. Rutledge, *George Chapman's Theory of the Soul and of Poetry* (Harvard diss., 1938); Nancy Pogrell, *Die philosophische-poetische Entwicklung George Chapmans* (Friedrichsen, 1939); and Margaret Bottrall, "Chapman's Defense of Difficulty in Poetry," *Criterion*, XVI (1937), 638-654.

[20] See especially F. L. Schoell, *Études sur l'humanisme continental en Angleterre* (Paris, 1926), chap. I, and the notes to "Ovid's Banquet of Sense," "Andromeda Liberata," and "Hymn to Our Saviour upon the Cross," in Phyllis B. Bartlett's edition of Chapman's *Poems* (New York, 1941).

[21] See Douglas Bush, *Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition in English Poetry* (Minneapolis, 1932), pp. 204, 212.

[22] In the 11th ed. (London, 1736), see, for example, pp. xxvi, 7, 8, 11, 12, *et passim*.

[23] Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith ed. (New York, 1930), pp. 28, 151.

[24] See A. P. McMahon, "Francis Bacon's Essay on Beauty," *PMLA*, LX (1945), 716-759. See also F. H. Anderson, *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (Chicago, 1948).

Ficino, at least with the commentaries on Plato; and there are some suggestions of Ficino's direct influence upon him in the symbolism of the masques.[25] The anonymous author of the moralization of the Narcissus story from Ovid (1560)[26] cites Ficino and Plato as authorities for part of his work; and Thomas Heywood mentions Ficino along with Moses and Tibullus in his *Troia Britanica* (1609).[27] He is quoted as an authority on human physiology by Henry Cuff in a surprisingly Platonic work entitled *The Differences of the Ages of Man's Life* (1607),[28] but neither this nor any later English work before the appearance of the Cambridge Platonists owes any appreciable direct debt to Ficino.

Quotations and parallel passages, however, are not the only evidences of direct influence. If Ficino was popular in England, we should expect to find publishers and booksellers trying to make money out of his popularity as they did in the cases of Pico, Castiglione, and Erasmus. Yet there is no recorded English edition of any of Ficino's own works or of his translations during the Renaissance.[29] John Dorne's list of books sold in 1520,[30] representative of the few booksellers' catalogues extant, includes 2,383 titles. One-ninth of these are works of Erasmus. Platonism is represented in the list by Porphyry (in Boethius' translation of the *Isagogue*), Pico, and Trapezund, but not by Ficino or even by Plato himself.

Translation is another sign of popularity; but, though Pico and Castiglione were translated into English during the Renaissance, Ficino and Plato were not.[31] The only Platonic dialogue translated into English during the Renaissance was the Pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, which ap-

[25] See D. J. Gordon, "The Imagery of Ben Jonson's 'The Masque of Blackness' and 'The Masque of Beauty,'" *Journal of the Warburg Institute*, VI (1943), 122-141. For more indirect influence, see W. Bang, "Ben Jonson and Castiglione's Il Cortegiano," *ES*, XXXIV (1906), 330-332, and J. L. Brown, "Bodin et Ben Jonson," *RLC*, XX (1940), 66-81.

[26] Printed in the Appendix to W. E. Buckley's edition of Thomas Edwards (Roxburghe Club, 1882). This work is usually attributed to Thomas Howell.

[27] Cited by Bush, *Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition*, p. 49.

[28] London, 1607, p. 77. Other authorities used in this work are mainly in the Platonic tradition—Proclus, Hugo of St. Victor, Trismegistus, Cicero, Alcinous, etc.

[29] See H. Palmer, *List of English Editions of the ... Classics* (London, 1911).

[30] *Oxford Historical Society Collectanea*, I, 73 ff.

[31] See Palmer, note 29 above; M. A. Scott, *Elizabethan Translations from the Italian* (Boston, 1916); and C. H. Conley, *The First English Translations of the Classics* (New Haven, 1929). On Pico, see note 58 below. Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano* (1526) was owned in England as early as 1530 and had been translated by Hoby by 1561. See Pearl Hogrefe, "Elyot and the Book Called Cortegiano in Ytalion," *MP*, XXVII (1930), 303-309.

peared in 1592 in a translation by one Edw. Spenser;[32] in 1612 John Brinsley was still complaining that there were no English translations of Plato for use in the schools.[33]

To be sure, all educated Englishmen could read Latin, and Ficino could have been read in any of a large number of continental editions.[34] Yet copies of these editions are relatively uncommon in surviving library catalogues of the period.[35] Though Ficino's earliest works were written about 1454, and all of his important translations and treatises had been published before he died in 1499, the earliest English library catalogue in which any of his works appear is the 1520 catalogue of William Grocyn's[36] library. Since Grocyn was one of the few Greek scholars in England in 1520, had spent three years in Italy (1488-91), and was himself an ardent Aristotelian, his ownership of two of Ficino's commentaries is scarcely indicative of Ficino's wide current popularity in England.

The work of Ficino most often found in English library catalogues of the period from 1520 on is his translation of the popular Hermes Trismegistus.[37] The first sure appearance of Ficino's Latin Plato is in the 1589 catalogue of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, the library used by Thomas Lupset.[38] Along with the Ficino Plato in this library is the first Plato in the Greek text (Aldine, Venice, 1513) and a copy of the 1578 Latin translation of the *Opera Platonis* by the French humanist, Serranus. This translation appears almost invariably along with Ficino's in the later catalogues of the period, and there are other evidences that Serranus' Plato was actually more popular in England than Ficino's. Ben Jonson's copy of Plato,[39] for example, was the Serranus translation; and, when Bacon spent five pounds for the "best edition" of Plato as a

[32] Claimed for Edmund Spenser and edited by F. M. Padelford (Baltimore, 1934). The attribution of a *Crito* to Nicholas Grimald by John Bale is incorrect. See Poole and Bateson's edition of Bale's *Index Britanniae Scriptorum* (Oxford, 1902), p. 303.

[33] John Brinsley, *Ludus Literarius* (London, 1627), p. 239.

[34] See P. O. Kristeller, *Supplementum Ficinianum* (Florence, 1939), I, lvi ff for complete bibliography.

[35] Of the many catalogues extant, about 150 are of significant value to us; the most complete published list to date is that in the *Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature*, I, 348-364.

[36] See note 14 above.

[37] See John Leland, *Collectanea de Rebus Britannicis* (London, 1770), IV, 15-21. The elaborate, ornamented entry, "Marsilus Ficinus," in the catalogue (*ca.* 1570) of a physician's library in Add. MS 28, 023 (fols. 98b-98a) is probably a reference to one of Ficino's medical works.

[38] See J. R. Liddell, "The Library of Corpus Christi College Oxford in the Sixteenth Century," *Library*, 4th Ser., XVIII (1938), 385-416. Ficino's Latin Plato was no doubt in England long before this, but catalogues are usually sketchy. The entry "Plato," for example, might mean the Cornarius edition of Basle, 1561, with Ficino's commentaries appended. See Fabricius, III, 130.

[39] See the list of Jonson's books in the Herford-Simpson edition of the *Works*, I, 266-267.

gift to St. Albans, it was the Serranus Plato which he bought.[40] In general, Ficino's translations of other authors, such as Psellus, Proclus, Iamblichus, and the Hermetica, seem to have been more popular in England than his Plato.[41]

It is not until after 1600, when most of the great Platonic prose and poetry has already been written, that Ficino's works begin to appear in any number or variety in English libraries; and even then they are far outnumbered by copies of Pico, Castiglione, Bembo, Leo Hebraeus, Romei, and even lesser *trattatisti d'amore* such as Diacceto and Della Barba.

What about the correspondence of the period? Though Ficino is not discussed in letters of the period as are Bruno and Erasmus, for example,[42] there is some evidence that he was highly regarded as a model of Latin epistolary style. His letters are quoted as models in William Fulwood's *Enemy of Idleness* (1568), and there is a separate volume of his letters in the 1589 catalogue in which his *Opera Platonis* appears.

The one further possible source of evidence of Ficino's popularity in England is in English works on moral philosophy and compendia of learning. The first English history of philosophy, by Thomas Stanley, was not published until 1655, and instead of Ficino's commentary on the *Symposium* Stanley selected Pico's "Discourse on Platonic Love"[43] to illustrate the meaning of Platonism. Before Stanley the standard histories of philosophy in England were three old collections of lives of the philosophers, by Diogenes Laertius, Walter Burley, and Eunapius. The Renaissance editors of Diogenes and Burley did not bother to bring them up to date with respect to Platonism, and the English translator of Eunapius (1579) confined his modernizations to a marginal note citing Ficino's translation of Plotinus.[44] The most popular English works on moral philosophy, such as Baldwin's *Treatise of Morall Philosophie* (1547), Heron's *Kayes of Counsaile* (1579), Crewe's *Nosegay of Morall Philosophie* (1580), and Pemble's *Summe of Morall Philosophie* (1635), quote all the ancient and mediaeval authorities, but

[40] Cited by T. W. Baldwin, *Shakespere's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke* (Urbana, 1944), I, 394.

[41] Frequently seen in the catalogues, for example, is the small anthology of Ficino's translations of these authors published at Venice in 1497, under the heading Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*, etc.

[42] Cf. for example, the Harvey-Spenser correspondence, where Castiglione is mentioned, but Ficino is not. Harvey himself owned a copy of Castiglione, but not, as far as we know, of Ficino. See list of Harvey's books in G. C. Moore Smith, *Gabriel Harvey's Marginalia* (Stratford-on-Avon, 1913), pp. 79-86.

[43] A long commentary on a *canzone* of Benivieni, of which there is an English translation in J. B. Fletcher, *The Religion of Beauty in Woman* (New York, 1911), pp. 116 ff., quoted below.

[44] London, 1579, p. 3a (STC 10566). For Burley see the edition of Hermann Kunst (Tübingen, 1886); for Diogenes see the Loeb edition.

never mention or use Ficino. The only books of this kind which show his influence are translations of French works, such as Bowe's translation (1586) of La Primaudaye's *L'Académie françoise* and Fenton's and Bryskett's translations of Pasquier's *Monophile*.

Compendia of miscellaneous learning, such as the popular *Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers* (1477), Alley's *Poore Mans Librarie* (1571), Taverner's *Garden of Wisdom* (1539), and the collections of Erasmus and Melanchthon, repeat all the well-known passages plundered during the Middle Ages from authors like Cicero and Augustine; there is no evidence in these works that Ficino had acquired any currency as a popular authority on any subject.

If any further proof is needed of the relative insignificance of Ficino's reputation in England, it may be seen in the contrasting vogue which he enjoyed in other countries during the Renaissance. His popularity in Italy, Hungary, and France has been studied;[45] it is enough to point out here that the same sources of information—literary borrowings, correspondence, library catalogues, publishing records, and the rest—which prove so barren in England have been found richly rewarding in other countries.

The evidence of Ficino's direct influence in England is clearly insufficient in itself to explain the great preoccupation of English authors with Renaissance Platonism, or to justify Ficino's reputation as the "fountainhead" of Platonism of the English Renaissance. If Ficino did not himself bring this Platonism into English literature, why do we find it there in such profusion, and why is it so much like his own? In order to answer these questions we must review the chronology of the so-called "Platonic Renaissance" in England and define as exactly as possible at every step of the way what we mean by "Platonism." In this way we may be able to distinguish between direct and indirect influences.

II

The "Platonic Renaissance" in England may be said to have begun in 1442 when Duke Humphrey of Gloucester received the first new Platonic dialogue seen in England for 300 years, Decembrio's Latin translation of the *Republic*.[46] If we begin in 1442 and list chronologically all the works of English literature which involve Platonism of one kind

[45] For Italy see especially T. F. Crane, *Italian Social Customs of the Sixteenth Century* (Ithaca, 1920), and Nesca Robb, *Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance* (London, 1935). For Hungary see J. Huszti, "Tendenze platonizzanti alla corte di Mattia Corvino," *CFI*, XI (1930), 1-37, 135-162, 220-236, 272-287. For France see W. Mönch, *Die italienische Platon-Renaissance* (Berlin, 1936), and especially A. Lefranc, "Le Platonisme et la littérature en France à l'époque de la Renaissance (1500-1550)," *Grands écrivains français* (Paris, 1914), pp. 63-137, and A. Renaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris* (Paris, 1916).

[46] For details, see Weiss, *Humanism*, pp. 54-85.

or another, we find that up to about 1570 we have listed prose works almost exclusively (chiefly those of Elyot, Ascham, Linacre, More, Colet, and Lupset). Between 1570 and about 1610, most of the Platonic works are poems (those of Spenser, Sidney, Drayton, *et al.*). After 1610 Platonism appears predominantly in dramatic works. Since these changes in literary form reflect corresponding changes in the character of the Platonism itself, it is convenient to think of Renaissance English Platonism in terms of a period of Platonic prose, a period of Platonic poetry, and a period of Platonic drama. These three periods we may now examine in some detail.

The Period of Platonic Prose

In general, the Platonism in early Tudor prose is either cosmological and Neoplatonic, as in Colet, or social and Socratic, as in More.

By cosmological Platonism I mean the ideas about the universe found in the *Timaeus*, but also the Neoplatonic expansion of those ideas which was used to reinforce Christian doctrine throughout the Middle Ages:[47] the idea that the universe is all one Being, that within that Being are various levels of existence, that everything on one level corresponds with something on every other level, and that there is therefore a hierarchy of being from man as animal through the ranks of angelic and celestial beings to God. This Neoplatonic conception which contributed so much to mediaeval assumptions about the unity and orderliness of the universe figures prominently in the theological works of men like Linacre and Colet, constituting what I have called their cosmological Platonism.

In Colet these Neoplatonic ideas are usually used for purposes of Biblical exegesis. Colet's interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, for example, in the *Letters to Radulphus*, hinges upon the Neoplatonic concept that creation was a continuous and intellectual process. In this work Colet's Platonism is an extension of mediaeval Platonism, a theological cosmology based jointly upon Christianity and Neoplatonism. But Colet was far better trained in the mysteries of Neoplatonism than any mediaeval authority. We have only to look at his commentaries on the treatises of the Pseudo-Dionysius to realize that his Platonism was mediaeval only in area; it was Renaissance in depth. His facility with Neoplatonic metaphysics reflects a knowledge of ancient as well as

[47] The typical attitude toward the relation between Plato and Christianity is reflected in the lines devoted to Plato in an early English encyclopaedia by William Alley, entitled *The Poore Mans Librarie* (1571): "This Plato was called Divinus Plato, for his excellent doctrine which doctrine conteyneth many thynges (as S. Austen sayth) which accorde with the holy Scriptures, so that in them is perceaved the first part of Genesis, unto this text. Spiritus domini inferebatur super aquas, and the mystery of the persons in the Divinitie is there expressed . . . he [Plato] lived sole and chaste (as S. Austen sayth)."

mediaeval authorities in the Platonic tradition. It was undoubtedly through Ficino that he knew of these ancient authorities; but he seems to have studied them from his own point of view, for he shows no inclination toward Ficino's own theories, which center in the doctrine of love. Colet was not, after all, interested in harmonizing Platonism and Christianity; he was interested in finding out what the Bible, and therefore the universe, really meant. It was typical of him that his first undertaking after returning from Italy was a new interpretation of St. Paul. From first to last his Platonism was the servant of his theology, and this is the reason that he found only one part of the Platonic tradition, the mediaeval, cosmological part, useful to him. A similar difference in the focus of their humanism separated most English theological writers of the period from Ficino. Like Colet, they tend to think of Ficino, not as having constructed a new philosophy, but merely as having repaired the foundation under an old one.

If Ficino had little influence on English theological writers, he had even less on men like More, whose humanism was oriented in society. To More, a vigorous man of affairs caught in the full stream of his country's troubles, the timid and sheltered recluse of Careggio could have had little to say. If we imagine More bringing to Plato's *Republic* his deep concern with English poverty, crime, and injustice and then turning to the back to read Ficino's brief and perfunctory commentary on that dialogue, we can see immediately the reason why the *Utopia* is indebted to Plato himself rather than to Ficino. The direct ethical emphasis of Socrates was perfectly suited to More's needs; the imaginative metaphysics of Ficino was not. As in the case of Starkey and Lupset, Ascham and Elyot, it was Plato's own version of his political and educational ideas which mattered, and their works are full of ideas drawn from the *Laws* and the *Republic*.[48] If they needed help in understanding Plato's views on the intellectual and aesthetic side of morality, or his concept of the philosopher king, or his picture of the possibilities for man in secular education, they got their help from Cicero, not Ficino; in the main their Platonism comes from Plato alone.

Even in this early prose the most significant influence of Ficino is to be found indirectly in the influence of his pupils and disciples. In the case of Colet and More, whom we have been discussing, the intermediary was Ficino's most famous pupil, Pico della Mirandola. Pico was learned enough to understand Ficino and versatile enough to attract both Colet and More. More regarded Pico as the perfect example of the Christian humanist, a man in whom the conflict between the

[48] For this kind of Platonism see Stob's University of Chicago dissertation, *Platonism in English Educators and Theologians of the Sixteenth Century* (1930), abstracted in *University of Chicago Theses*, Humanistic Series, VIII (1929-1930), 335-341.

Christian sense of sin and the Greek sense of beauty was happily resolved. He translated two of Pico's works and an Italian life of Pico,[49] and it was through Pico, if at all, that he felt the impact of Ficino's own sense of the oneness of Christianity and Platonism. Colet, too, was much impressed by the works of Pico, whose *Heptaplus* both parallels and inspires Colet's own attempts to apply Neoplatonic theory to practical exegesis. Again and again in England, Platonic ideas which struck no spark in Ficino's language caught fire in Pico's; if not Pico, it was Castiglione, or Bembo, or someone else, but always someone other than Ficino who made Ficino's influence felt in England. The pattern which we shall see in poetry and drama is already emerging in the period of Platonic prose, but at the end of this period Platonism in England was still mainly cosmological and theological as it had been throughout the Middle Ages, with some political and educational Platonism following upon the revival of the *Republic*.

The Period of Platonic Poetry

About 1570 a new Plato burst upon the English scene—not Plato the cosmologist or Plato the politician, but the Plato of the *Symposium*, Plato the apostle of love and beauty, of refinement and gentility, of art and poetry, of everything to which the "barbarous" English aspired in their scramble to catch up with the civilized continent. Coming to England in the art of Italy and France, the doctrine of idealized love and beauty found a hospitable reception in the art of England; in literature, masques, pageants, drama, painting, sculpture, in every mode of expression of the cultural life of England, Platonic love and beauty were a dominant theme for the next forty years.

In literature the principal form of expression was poetic. The newly literate courtiers of Elizabeth, finally reacting to the compulsions of the new continental doctrine that the courtier must be a poet as well as a gentleman, began busily filling their empty Petrarchan jars with the poetry of Platonic love and beauty. Sidney, Spenser, Davies, Greville, Daniel, Drayton, Chapman, Drummond, the Fletchers, Shakespeare—almost every poet of the period contributed to making it a "period of Platonic poetry." In this poetry of idealized love and beauty may be seen Ficino's distinctive influence in England. It is not that he made of Plato a Christian or a Neoplatonist, for Plato had been a Christian Neoplatonist, among other things, throughout the Middle Ages. Ficino's contribution was that he made of Plato a philosopher of love and beauty, which he had never been before. Most of the remainder of this survey, therefore, will be devoted to explaining what Ficino's doctrine of love and beauty was and how it came to influence English poetry even though Ficino himself was not particularly well known in England.

[49] For these translations see the edition of J. M. Rigg (London, 1890).

Ficino himself[50] was born into a world which still had the "rage for order," which wanted to be able to explain the universe as a unit, and which therefore always tried to rationalize apparently anomalous experience until it seemed to fit the universal Christian pattern. There were at the time three different love traditions current in Western Europe, to one of which, the tradition of Christian love, every effort had been made to adjust the other two. But Christian love, which tends to fall into the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God, had had to make two separate conciliations instead of drawing all into itself.

On the one hand, Christian love as a personal relation had already effected a reconciliation of sorts with the tradition of courtly love.[51] Poets of the court of love to the time of Petrarch had found only one way to reconcile love of woman with love of God; this was the way of recantation, of giving up the one for the other in the end. Even Petrarch recanted in the traditional manner, but not before he had helped to show the way to a new compromise between sexual and spiritual passion, justifying the love of man for woman on the grounds of the essential divinity of woman, the *donna angelicata.* It was left to Dante to arrive at the solution of identifying Beatrice herself with love in the broad Christian sense of *caritas,* thus completing the ladder from man to God. In Dante, in Cavalcanti's song beginning "Donna me prega," and earlier in Guinicelli's song beginning "Al cor gentil ripara sempre Amore," there is already apparent (in the obscure discussion of such concepts as the angelic intelligence) the tendency to inject Augustinian Neoplatonism into the problem of personal love. This Neoplatonism had in the meantime effected an entirely separate reconciliation of its own with Christian love.

For the Neoplatonists[52] love is the inescapable force which breathes in and out of the universe, emanating from the One through ever-widening circles out to individual things and returning to the One; it is the force responsible for growth, decay, and all other cosmic processes and

[50] See J. Festugière, *La Philosophie de l'amour de M. Ficin* (Paris, 1941), and P. O. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino.* The principal primary document here is Ficino's commentary on the *Symposium,* printed with English translation in *Univ. of Missouri Studies,* XIX (1944).

[51] For the sake of clarity I omit from this discussion the possible elements of Platonism introduced into the courtly love tradition by the Arabian influx through Spain in the eleventh century, as pointed out in A. R. Nykl, *A Book Containing the Risala, Known as the Dove's Neck-Ring* (Paris, 1931), pp. ciii ff. See in general on the courtly love tradition, C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (Oxford, 1936), and J. J. Perry's translation of Andreas Capellanus' *Art of Courtly Love* (New York, 1941). On the relation between courtly and Christian love see especially C. S. Singleton, "From Love to Caritas," chap. III of *An Essay on the Vita Nuova* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949).

[52] The primary source here is Plotinus, *Enneads,* Book III. See also W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London, 1929).

is usually thought of as a cosmic rather than personal phenomenon. So far as the individual is concerned, he is attracted to the One instinctively, and his pursuit of the One is more intuitive than intellectual. With this metaphysical conception of love the omnipotence and universal love of the Christian God had many affinities. The Christian vision of love as the spiritual power motivating the entire universe had been expressed with much of the Neoplatonist's enthusiasm by St. Paul and later by St. Benedict, and the general outlines of a synthesis between the two had been worked out early in the Middle Ages by Augustine, the Pseudo-Dionysius, and others. Ficino did not need to invent the identification of the Neoplatonic One with the Christian God or the Eros[53] of the Neoplatonic soul with the Agape of the Christian soul, because he was already familiar with that identification, not only in the theology of Augustine but also in the poetry of such men as Bernardus Silvestris, Alanus de Insulis, and Abelard. Ficino was, however, able to work out the identification in new and more complete detail because of his fresh access to the primary materials of the Neoplatonic tradition, the works of Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblichus, and some lesser authors.

But the mediaeval synthesis had never explained satisfactorily the place of personal love in relation to the cosmic force. On the cosmic side, the harmony of Christianity with Neoplatonism was strangely unsatisfying; the bottom of the Neoplatonic ladder from man to God was missing. Ficino happened to be born just in time to discover the missing piece and put it in its place. In the *Symposium*[54] of Plato Ficino found the completion of the arc from God to man; for him the discussion of the meaning of personal love in the *Symposium* completed the pattern. Just as courtly love fitted into place at the end of the scale of Christianity, so the *Symposium* fitted into place at the end of the scale of Platonism; the pattern was complete, the two scales were really one, reaching from God to man and from man to God. All the physical drives of human love might be justified spiritually and at the same time idealized intellectually, because love in man is not only a God-given and cosmically necessary and irresistible search upwards toward a perfection which is both spiritual and intellectual; it is also an irresistible, God-given, and cosmically necessary compulsion downward to create the likeness of Divine Beauty in the physical world. Platonism and Christianity, seen as love, are one; and the term "Platonic love," which Ficino invented, embraces love in its widest sense. Love for Ficino is the dart in the eye and the fire in the heart of the courtly lover, becoming idealized through the process de-

[53] Both the Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions are grouped under the general term "Eros" by A. Nygren in his *Agape and Eros* (London, 1943).

[54] See R. Lagerborg, *Die platonische Liebe* (Leipzig, 1926), and L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne de l'amour* (Paris, 1908).

scribed in the *Symposium* and ultimately revealing itself as identical with the world force of Neoplatonic Christianity. All the known love traditions are fused to show how love between individual persons derives from the love between the individual and God.

Since Ficino's theory is so inclusive, one may well ask how it is possible in a particular poem to distinguish Ficinian Platonic love from any other expression of love. To answer this question negatively, there are two kinds of Renaissance love poetry which are not Ficinian.

The poetry of courtly love always deals with the physical love of man for woman; the rubies, pearls, marble, ivory, and golden wire of its imagery are always stoutly physical; love is never idealized above the status of a pagan god; and beauty, though frequently identified as the hallmark of divinity, is never treated as an intellectual abstraction.[55]

More difficult to distinguish is the Christian love poetry of men like Southwell, Breton, and Lok, where Christian mysticism[56] is very close in tone and imagery to Ficino's Christian Neoplatonism. In general, however, this religious poetry is concerned solely with the Christian relation of the soul to God; its imagery is typically Biblical and spiritual; it never concerns itself with abstract beauty, and its emphasis upon union with God as the object of its longing is foreign to Ficino's emphasis. In a poem like Sonnet LXVIII of Spenser's *Amoretti,* or Sonnet LXIV of Michelangelo, taken out of its context in a sequence, it is almost impossible to detect the difference between a purely Christian intention and one of Christian Neoplatonism; but the difference is not usually so obscure as it appears in these poems.

To suggest a more positive answer to the question of recognizing Ficinian love when one sees it, I quote in translation part of a long poem which is nothing less than a poetic transcription of the theory of Ficinian love; this poem (Benivieni's "Canzona dello Amore celeste et divino") is Ficino in concentrated form, and shows not only what ideas are involved but also in what images and figures they are usually expressed in Renaissance poetry:

STANZA II

I tell how Love from its celestial source
In Primal Good flows to the world of sense;
When it had birth; and whence;
How moves the heavens, refines the soul, gives laws
To all; in men's hearts taking residence,
With what arms keen and ready in resource,
It is the gracious force
Which mortal minds from earth to heaven draws;

[55] For a typical Elizabethan courtly love poem, see No. 309 in *Tottel's Miscellany* (ed. H. Rollins).

[56] See J. B. Collins, *Mysticism in the Elizabethan Age* (Baltimore, 1941).

How it may light, warm, burn; and what the cause
One love may earthward bend, one heavenward bear,
A third sustain midway 'twixt earth and heaven . . .

STANZA III

When from true heaven deflected, radiance flows
To mind angelic from the highest sun,
And on that first-born one
Pours light and form through living leaves defined,—
This, that its first good longs to look upon
By natural desire which for that glows,
To that, reflected, owes
Power to express the wealth in itself shrined.
Then is the first desire which turns the mind
To the living sun of uncreated light
More wondrously inflamed and set on fire.
That heat, that glow, that flaming of desire,
Which, in the mind obscure by heavenly light
Kindled, now makes so bright
The mind angelic, is the first and true
Love, the devotion due
Born then of want and wealth when of the skies
She was conceived, whom Cyprus glorifies.

STANZA IV

This Love, for that he on the amorous breast
Of the fair Cyprian at the first has lain,
To follow still is fain
The starry splendor of her fairest face.
Hence our first stirrings of desire attain
Through him an object newly manifest;
And sharing his high quest,
The way to highest good we too retrace.
By him the fire through which his living grace
Distils, in us is lit; in flames whereof
The heart consuming dies, yet dying lives.
Through him pours the live fountain, whence derives
What heaven then shaping here below does move.
Diffused is through this Love
That light in us which leads us to the skies.
Through him within us rise
Splendors reflected from the sun supernal
Until our souls are lit with love eternal.

STANZA V

As from first good the eternal intelligence
Is, lives, conceives, so conceives, moves, creates
The soul; where germinates
Each living ray shed from the breast divine,
Till from the soul's meek brooding emanates
That which endowed with motion then and sense,
Through the soul's influence,

Lives, feels, fulfilling each innate design.
And from that soul, as the heavenly from God's shrine,
Is earthly Venus born, whose beauty lights
The skies, inhabits earth, is nature's veil.
The heavenly, who from the sun is mirrored pale
Within his shade whose musing she incites,
As she receives her lights
Ev'n from the living sun that in her glows,
So she her light bestows
On the earthly; and while sacred love is hers,
To her base sister love profane defers.[57]

Having made some attempt to understand what is meant by Ficino's Platonic love, we turn now to the two ways in which Ficino's theory reached England. It was naturally in Italy that Ficino was first well known, and it was there that his doctrine of love and beauty first took literary form. In the Platonic Academy around Ficino there were several poets, including Lorenzo de' Medici, and Ficino himself was much influenced by Dante, Landino, and Cavalcanti; these facts, together with the age-old association between love and poetry, probably had something to do with the fact that the first literary repercussion of Ficino's statement of his theory of love was, in form at least, poetic: Benivieni's "Canzona dello Amor divino" which I have just quoted.

Pico della Mirandola wrote a learned explication of this difficult poem,[58] generally spiritualizing and amplifying Ficino's theories. Pico's *Discourse* heads a long list of *trattati d'amore* which have as their purpose the popularizing of the doctrine of Platonic love and its adaptation to practical affairs. The most significant of these as steps in the adaptation of philosophical theory to popular literary material were Bembo's *Gli Asolani*[59] and Castiglione's *Courtier*,[60] but the treatises of

[57] Benivieni's *canzone*, translation by J. B. Fletcher. See note 43 above.

[58] See Robb and Edouard Meylan, "L'Évolution de la notion de l'amour platonique," *Humanisme et Renaissance*, V (1938), 418-442, for the sequence of events here. For Pico's commentary and the *canzone* in Italian, see E. Garin's edition of Pico's *De Dignitate*, etc. (Florence, 1942). For the commentary in English see Thomas Stanley's *History of Philosophy* (1656) under Plato. Through Pico also some of Ficino's scientific notions went to Germany and from there came to England in the works of Reuchlin and Paracelsus, to bear fruit in the scientific treatises of men like Robert Fludd and John Dee.

[59] This work, the first popularization of Ficino's love theories, went through twenty-four editions before 1600. Bembo was know in England before *Gli Asolani* arrived there, through the influence of his friend Reginald Pole, Erasmus, and Book IV of Castiglione's *Courtier*. Sidney modelled one of his songs in the *Arcadia* on a sonnet of Bembo (see J. G. Scott, *Les Sonnets élisabéthains*, pp. 159, 182). On the *trattati* in general see Robb, pp. 176 ff. and the references there given.

[60] On this most influential of the *trattati*, see especially Walter Schrinner, *Castiglione und die englische Renaissance* (Berlin, 1939), and Sir Walter Raleigh's edition of Hoby's 1561 English translation (London, 1900).

Ficino's intimate disciple, Diacceto,[61] the well-known and remarkably original Leo Hebraeus,[62] the popular Romei,[63] and Bruno,[64] Caviceo, and Della Barba all enjoyed a wide circulation and were imitated all over Europe.

As the doctrine was gradually watered down for general courtier consumption in romantic prose dialogues, it continued also to spread in poetry.[65] Lorenzo incorporated it with varying success in many of his poems, notably the *Selve d'Amore*. Bembo, Poliziano, Palmieri, Nesi, and Verino all wrote poetry expressing various parts of the total doctrine of Ficinian love; but it was Michelangelo who succeeded best in writing Platonic lyrics of some poetic as well as philosophical value. The important thing to note about all of these early Platonic poets is that their poetry represents a departure from rather than a modification of Petrarchism; one reason their work is so mediocre as poetry (except for Michelangelo) is that it is an expression of completely new ideas, sometimes imperfectly grasped and requiring a whole new verse technique. It is Platonic poetry in conception and execution. In this poetry as well as in the prose *trattati*, Ficino's love theory was permanently grafted to literature as a medium[66] before it ever left Italy; it thus had the advantage of the wide dissemination throughout Europe which all things Italian enjoyed during the Renaissance.

Part of Ficino's influence went to England in this Italian Platonic lit-

[61] On these see P. O. Kristeller, "Francesco da Diacceto and Florentine Platonism in the Sixteenth Century," *Miscellanea G. Mercati*, IV (1946), 1-45, and T. F. Crane, *Italian Social Customs*, chap. III.

[62] *Dialoghi di Amore* (1535). This is the date of first publication; the work was known in England both in the Italian and in the French translation of Pontus de Thyard (1595).

[63] The *Courtier's Academy* (1598); this is the date of the English translation of John Kepers. Another Italian work which had great influence in England is Guazzo's *Civil Conversations*, translated by George Pettie (1581).

[64] *Gli Eroici Furori* (1585). This is the date of the first printing in England (H. Sellers, "Italian Books Printed in England before 1640," *Library*, 4th Ser., V, 1924, 105-128). Bruno's work was the more influential because he himself spent two years in England (1583-85) lecturing at Oxford; he was received into the circle of Sidney and Fulke-Greville and created an immense English reputation. See G. McColley, "Walter Gilbert and the English Reputation of Giordano Bruno," *Annals of Science*, II (1937), 353-354; N. Orsini, "Appunti su G. Bruno in Inghilterra: l'avversario di Oxford," *GFI*, XVIII (1937), 41-42; and Oliver Elton, "Giordano Bruno in England," *Quarterly Review*, CXCVI (1902), 483-508 (reprinted in *Modern Studies*, 1907).

[65] See Robb, *op. cit.*; Luigi Tonelli, *L'amore nella poesia e nel pensiero del Rinascimento* (Florence, 1938); and M. G. Thomas, "L'Amour platonique dans la poésie italienne," *Mémoires de l'Académie de Stanislaus* (1890).

[66] Painters and sculptors also took up the theme. See, for example, the blindfolded Cupid of Lucas Cranach (1472-1553) reproduced in E. Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (fig. 106). Cupid in this painting is standing upon a volume of the *Opera Platonis* and removing his blindfold as a sign of his enlightenment. Robb discusses the influence of Ficino on the plastic arts in chap. VII.

erature, mostly in prose. The works of Bembo, Pico, and Castiglione were all extremely popular in England and were imitated in countless dialogues and treatises on love. Even lesser writers, such as Diacceto and Della Barba, appear in English libraries of the period as often as Ficino himself does. Spenser used Castiglione, Benivieni, and Bembo as well as Ficino; and Chapman, who read Ficino, borrowed many of his ideas already adapted for poetry in the *Mythologiae* of Natale Conti.

But by far the larger part of Ficino's influence reached England by following the usual channels of Renaissance humanism, through France.[67] French humanists much as Symphorien Champier corresponded with him, translated and imitated the commentary on the *Symposium,* and edited and translated into French some of Ficino's Plato and some of his own works as well. On the literary side, the new doctrine of Platonic love joined forces with the French cults of feminism and gentility. In the salons[68] influential women, such as Marguerite de Navarre,[69] read Ficino and the Italian *trattati d'amore,* and preached the doctrine of Platonic love to their admirers. French dialogues and treatises on love were written in imitation of their Italian predecessors, and during the decade 1540-50 Platonic love became the dominant theme of serious French poetry in two centers: Lyons and the court of Marguerite de Navarre. Poets such as Lefèvre d'Étaples, Antoine Héroët, Étienne Dolet, Maurice Scève, Louise Labé, and even the members of the Pléiade[70] incorporated Platonic love in their basically Petrarchan poetry.

At the other end of the detour through France, Englishmen were in the habit of reading their classics in French editions and especially of translating their Greek from French translations.[71] The literary interests and connections of such men as Robert Gaguin,[72] the French ambassador to England in the reign of Henry VIII, provided direct French links between Ficino and English writers. Anne Boleyn had been brought up in the court of Marguerite de Navarre, and Princess Eliza-

[67] See note 45 above and Festugière, note 50. It should be remembered also that many of Ficino's ideas came to England indirectly in the writings of widely read men like Montaigne. See P. Villey, *Les Sources des Essais de Montaigne* (Paris, 1908).

[68] See L. C. Keating, *Studies in the Literary Salon in France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).

[69] See A. Lefranc, "Marguerite de Navarre et le platonisme de la Renaissance," *Grands écrivains français,* pp. 139-249.

[70] See W. A. R. Kerr, "The Pléiade and Platonism," *MP,* V (1907-08), 407-413; R. V. Merrill, *The Platonism of Joachim Du Bellay* (Chicago, 1925), and "Platonism in Pontus de Tyard's Erreurs Amoureuses," *MP,* XXXV (1937), 139-158.

[71] See F. L. Schoell, *Études sur l'humanisme continental,* chap. VI, "L'Hellénisme français en Angleterre," and A. H. Upham, *French Influence in English Literature* (New York, 1908).

[72] Gaguin knew Colet and also Skelton.

beth herself translated Marguerite's Platonic handbook, *Le Miroir de l'Ame Pécheresse*, into English. We have seen[73] that Primaudaye's *L'Académie Française* and Pasquier's *Monophile* were both translated into English almost as soon as they appeared in French.

Of all French Platonic literature, it was the poetry which proved most influential in England. There was throughout the Renaissance a close rapport between French and English poetry, the French poets normally setting the styles and the English imitating them; the whole rejuvenation of English poetry which began with Spenser's *Shepherd's Calendar* was a product of French inspiration, and Spenser's interest in the Pléiade was only the first symptom of what became the normal relationship between poets in France and England.[74]

This relationship suggests that English poets would first have learned about "Platonic" poetry by seeing it in French and that, when they tried to write it themselves, they would have borrowed French techniques. In general, since French poetry was further removed than Italian from the sources of Platonic theory, the French technique of writing Platonic poetry was to use the theme or the language of idealized love merely as a means of varying the standard Petrarchan poem of physical passion; there is little attempt to poetize the Ficinian theory, or to deal with truly idealized love at all in its own terms. Platonic love is treated mainly as a pleasant variation and a source of casual detail within the framework of Petrarchism.

Most of the "Platonic" poetry in England is of this same type, basically Petrarchan and paying mere lip service to idealized love and beauty. One of the French techniques borrowed by English poets may be illustrated in Sonnet XV of Spenser's *Amoretti*:

> Ye tradefull merchants, that with weary toyle
> Do seeke most pretious things to make your gain,
> And both the Indias of their treasures spoile,
> What needeth you to seeke so farre in vaine?
> For loe; my love doth in her selfe containe
> All this worlds riches that may farre be found:
> If saphyres, loe! her eies be saphyres plaine;
> If rubies, loe! hir lips be rubies sound;
> If pearles, hir teeth be pearles both pure and round;
> If yvorie, her forhead yvory weene;
> If gold, her locks are finest gold on ground;
> If silver, her faire hands are silver sheen:
> But that which fairest is but few behold,
> Her mind, adornd with vertues manifold.

The framework of this poem, both in verse form and conceit, is Petrarchan; the imagery is the imagery of courtly love merely twisted at the

[73] See p. 221 above.

[74] See Sir Sidney Lee, *The French Renaissance in England* (Oxford, 1910).

end to provide a "Platonic" effect. This is typical of the extent of the Platonism of the sonnet sequences of poets such as Lodge, Watson, Lynche, and Barnes, who rarely go beyond the ordinary Christian dichotomy between virtuous and lustful love, and retain all the earmarks of Petrarchism—but incorporate the stylish device of introducing into Petrarchan poems the concept of ideal beauty as the true object of love or as providing an intellectual object for sexual love. An exactly analogous technique may be seen in many French "Platonic" poems such as the following sonnet of Du Bellay:

> Ce ne sont pas ces beaux cheveux dorez,
> Ny ce beau front, qui l'honneur mesme honnore,
> Ce ne sont pas les deux archets encore'
> De ses beaux yeux de cent yeux adorez:
>
> Ce ne sont pas les deux brins colorez
> De ce coral, ces levres que j'adore,
> Ce n'est ce teinct emprunté de l'Aurore,
> Ny autre object des cœurs enamourez:
>
> Ce ne sont pas ny ces lyz ny ces rozes,
> Ny ces deux rancz de perles si bien closes,
> C'est cet esprit, rare présent des cieux,
>
> Dont la beauté de cent graces pourvëue
> Perce mon ame & mon cœur & mes yeux
> Par les rayons de sa poignante vëue.[75]

Another indication of the fact that it was probably French rather than Italian Petrarchism which brought this "Platonism" into English poetry is that the fad of comparing the beloved of a sonnet sequence to ideal beauty by entitling the sequence or the lover "Idea" was a French fad. On the basis of such models as Ponteux's *L'Idée* and Scève's anagrammed *Délie,* Daniel entitled his sequence *Delia,* Lynche called his *Diella,* and Drayton named his *Idea's Mirror.* Drayton also wrote a sequence of pastoral eclogues which he called *Idea,* and William Drummond named one of his poems "On Beauty's Idea." The use of the term "idea" in this sense is a convention in the texts as well as the titles of Elizabethan poems in the 1590s. It is used mainly as a modern touch in basically Petrarchan poems; and, although its popularity stems indirectly from Ficino, the immediate source for England was France.

[75] Sonnet II of *Sonnets de l'Honneste Amour,* adapted, incidentally, by Du Bellay from Pontus de Tyard's "Chant a son Leut." The sonnet form was, of course, not the only form which was adapted for Platonic purposes. One of the most popular forms was the pastoral, which has a long history of association with Platonism. Good examples in English are Daniel's *Queen's Arcadia* and Fletcher's *Faithful Shepherdess.* Another important form was the poetry of Platonically allegorized mythology exemplified by Drayton's "Endymion and Phoebe," and Howell's moralization of Ovid's tale of Narcissus. I have used the sonnet form in the text because it is the most familiar form and the most convenient to illustrate.

Whatever the actual source or the specific technique used, English poets who dabbled in Platonic love need have gone and usually went no further for inspiration and example than French poetry on the same theme. Since their French models rarely left the realm of Petrarchism, Platonism became permanently associated in the English mind with Petrarchism, and we hear Nicholas Breton, for example, complaining in one breath of "the conceits of the Petrarchist and Platonist."[76]

A few English poets of the period did not stop with French models, but went on to Italian authorities in their pursuit of the new Platonism.[77] Their poetry, even in the sonnet form, escapes the bonds of Petrarchism, speaks of a genuinely idealized love and beauty, and reveals a familiarity with the ideas and language of the *trattati d'amore*; such poems begin, move, and end in the realm of intellectual-spiritual love, which is the realm of Ficino. The principal English authors whose poetry gives evidence of thus having gone beyond French poetry to other sources are Spenser, Greville, Sidney, and Chapman. This type of poem may be illustrated by Sidney's well-known sonnet:

> Leave me O Love, which reachest but to dust:
> And thou my mind aspire to higher things:
> Grow rich in that which never taketh rust:
> Whatever fades, but fading pleasure brings.
>
> Draw in thy beames, and humble all thy might,
> To that sweet yoke, where lasting freedomes be:
> Which breakes the clowdes and opens forth the light.
> That doth both shine and give us sight to see.
>
> O take fast hold, let that light be thy guide,
> In this small course which birth drawes out to death,
> And thinke how evill becommeth him to slide,
> Who seeketh heav'n, and comes of heav'nly breath.
> Then farewell world, thy uttermost I see,
> Eternall Love maintaine thy life in me.

With this may be compared Michelangelo's Sonnet CCVII (of *Rime*, ed. V. Piccoli), in which again the whole attitude, and not a mere detail here and there, belongs to the Ficinian tradition of idealized love and beauty:

> Per ritornar là donde venne fora,
> L'immortal forma al tuo carcer terreno
> Venne com'angel di pietà sí pieno,
> Che sana ogn'intelletto, e 'l mondo onora.

[76] "What is Love," in *The Longings of a Blessed Heart* (London, 1601), pp. 12-14.

[77] This explains in large part the difference between the two treatments of Platonism discussed by Paul N. Siegel in "The Petrarchan Sonneteers and Neoplatonic Love," *SP*, XVI (1945), 164-182. I prefer to regard the varying treatments of "Platonism" as types of poetry rather than as schools of poets, since poets frequently wrote more than one type of "Platonic" poem.

Questo sol m'arde, e questo m'innamora,
Non pur di fuora il tuo volto sereno:
C'amor non già di cosa che vien meno
Tien ferma speme, in cui virtú dimora.

Né altro avvien di cose altere e nuove,
In cui si preme la natura; e 'l cielo
È c'a lor parto largo s'apparecchia.

Né Dio, sua grazia, mi si mostra altrove,
Piú che 'n alcun leggiadro e mortal velo;
E quel sol amo, perch'in lui si specchia.

In addition to the Petrarchan poetry of casual Platonic detail, and the love poetry of genuinely idealized love, there is yet a third kind of English Platonic poetry. This poetry, exemplified by Spenser's *Fowre Hymnes* and Chapman's "Ovid's Banquet of Sense," attempts to deal directly and philosophically with the whole meaning of Ficinian love and beauty. Poetry of this sort reflects still deeper probing by English poets into the sources of the theory of Platonic love, beyond the popular *trattati* to Pico, Benivieni, and Ficino himself. But the number of such poets is very small, and the direct influence of Ficino upon English poetry is also relatively small. In the main the Platonism in English poetry of the Renaissance derives from Ficino in the two ways I have suggested—some from the Italian popularizers of Ficino's doctrine, but most at third hand from the French poets.

After about 1610 Platonic poetry in England drew still farther away from Ficino. As the sweet idealism of the Elizabethan Age turned into the curds of realism and the whey of disillusionment, the theme of Platonic love was reduced to the conventions of "the chaste love" and "the coy mistress."[78] Eventually poets inverted the theme of idealized or Platonic love and satirized it, as in Hoskins' "Absence," and the reaction finally expressed itself openly in poets like Cleveland, who threw off all disguise and declared himself honestly "Anti-Platonick."[79]

The Period of Platonic Drama

While the theme of idealized love was disappearing from poetry, it was kept alive for a few more years in the drama by another wave of French Platonism. This revival of interest came in the person of the French wife of Charles I, Henrietta Maria. Henrietta had been brought up in French salons in which Platonic love of a sort was all the rage, and

[78] See, for example, Suckling's "Why so pale and wan, fond lover?" and Marvell's "To his coy mistress."

[79] See also L. J. Bredvold, "The Naturalism of Donne in Relation to Some Renaissance Traditions," *JEGPH*, XXI (1923), 471-503.

she soon started the fad in the English court.[80] The theme of Platonic love had been tried before on the public stage in England with little success;[81] now, however, in the heated and scented atmosphere of the court, Platonic love became the stock subject of a type of long-winded pastoral play which the King and Queen applauded and in which they themselves frequently acted. Throughout their reign a surfeit of such plays by Montague, D'Avenant, Suckling, Ford, Killigrew, and even the aging Ben Jonson, was written for the court.[82] Although Ficino was reputedly read by court ladies who were interested in the new love, the real handbook for this fad, in England as in France, was d'Urfé's pastoral extravaganza, *Astrée*. This had only a very indirect relation to Ficino and practically none to Plato. For the most part, the theme of sexless love was an illegitimate offspring of courtly love, on the one hand, and of academic discussions of sexless passion, on the other. Following d'Urfé's directions, bored lords and ladies of the court actually dressed up in shepherd's costumes and practiced adultery under cover of the theory that, since true love was supposed to be of the soul, what they did with their bodies was irrelevant.

During this period, which I have called the period of Platonic drama, Ficino's influence in the field of belles-lettres was waning, but in more academic circles it was growing, as we have seen in the works of Raleigh and Burton. On the closing of the theaters in 1642, Platonism in England may be said to have retired to its proper province of philosophy among the Cambridge Platonists.

III

Having traced the course of Renaissance Platonism in England through its three periods, prose, poetic, and dramatic, we may now see more clearly what was meant by the statement at the beginning of this paper that Platonism in Renaissance England was a distinctly literary phenomenon. Our problem has been to assess the influence of Ficino upon that phenomenon. In place of the traditional notion that he was directly responsible for the wide popularity and the Neoplatonic character of Platonism in English literature of the Renaissance, I suggest a somewhat more complex notion.

The wide popularitiy of Platonism in English literature was due not so much to the popularity in England of Ficino as to the popularity of

[80] On the social situation see especially J. B. Fletcher, "Précieuses at the Court of Charles I," *Journal of Comp. Lit.*, I (1903), 120-153.

[81] Especially by Fletcher in *The Faithful Shepherdess* and by Chapman in *The Widow's Tears* and *Sir Giles Goosecap*.

[82] See especially G. F. Sensabaugh, "Love Ethics in Platonic Court Drama 1625-1642," *HLQ*, I (1938), 277-304, and "Platonic Love and the Puritan Revolution," *SP*, XXXVII (1940), 457-481.

the Italian and especially the French writers of belles-lettres who had made Ficinian doctrine a familiar literary subject. His direct influence in England, for practical purposes, was limited to three writers of scholarly prose, Colet, Raleigh, and Burton, and two philosophical poets, Spenser and Chapman. The remaining mass of Platonic writing in England must be traced to the direct influence of other authors than Ficino.

As a second qualification of the traditional notion about Ficino and English Platonism, we must now recognize that, aside from his importance as a translator, his influence is centered primarly in the doctrine of Platonic love. Cosmological Platonism, such as that in Colet, is largely an extension of mediaeval views; political Platonism, such as that in More, is largely the result of reading Plato himself; and the perverted "Platonism" of Caroline drama is largely the result of reading d'Urfé. Where Ficino affected English Platonism most powerfully was in the theory of love and beauty which passed for Platonism in English poetry. To point out that even here Ficino's influence was mainly indirect is not to minimize the ultimate importance of that influence. Ficino certainly was the fountainhead of Renaissance love Platonism. What I have been concerned to show is that this was not the only kind of Renaissance Platonism, and that, even to this kind, the Northwest Passage, so far as English writers are concerned, was not Ficino but the poetry of Italy and France.

University of California, Berkeley

TWO CHAMPIONS OF A NEW CHRISTIANITY: LAMENNAIS AND MICKIEWICZ

MANFRED KRIDL

THE MUTUAL relations and influences of Félicité de Lamennais (1782-1854)—apologist of Catholic theocracy, then revolutionary democrat—and the Polish poet and leader, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), offer much that is interesting and instructive for comparative studies.[1] The two men sprang from entirely different soils and grew up under entirely different conditions and circumstances, yet they present basic affinities of character and mind. They arrived, almost independently, at a very similar world view and, for a time, followed similar paths in writing and action. One may say that the works of each came to represent the basic thought of the other—for instance, Lamennais' *Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion* for Mickiewicz and Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish Pilgrims* for Lamennais became a realization and final crystallization of thoughts, feelings, and conceptions independently acquired, although not always clearly realized. This is probably the psychology of all literary influences, apart of course from the so-called "spirit of the age," by which we denote certain spiritual properties common to large groups of men living in a given historical epoch.

The spirit of the epoch around 1820-1830 manifested itself in Europe, among other trends, in a revival of Christianity and in a growing movement for liberty. Both Lamennais and Mickiewicz are outstanding representatives of these two trends, which embraced large circles of the European intelligentsia and even penetrated, in one form or another, the masses of the population of Western European countries. In France the modern renaissance of Christianity (and Catholicism) goes back to the beginning of the nineteenth century and is represented by Chateaubriand, de Maistre, de Bonald, and others. Lamennais certainly owed much to these writers, especially in his first, "theocratic" period, but even then the character and tone of his works were different—more

[1] This problem has so far not been treated thoroughly in studies devoted to Lamennais except in Poland, where a book, *Mickiewicz and Lamennais*, was published by the present writer in 1919. This book passed almost unoticed in Western Europe and America, probably because it was written in Polish. An important chapter on Lamennais has thus remained virtually unknown abroad. The present article tries to fill this gap: it is based on earlier research, and takes into account all available materials published since 1919.

emotional, more dogmatic and intolerant. His "revolutionary" period, in its beginning, brought into being the concept of democratic Neo-Catholicism, which found expression not only in the writings of Lamennais and his friends (Montalembert, Gerbet, Lacordaire, Rohrbacher, and others) but also in *L'Avenir*, the organ of the Neo-Catholic movement.

Lamennais' fame and influence in his theocratic period were based primarily on his *Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion* (4 vols., Paris, 1817-23). The work was greeted with immense enthusiasm by Catholic Europe; readers spoke of a new Bossuet or Chateaubriand. Its reception was due not so much to the intellectual values of the *Essai* as to the passion with which it was written and to the ruthless attack against what may be considered, and not only from the religious point of view, one of the major illnesses of humanity—indifference, discouragement, depression, a kind of spiritual lethargy. Lamennais attacked not only practical but also, and primarily, *dogmatic* indifference, that is, generally speaking, the mental attitude which does not recognize any absolute truth existing independently of man and, by the same token, sanctions all opinions, beliefs, doctrines, and systems of thought.

The main reason for this state of affairs, according to Lamennais the theocrat, was the decline of faith in *authority* and in the substitution for it of the principle of *libre examen*. His aim was the dethroning, the virtual annihilation, of individual reason and at the same time, by a strange but not uncommon paradox, the justification of Catholicism by means of logical reasoning. Another paradox, practically ruinous for his theoretical premises, was the belief that he had found an unshakable criterion of certitude in what he called *consentement universel*, the universal reason of mankind, the universal covenant expressed in tradition.[2] This was to be the main weapon against individual reason. In fact, these two concepts of reason, individual and universal, are only two variant forms of the same notion. Lamennais' theory of universal consent must finally go back to the individual, because only the "individual reason" can perceive and define the universal reason and the results of its processes. By what means can the individual achieve this task when all his cognitive ability is—according to Lamennais—illusory and false?[3]

Mickiewicz became acquainted with the *Essai* during his stay in

[2] For the sources of this theory (Malebranche, Bonald, and others) see Christian Maréchal, *La Mennais: La Dispute de l'Essai sur l'indifférence* (Paris, 1925), and Jacques Poisson, *Le Romantisme social de Lamennais* (Paris, 1931). See general remarks on the sources of Lamennais' philosophy in Claude Carcopino, *Les Doctrines sociales de Lamennais* (Paris, 1942).

[3] See Paul Janet, "La Philosophie de Lamennais," *Revue des deux mondes*, XCI (1888-89); M. Ferraz, *Histoire de la philosophie en France au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1880); Paul Lazerges, *Lamennais, étude sur l'unité de sa pensée* (Montauban, 1895).

Rome in 1830, and possibly with other works of Lamennais available at that time, such as *Mélanges religieux et philosophiques* (1819), *De la Religion considerée dans ses rapports avec l'ordre politique et civil* (1825-26), and *Des Progrès de la Révolution et de la guerre contre l'Eglise* (1829). We can assume, both directly from Mickiewicz's correspondence and indirectly from his contemporary utterances, that his attitude in religious and cognitive matters corresponded to that of Lamennais, and that the works of the French writer only confirmed and strengthened his own opinions. He distrusted the materialistic foundations of contemporary civilization and the rationalist trends in modern philosophy. Hegel's lectures in Berlin which he attended left him cool, and the philosopher's efforts to explain the difference between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* gave rise to some ironical and contemptuous remarks. He spoke of the pride of human reason in attempting to grasp the truth, and contrasted its blindness and incompetence with faith, inspiration, and tradition.[4] He compared attempts to make the sun of spiritual truth a satellite of the earth-reason with the pre-Copernican belief that the sun turned around the earth. His lyric poems written in Rome are full of the same tones of deep and unrestricted faith and of contempt for every form of rationalism.

In this respect, then, Mickiewicz agreed entirely with Lamennais, the only difference being that he placed greater stress on the role of feeling and inspiration in attaining the truth. This becomes more noticeable as we approach the problem of the criterion of certitude. In general, Mickiewicz accepted Lamennais' theory that certitude and truth do not lie inside man but outside of him. Whenever man tries to find truth in himself, he revolts against God, against the nation and the masses. In religious matters the masses are represented by Christianity embodied in the Church, in national problems (which were at that time more important for Mickiewicz) they are represented by the nation itself and its history. Hence Mickiewicz considered his *Books of the Polish Nation and the Polish Pilgrims* (1832), which was conceived in the new spirit, not as his individual work but as one drawn from Polish history, from the writings of Poles devoted to their country, martyrs to the national cause. In the first version of this work Mickiewicz quotes by name some Poles to whom he was especially indebted and mentions the works of Lamennais.

The problem of certitude appears in its clearest form in an article of Mickiewicz entitled "On the National Spirit."[5] The problem is posed, not as in the case of Lamennais in an abstract, philosophical way, but in

[4] Antoni Edward Odyniec, *Listy z podróży* (Letters from a Journey) (Warsaw, 1875-78), II, 302.

[5] *Dzieła A. Mickiewicza* (Works of A. Mickiewicz) (Paris, 1880), Vol. V.

connection with the Polish national cause. The question is where to discover the source of the Polish national idea, of the Polish "truth." Mickiewicz finds it in the opinions and feelings of old Poland, in the inner domestic tradition of the nobility and the common people. This sounds like an echo of Lamennais' statement:

> Avant Jésus-Christ il existait une société spirituelle et visible, société universelle, mais purement domestique, qui conservait le dépôt des vérités nécessaires en sorte que la vraie religion se composait des dogmes et des préceptes originairement révélés de Dieu et attestés par la tradition de toutes les familles et de tous les peuples.[6]

Tradition, in general, played an important role in Lamennais' system; he identified it with inborn, revealed ideas, with truth transmitted from generation to generation, and called it "la vie, la pensée, la règle de la vérité."[7]

The question remains, however, how to come to the cognition of the truth created by mankind or by nations and preserved in tradition. Mickiewicz and Lamennais agreed that this cannot be done by individual reason itself. They state in a similar way the essence and limits of individual reason:

> On peut tout soutenir, [says Lamennais] tout contester, même sans recourir à des principes divers; car il n'en est point d'où l'on ne déduise des conséquences contraires. Deux esprits, partant du même point, et marchant au même but, ne sauraient faire quatre pas sans se séparer. Que dis-je? Notre propre esprit, différant de lui-même, adopte et rejette, d'un moment à l'autre, le même jugement, d'une persuasion également pleine, et qu'aucun changement, si soudain qu'il soit, ne déconcerte.[8]

> Individual reason [says Mickiewicz] if depending only on itself, not only does not tend to agree with others, but is, by its very nature, opposed to any agreement; it always possesses an eccentric movement and a tendency to part from others.[9]

Nevertheless, Lamennais realized sometimes the difficulty of denying the individual and recognizing at the same time the universal reason, and finally had to agree that the universal can manifest itself only to the individual reason, which involved him in one of his not infrequent inconsistencies.[10] In his doctrine the cognition of the truth is accomplished by individual reason based on the authority of "la raison universelle."

Mickiewicz was more consistent and stable in his distrust of the intellect and its activity, although his reasoning was not distinguished by logical exactness. He also, in accord with Lamennais, considered mankind as the highest authority in the question of truth and error, but in his opinion the wisdom of mankind could be revealed only to the hearts of

---

[6] *Essai*, II, 202. Lamennais, *Œuvres complètes*, 12 vols. (Paris, 1836-37).
[7] *Ibid.*, II, 94.
[8] *Ibid.*, II, 12.
[9] Mickiewicz, *Works* (see note 5), V, 34.
[10] *Essai*, II, p. lxvii of the Preface.

deeply feeling men. Thus not the intellect but rather sentiment became the recipient of eternal truths, a view consistent with Mickiewicz's romantic conception of "feeling and faith," a conception expressed first in his early poem "Romanticism" (Romantyczność) and developed later in his moral and political writings. Both in theory and in practice Mickiewicz preached the superiority of intuition, inspiration, and *élan* over rationalistic deliberations and discourses. He distinguished between "small," practical, daily reason and "great" reason of whole generations and posterity, and attributed only to the latter the right to judge historical deeds and events.[11] In his final period he even went so far as to call Lamennais "a dry, rationalistic theologian."[12] This was, of course, neither accurate nor just. In his theoretical writings, in his ardent search for the criterion of certitude, Lamennais rejected sentiment and inspiration as means of cognition;[13] but in his other writings and in his actions he manifested to a high degree the characteristics which Mickiewicz himself required from a leader: a deeply emotional attitude, a hot temperament, passion in defending his opinions and in accusing his opponents, a truly poetic inspiration in depicting all the evils of the world, and the vision of a better existence.

We cannot today attach much importance to the theoretical and logical aspect of the doctrines of Mickiewicz and Lamennais. It is not the intellectual premises and inferences that were important and characteristic of them, but the consequences in their lives and activities. Their ethical norms required self-denial (man does not create truth but receives it) and self-sacrifice in the service of society, the nation, humanity. Their elemental, inborn instincts and feelings influenced the formation of their world views, but at the same time ruined the theoretical bases of them. We must bear in mind that their "philosophy" imposed upon them the necessity of transforming themselves in accordance with the national spirit and the spirit of all humanity and the necessity of confronting their own feelings, thoughts, and judgments with what they considered to be the unchangeable, eternal truth. This eternal truth, apparently existing beyond them, was of course their own individual truth. Their lives and actions were in fact a denial of what seemed to be the logical consequence of their theories, that is, of the passive attitude of man who is not a creator but a recipient ("L'homme ne crée rien, il reçoit, conserve, transmet"). In reality, they *were* creators and they created, if not an epoch, at least one of the epoch's most characteristic trends. It did not disturb them that they were always in the minority,

[11] Mickiewicz, *Works*, II, 66.

[12] *Współudział A. Mickiewicza w sprawie A. Towiańskiego* (Collaboration of A. Mickiewicz with A. Towiański) (Paris, 1877), I, 17-19.

[13] *Essai* II, 130, 136. See also *Lettres inédites de Lamennais à Montalembert*, ed. Eugène Forgues (Paris, 1891), p. 159.

that their ideals were by no means shared by their own people, not to speak of all humanity. They were deeply convinced that their truth was the universal and absolute truth. If reality denied it—so much the worse for reality!

There was, however, another side of their philosophy—distrust and disbelief of themselves, abnegation and humility turning into a kind of self-contempt and "self-devaluation." There was in both of them a kind of concealed worry and sadness characteristic of "ethical man" confronted with a hostile world. The correspondence of both Mickiewicz and Lamennais gives clear proof of this state of mind.[14] On May 7, 1834, after the condemnation of the *Paroles* by Rome and the loss of intimate friends, Lamennais wrote these heartbreaking words:

> Mon âme, fortifie-toi, car bientôt, tu n'auras plus que Dieu. Les hommes s'en vont et te laissent seule. Tu as aimé la vérité et la justice; tu as voulu cela, rien que cela; et eux, ce qu'ils aiment, c'est l'opinion qui flotte et qui passe; ce qu'ils veulent, c'est un mol chevet pour y reposer leur tête. Mon âme, fortifie-toi, car tu as encore à souffrir beaucoup; il reste encore au fond du calice quelques gorgées de lie qu'il faudra bien que tu boives...
>
> J'étais comme un arbre chargé de feuilles et couvert de fleurs. Les fleurs sont tombées, les feuilles sont tombées, au souffle de la tempête; elle a brisé jusqu'aux branches mêmes et le vieux tronc maintenant est là solitaire et dépouillé. Les pluies ne le ranimeront plus. L'eau des nuées, chassées par le vent, coule sur sa sèche écorce, à travers la mousse et rien ne reverdit.[15]

The close affinity of the two leaders, in general points of view and in their approach to particular problems, reaches its climax in their journalistic activity between 1830 and 1833 and in their significant works during the same years, Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish Pilgrims* (1832) and Lamennais' *Paroles d'un croyant* (1834). Their moral and political program was based on three ideals: Christianity (Catholicism), democracy, and liberty. Between 1830 and 1834 Lamennais evolved more and more toward Catholic democracy. This was already visible in his *Des Progrès de la Révoltion et de la guerre contre l'Eglise* (1829), marked by a gradually developing disappointment with monarchy as a form of polity and a leaning toward liberal and progressive elements. The July Revolution pushed him into the ranks of its decided adherents, strong opponents of the Ancien Régime.[16] In October 1830 appeared the newspaper *L'Avenir* which—according to its motto: *Dieu et la Liberté*—aimed at a union of religion and Church with liberty. Lamennais was one of the founders and main contributors of *L'Avenir*; in a series of articles he called for new foundations of Catholicism, for a

[14] Cf. Lamennais, *Lettres inédites*, pp. 153, 331, 332; *Korespondencja A. Mickiewicz* (Correspondence of A. Mickiewicz) (Paris, 1880), I, 156, 165, 177, 229.

[15] Quoted by F. Duine, *Lamennais: Sa vie, ses idées, ses ouvrages* (Paris, 1922), pp. 201-202.

[16] E. D. Forgues, ed., *Œuvres posthumes de Lamennais* (Paris, 1863), II, 158.

break with the past in facing the future, which—according to him—belonged to the progressive, liberating movement of nations. Modern Europe had developed on the basis of Christianity; the new movement must be bound with Catholicism. In this alliance the Church would maintain and even strengthen its leading position.

If we take into account the general policy of the Vatican, which has always been that of extreme caution in engaging the Church in any "novelties" and which at that time especially was bound up with the established order in Europe, we may easily perceive that the ideas of Lamennais and his adherents were very bold, almost revolutionary. This is especially clear in respect to the democratic trend of the Neo-Catholic movement. Democracy, in the general sense of the term, was congenial to Lamennais' philosophical attitude. Since the masses were in his opinion the creators of truth and its preservers, it was entirely natural to consider them as the decisive factor in all political, social, and national problems. Leaders have to follow the instinct of the masses, which is infallible.[17] In an article of February 12, 1830, Lamennais answered a letter of Cardinal Ventura accusing *L'Avenir* of revolutionary tendencies. He stated frankly that he and his friends did not expect anything from the "kings" (as did the Vatican), but very much from the "peoples" who are selected by God to introduce His Kingdom on earth.[18] The nations are now mature enough to get rid of the tutorship of kings. The time of the Holy Roman Empire is finished. A republic is the only constitutional form by which the right of the people can be attained. Consequently, Lamennais and *L'Avenir* demanded freedom of conscience, separation of State and Church,[19] freedom of education, press, and association, electoral rights for the masses, and decentralization. Needless to say, in this program the Neo-Catholics marched together with the most progressive parties.

As to Mickiewicz, he was traditionally attached to Catholicism and strengthened in his faith by his stay in Rome, by friendship with practicing Catholics, and by the reading of Catholic writers, among others Lamennais. This attachment and faith found an artistically superb expression in his religious lyrics written in Rome and in his later works. The third part of the *Forefathers*, a romantic drama published in 1832,[20] is based on the idea of the close unity of the natural and supernatural world and is, in this respect, akin to the Catholic conception of the *Divine Comedy*. His next work, the *Books*, is permeated by the same un-

[17] Article in *L'Avenir*, Nov. 9, 1830 (*Œuvres complètes*, X, 185).

[18] Article in *L'Avenir*, Feb. 12, 1830 (*Œuvres complètes*, X, 262).

[19] It is very characteristic (and little known) that this demand was first made by liberal Catholics with the aim of liberating the Church from its humiliating dependence upon the State.

[20] See Adam Mickiewicz, *Poems*, ed. George Rapall Noyes (New York, 1944).

shakable faith and attachment to the Catholic Church. But with this is combined love of and sacrifice for liberty, a traditional feature of the Polish spirit and especially strong after the defeat of the Polish uprising against Russia in 1830-31.

Thus Mickiewicz continues to follow the way traced by Lamennais. Sometimes he even uses similar arguments in preaching the marriage between Catholicism and liberty. In his articles on the national spirit and on the Polish parliament[21] he describes in the same way as Lamennais[22] the benevolent role of Christianity in spreading liberty in the Middle Ages and the grave consequences brought about by the loss of faith in authority. In another article, "The Project of a French Paper,"[23] he writes that such a paper devoted to the Polish cause should "defend national religion and ancient institutions" because their spirit implies "the necessity of a gradual granting of liberty to the whole nation"; all disasters are caused by the abandonment of the spirit of religion and of ancient institutions.

The democratic convictions of Mickiewicz are less precisely formulated than those of Lamennais, but his general attitude is based on the same theoretical and emotional foundations. It is hostile to all European monarchical governments and ties the Polish cause to that of the "peoples" and the enemies of the ancient order. Consequently, he advises the Poles to look for allies among popular, republican parties and to treat the problems of all nations from the point of view of liberty and universal European federation.[24] He does not, however, formulate a detailed political and social program (as did Lamennais) nor even recommend a republic as a preferred form of polity.[25] His utterances are limited to general problems in accordance with his unwillingness to introduce "rationalistic" elements into problems concerning the future of humanity.

In general, the concept of "democracy" was in this period rather vague and imprecise. "People" did not mean a concrete social class (of workers or peasants) but the whole nation; in the same way "peoples" meant nations. Lamennais came later to distinguish these two concepts (his *Livre du peuple* is concerned with working people, not the entire nation). Mickiewicz never did. Nevertheless, they both had a position in common which must be accepted as in principle democratic—their faith in the masses as a historical category, that is, masses creating history. These masses may be conceived and defined in different ways—hence differences in democratic theories and programs. But the basis is, in general, the same.

---

[21] *Works*, V, 31, and VI, 71, 72.
[22] *Essai*, I, 6; *De la religion*, p. 7.
[23] *Works*, VI, 68.
[24] *Ibid.*, VI, 67, 68.
[25] "O partji polskiej" (About the Polish Party) in *Pielgrzym polski* (Polish Pilgrim) (1833).

Of all the political trends in contemporary Europe, that of the Neo-Catholics, headed by Lamennais, was undoubtedly the most congenial to Mickiewicz, not only because of its religious character and enthusiasm for "peoples" striving for liberty, but also because of its friendly, sympathetic attitude toward Poland. After meeting Lamennais in Paris in 1831, Mickiewicz wrote to one of his friends that the French priest was the only one who sincerely wept over Poland (this was the time of the Polish insurrection). In April 1832, Lamennais wrote a touching hymn on Poland, every paragraph of which started with the refrain: "Dors, ô ma Pologne, dors en paix dans ce qu'ils appellent ta tombe; moi je sais que c'est ton berceau."[26] He greeted with enthusiasm the Polish uprising and wrote with sympathy and full realization of the international consequences of its defeat:

> En fait, nous avons applaudi à l'insurrection de la Belgique et de la Pologne; et nous y applaudissons encore de toutes les forces de notre âme . . .
>
> Qu'elle sache surtout, cette héroïque et généreuse Pologne, à jamais si chère à nos cœurs, si grande dans notre admiration, si sainte dans nos souvenirs, que ce n'est pas nous qui avons abandonné nos vieux frères d'armes, nous qui sommes coupables du sang de ses enfants: il retombera sur d'autres, et les marquera éternellement d'un signe d'opprobre et de malédiction.[27]

L'Avenir devoted much space to the Polish question and uncompromisingly backed the Poles in their fight for independence. At a time when the French government cultivated a policy of "noninterference" and "nonprovocation" of Russia, *L'Avenir* boldly demanded armed intervention in Poland. The Catholic paper was certainly expressing the opinion of French liberal circles, to some extent also that of the Parisians who arranged anti-Russian and antigovernment demonstrations. "Vive la Pologne" was frequently heard as an expression of recognition and sympathy. The Polish émigrés were received with the most cordial hospitality.[28]

The period 1830-34 was a time of spiritual crisis in the life of Lamennais. His attempt to unite Catholicism and modern political and social trends into a new and powerful force capable of ruling the world proved a failure. The Catholic Church condemned categorically, in the

[26] Printed in the French translation of Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish Pilgrims* (Paris, 1933).

[27] *Œuvres complètes*, X, 259, 358.

[28] Typical of this enthusiasm for the Polish cause is a sentence Victor Hugo wrote in a letter to Charles Montalembert: "Je suis presque aussi Polonais que vous, mon bien cher ami, et vous savez combien je vous aime de l'être plus que moi, combien je me blâme de l'être moins que vous. En amour pour cette noble Pologne je ne le cède qu'à vous." Quoted in R. P. Lecanuet, *Montalembert* (Paris, 1895), p. 365. See also M. Kridl, "Adam Mickiewicz et la France," *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* (1929).

encyclical of Pope Gregory XVI, "Mirari vos," the ideas of *L'Avenir* and Lamennais concerning absolute liberty in spiritual and social life. The Church held to its position of supreme authority, a concept already abandoned by Lamennais. It was a severe blow. Lamennais' correspondence is full of pain and bitterness. He tried for a time to find a solution in separating religious and social problems, yielding to the Church as religious authority and reserving for himself full freedom in social matters. But this very distinction proved his abandonment of the position of champion of the fighting Church. It was only a question of time until he would frankly acknowledge this fact and join the revolutionary democracy.

Meanwhile he saw his dreams destroyed; the official Church condemned the Polish uprising, praised the Czarist government, and expressed solidarity with reactionary governments which he hated. Simultaneously, social and political problems assumed, as he saw them, an increasingly acute form. The whole world seemed to be divided into two opposite camps, the oppressors and the oppressed. He felt it his duty to declare on which side he stood. Silence in such a situation could be interpreted as agreement with the existing order, and consequently as a betrayal of the disinherited. He therefore had to speak, to express everything, no matter what the consequences; he had to console and uplift the suffering people and show that the future belonged to them.

Such was, in general, Lamennais' state of mind when he became acquainted with Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish Pilgrims*. He described it in detail in a letter to the Archbishop of Paris,[29] in which he also confessed that *Paroles* was an expression of his feelings and thoughts. His letters between 1832 and 1834 are full of remarks, conceptions, and ideas which are to be found in *Paroles*: the disintegration of the old society, the seeds of a new one, the approach of decisive catastrophes, the fight between the principles of despotism and liberty, a critical attitude towards the Vatican, the conception of the people as the soundest social force.[30]

Mickiewicz settled in Paris for good in 1832 as one of the numerous Polish émigrés. Although he did not meet Lamennais until the beginning of the next year, he soon made the acquaintance of Lamennais' intimate friend and a devoted friend of Poland, Count Charles Montalembert, through whom Lamennais received information about the Polish poet. He sent Mickiewicz greetings and invitations to come to see him

[29] Lamennais, *Affaires de Rome* (Paris, 1836-37), p. 169.

[30] See *Lettres à Montalembert*, pp. 164, 165, 176, 180, 202, 210; Laveille, *Un Lamennais inconnu*, pp. 294, 334, 326, 356, 357; *Confidences de Lamennais: Lettres inédites de 1821 à 1838*, ed. Arthur de la Villerabel (Paris, 1886), p. 117; Forgues, *Œuvres posthumes de Lamennais*, pp. 300, 303, 305, 224, 325, 350, and *passim*.

at La Chênaie, his native town.[31] No less than in the person of Mickiewicz, Lamennais was interested in his works, especially in the *Books*, about which he learned from Montalembert, who admired it and supervised its translation into French.[32] Montalembert must have greatly impressed Lamennais by his enthusiasm. Lamennais' letters in the first half of 1833 are full of questions about the book, the progress of the translation, and his eagerness to read it.[33] Finally in May of that year he received the proofs of the first thirteen pages. He must have read them at once, because the next day (May 2) he writes to Montalembert with enthusiasm:

J'ai reçu hier par la poste treize feuilles du livre de Mickiewicz... On ne peut rien lire de plus touchant et de plus original. Ce petit ouvrage fera un bien immense, non seulement aux Polonais, mais aux Français et à tous les peuples dans la langue desquels il sera traduit. Il faudrait l'envoyer en Angleterre, en Allemagne et en Italie. Si tu es trop pressé, imprime sans attendre mon avis...[34]

On May 4 he writes again: "Je demeure de plus en plus persuadé de l'immense bien que peut faire ce petit livre. N'y aurait-il pas moyen d'aviser à quelque expédient pour le répandre parmi la jeunesse surtout et dans le peuple?..."[35] And on May 5: "Ne néglige aucun moyen de répandre le *Livre des Pèlerins Polonais*. C'est le livre de l'humanité entière..."[36]

Further letters to Montalembert and others express a growing admiration. To the Marquis de Corioli, Lamennais writes:

Il va paraitre incessamment un petit volume intitulé: *le Livre des Pèlerins polonais*, par Mickiewitz, sans contredit le premier poëte de notre époque: il y a là des choses ravissantes; sans oublier toute la distance qui sépare la parole de l'homme de la parole de Dieu, j'oserais presque dire quelquefois: cela est beau

[31] "Dis à Mickiewicz combien nous serons heureux de le recevoir dans notre petite retraite..." (Oct. 14, 1832). "Dis de ma part mille choses affectueuses à notre Rio [friend of Lamennais] et à Mickiewicz..." (Nov. 26, 1832). "Rappelle-moi au souvenir de Mickiewicz et presse-le d'avancer sa traduction française des *Annales de Pologne*. D'après ce que tu m'en as dit, j'ai un grand désir de connaitre cet ouvrage" (Feb. 5, 1833). See also letters of May and June 1833.

[32] Although Montalembert's name appeared as translator of the *Books*, he had in fact only written the Preface and corrected the translation made by a Pole, Bohdan Jański.

[33] "J'attends avec impatience [l'ouvrage] de Mickiewicz. Dis lui... les choses les plus amicales de ma part..." (Jan. 9, 1833). "J'attends impatiemment [la publication] de l'ouvrage de Mickiewicz avec ta preface..." (Feb. 12, 1833). "Quand paraitra donc la traduction de l'ouvrage de Mickiewicz?" (Feb. 23, 1833). "Je suis charmé que ta traduction de l'ouvrage de Mickiewicz soit achevée. Ce que tu m'en dis me donne un vif désir de la lire. Tu peux sans doute y ajouter la petite élégie ["Hymne à la Pologne"], si tu juges qu'elle ne dépare pas trop l'admirable ouvrage de Mickiewicz... Pauvre nation!... Mais elle renaitra. Le crimes des rois ont monté vers Dieu comme la fumée du premier meurtre, et du pied de son trône l'ange vengeur est déjà parti..." (Mar. 1, 1833).

[34] *Lettres à Montalembert*, p. 124.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

comme l'Evangile. Une si pure expression de la foi et de la liberté tout ensemble est une merveille dans notre siècle de servitude et d'incroyance.[37]

A letter to Countess Senfft of May 9, 1833, contains remarks about the "general evil" which affects everybody and especially the Poles. "Their great poet, Mickiewicz, wrote for them an enchanting work . . . one of the most beautiful written in recent times."[38] Lamennais' imagination, apparently excited by the *Books,* found expression in apocalyptic images and visions:

Il y avait en enfer un démon horrible, né de l'accouplement de l'Orgueil et de l'Impiété, et son nom était le Meurtre. Comme il répandait l'épouvante dans les régions infernales et qu'à son aspect, Satan même ressentait une émotion étrange, comme si le mal pur, essentiel, infini, avait passé devant sa face, il le bannit de son empire. Le monstre, exilé, prit une forme humaine et se réfugia sur la terre: on l'y nomme "Nicolas."[39]

If the *Books* became for Lamennais a kind of revelation, it was due to the fact that he had found there a realization of what he had dreamed himself and what he demanded in vain from the Church, i.e., the close organic unification of faith and liberty. Mickiewicz showed the Polish nation the road of faith, of Christian love, of fraternity among peoples, the incorporation into life of Christian ethics. His book was for "all humanity" in the sense that, although formally limited to Polish problems, it traced the future of a universal culture. In this respect it agreed, as we know, with the ideas of Lamennais, and was indeed indebted to them.

Although—as will be demonstrated later—the *Books* influenced to a considerable degree the composition, the tone, and the character of the *Paroles,* the idea of writing such a work had occurred to Lamennais before he was acquainted with the Polish pamphlet. He had even started writing it. On May 16, 1833, he wrote to Montalembert: "Avant d'avoir lu Mickiewicz, j'avais commencé un petit ouvrage d'un genre fort analogue"[40]—which casts significant light on the psychology of literary influences.

Lamennais himself set forth the reasons which led him to write and publish this work as follows:

Les motifs que j'ai de publier cet écrit sont: (1) la conscience qu'en le faisant je

[37] Forgues, *op. cit.,* II, 290.

[38] *Ibid.,* II, 291.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Lettres à Montalembert,* p. 133. It is not known exactly when he did it. The supposition of Charles Périn, editor of Lamennais' letters to de Coux (*Revue trimestrielle,* Oct. 15, 1881), and of Paul Vulliaud (*Les Paroles d'un Croyant de Lamennais,* Amiens, 1928, p. 9) that the work was ready in Mar. 1833 is unfounded, since Lamennais writes to Montalembert on May 1, 1833 about "fragments" of it, and on May 16 of the same year about continuing it. So *Paroles* was finished at the earliest in May 1833. The supposition of Pierre Harispe (*Lamennais,* 1924, pp. 62-63) that it was Lamennais' *amour-propre* which made him say that he started *Paroles* "before" instead of "after" reading Mickiewicz can hardly be taken seriously.

remplis un devoir, parce que je ne vois de salut pour le monde que dans l'union de l'ordre, du droit, de la justice et de la liberté; (2) la nécessité de fixer ma position qui aux yeux du public est maintenant équivoque et fausse; de laver mon nom dans l'avenir du reproche d'avoir connivé à l'horrible système de tyrannie qui pèse aujourd'hui sur les peuples. S'il faut souffrir pour cela, peu importe; je ne le regretterai pas. Il y a, pour chaque position, un genre de courage dont il est honteux de manquer.[41]

The genesis of the *Books* is in many ways similar. Like Lamennais, Mickiewicz undoubtedly wanted to take his stand to fulfill a duty toward his nation and humanity; like Lamennais, he descended to his neighbors and like him brought them the hope of a better future. Finally, the two works are expressions of spiritual crises, of an evolution and change in the activity of both authors.

On the other hand, there were differences both in the genesis of the two works and in the evolution they expressed, related to the quite different circumstances and conditions, both historical and personal, in which Mickiewicz and Lamennais acted. We know, in general, the situation of Lamennais. *Paroles* was preceded (and caused) by his break with the Church and his growing sentiment of responsibility for the evils of the world. Mickiewicz was primarily a poet and his last work before the *Books*, the third part of the *Forefathers*, was concerned with the problem of Polish martyrology and the future of Poland conceived in metaphysical terms, bound up with the fate of humanity. There was also in the poem a vehement, artistically superb outburst of Promethean revolt against Providence and its rule over the world. All this was in connection with the national catastrophe of 1831. Now in exile, the poet abandoned for a time the mission of a visionary and took a more simple task, that of a humble teacher of his brother émigrés. His aim was to unite them around a few simple and lofty ideas deriving from Polish traditions but possessing universal values, to save them from denationalization abroad, and to counteract the political fight of several parties which was harmful for the strength and unity of the representatives of Poland abroad. The humble presentation of nationally approved traditions and truths produced the peaceful and generally serious and lofty tone of the *Books of the Polish Pilgrims*. There is self-control and control of the subject. Even in rare moments of excitement a kind of consecration dominates.

The tone of Lamennais' confessions is passionate, hot, explosive. He had been silent for too long a time, too many feelings and thoughts had been pent up in him to be expressed calmly and systematically. Now vehement, now tender and affectionate, his narration is intermingled with apocalyptic visions of the present and the future. At times there are passages of deep lyricism, for instance the paragraphs ending with:

[41] Blaize, *Œuvres inédites de Lamennais*, II, 141.

"L'exilé partout est seul." The *Books*, on the contrary, is a kind of catechism, a collection of truths and moral advice to the nation. Mickiewicz addresses the work to the Polish nation, especially to the émigrés; the attitude of Lamennais is international. All humanity appears before him as one man who lives in pain and humiliation:

> Et toute la race humaine me paraissait comme un seul homme. Et cet homme avait fait beaucoup de mal, peu de bien, avait senti beaucoup de douleurs, peu de joies. Et il était là, gisant dans la misère, sur une terre tantôt glacée, tantôt brûlante, maigre, affamé, souffrant, affaissé d'une langueur entremêlée de convulsions, accablé de chaines forgées dans la demeure des démons . . .[42]

Lamennais brings to all mankind his words of consolation and his prophecy of a better future. He describes in a general way all the crimes and sins of contemporary civilization, all the means of economic exploitation, of political, social, and national oppression. There are, of course, some allusions to the situation in France but these are also of a general character.

Social problems, as they are conceived and treated by Lamennais, virtually do not exist for Mickiewicz. In his opinion, when Poland is restored, the social question will be solved in a new, unknown, voluntary, "Polish" manner. In his work the Polish nation and its idea are opposed not only to "governments" but also to other nations; in Lamennais humanity is embodied in the people (and "peoples") and opposed to "thrones" and earthly powers. He reacts primarily against the social evil and misery; the concept of the fatherland for him is closely bound up with the prior solution of social problems. "L'étable, où dorment et mangent les bêtes de service, n'est pas la Patrie" (*Livre du peuple*, p. 136). For Mickiewicz the concept of the fatherland has a metaphysical character, it is something sacred and independent of any real conditions, an *idea*, an embodiment of all dreams, of perfection not really existing but conceivable. Both Lamennais and Mickiewicz are convinced that a radical social revolution is indispensable and near; but the Polish poet conceives it rather as an inner change of individuals which will decide all other external things, Lamennais rather as a change of social conditions and forms.

In order to give his words more significance and gravity, Mickiewicz used a majestic Biblical prose, breaking with contemporary literary conventions. This form aroused either enthusiasm or indignation among his readers. Lamennais certainly belonged to the enthusiasts and did not shrink from using the same form in his work. He explained his intention to approach the Gospels in his language in a letter to Sainte-Beuve[43] and

[42] *Paroles d'un croyant*, 3rd ed. (Geneva, 1834), p. 17.
[43] Quoted by Forgues, *Revue contemporaine*, Aug. 25, 1895, p. 505.

the manuscript of *Paroles* shows a definite tendency to give to his sentences a grave and simple style.[44]

The evangelic character of the style of both authors was in harmony with their general attitude, prophetic and apostolic. The belief that through them were expressed the feelings, dreams, longings, and sufferings of millions inspired both with confidence in their mission. Mickiewicz frankly states that some of his assertions have a divine source—they come from "God's grace." Lamennais writes about an "inner force" which drives him toward accomplishment of his task; without this he would be unable to write one word. It is as if a voice spoke to him all the time, a voice of which he is only a feeble echo. "I follow the voice," he says in another place, "which calls upon the gates of the future to open and the peoples to enter."[45]

The Catholicism of the two books is, of course, not strictly dogmatic and orthodox. They are too revolutionary, they pose the problem of liberty in too radical and uncompromising a way, their criticism of the established order (to which the Church clung) and of various methods of oppression is too bellicose. No wonder, then, that both were put on the *Index librorum prohibitorum.*

There is another common feature which should be stressed. The mentality of both writers is characterized by a certain simplicity which hinders them in their grasp of the variety of human reality, its complications, splits, differences, and contrasts. They apply to everything one firm and rigid standard, one simple, uncompromising, and unadaptable philosophy. This uniform explanation of everything becomes oversimplified and onesided. Simplicity is sacred, but also naive. This is both its weakness and its strength. Without naïveté all reformers, revolutionaries, builders of the future would be deprived of their inner certitude, their force of decision, and their infallible instinct of action. Their knowledge of the world is of a different order, built up from other foundations; its basic points are—according to Sainte-Beuve—determined by a transcendental geometry.[46] It is an apocalyptic vision which—to use the words of Ballanche—"engloutit le temps, l'espace, ne tient nul compte des passions humaines, dédaigne les obstacles, les réalités, les règles conventionelles et les transactions; la vision crée un autre objectif, un objectif qui brille seulement au bout de l'horizon, comme une magnifique aurore boréale . . ."[47]

---

[44] For instance (words in brackets are crossed out): "Ne vous laissez pas tromper par [les mots] *de vaines paroles*; Fils de l'homme, monte sur les hauteurs et [dis nous] *annonce* ce que tu [aperçois] *vois*; Je vois un troisième peuple sur lequel six [monarques] *rois* ont [posé] *mis* le pied . . ."

[45] *Confidences de Lamennais*, p. 145.

[46] "L'abbé de Lamennais," *Revue des deux mondes*, Feb. 1, 1832, p. 366.

[47] Ballanche, "Paroles d'un Croyant," *Revue européenne*, May, 1834, pp. 348-349.

Both authors start with "the beginning," with the happy days of yore, and contrast them with the present day. "In the beginning," says Mickiewicz, "there was belief in one God, and there was freedom in the world. And there were no laws, only the will of God, and there were no lords and slaves, only patriarchs and their children." And Lamennais: "Et je fus transporté en esprit dans les temps anciens, et la terre était belle et riche et féconde et ses habitants vivaient heureux parce qu'ils vivaient en frères" (chapter III).

But later—according to Mickiewicz—men renounced the one God, and one half of the people became the slaves of the other half, and finally "fell together into the slavery of the Roman Emperor." It was only with the coming to earth of Jesus Christ that regeneration of mankind followed. "And justice returned to the earth," and fraternity of nations, and "freedom spread in Europe slowly but steadily and in order . . . But the kings corrupted all."

This process is described by Lamennais in a more general way: "Il y a dix-huit siècles, le Verbe répandit la semence divine et l'Esprit saint la féconda. Les hommes l'ont vue fleurir, ils ont gouté de ses fruits, des fruits de l'arbre de vie replanté dans leur pauvre demeure" (chapter I). Lamennais compares the epoch of early Christianity with the contemporary situation, presenting in chapter II the slavery of the peoples and predicting that the dawn of liberty is near. Only later (chapter III) does he come back to the cause of the evil, attributing it, like Mickiewicz, to "the kings." The kings corrupted all—says the Polish poet—for they became evil "and Satan entered into them."

> Et je vis le Serpent [writes Lamennais] qui se glissait au milieu d'eux, il fixa sur plusieurs son regard puissant, et leur âme se troubla, et ils s'approchèrent, et le Serpent leur parla à l'oreille.
>
> Et après avoir écouté la parole du Serpent ils se levèrent et dirent: Nous sommes rois [III].

The question of "corruption" is treated by the two authors in different ways. For Mickiewicz the cause of the disaster lies in the fact that the kings became evil. Lamennais uses the same motif, but—according to him—the cause lay not in the fact that the kings became evil, but in that they appeared on the earth and with them the idea of power of man over man. This was precisely the work of the "Serpent." Mickiewicz does not see anything wrong in the royal institution itself. It can be good and efficient; but it can also be wrong, when Satan enters into the representatives of power.[48] For Lamennais, on the contrary, the very fact

[48] "Think not that government is of itself evil and knowledge of itself evil, but men have corrupted them," says Mickiewicz in *Books*, chap. IV. All the quotations are from *Konrad Wallenrod and Other Writings of Adam Mickiewicz*, trans. from the Polish by J. Parish, D. P. Radin, G. R. Noyes, and others (Berkeley, 1925).

that a man considers himself king is a work of Satan and a sin. This is a very characteristic detail, which confirms our statement that Mickiewicz always emphasizes the inner value of an individual, whereas Lamennais emphasizes the value of social forms and institutions.

What then were the means employed by the "kings" to corrupt what Christianity established on earth? In the *Books* they say:

> Let us take heed: lo, the people are attaining to understanding and plenty, and they live uprightly, so that we cannot punish them, and the sword rusteth in our hands; but the people are attaining to freedom and our power weakeneth, and as soon as they mature and become wholly free, our power will be at an end . . .
>
> Let us strive that the people may always be foolish and thus not know their powers, and that they may quarrel among themselves and thus not unite one with another against us.

Lamennais treats this affair in a more detailed way in chapter XIII, using the accessories of second-rate romanticism. In a great hall, whose walls are covered with red material and where a red lamp burns, a meeting of seven kings takes place. In the middle a throne is built of human bones and skeletons; under it lies an overthrown crucifix; before the throne is a table on which is a skull and a vase filled with boiling human blood. The kings are discussing the question of how to crush liberty established on earth by Christ: "Que ferons-nous pour étouffer la liberté? Car notre règne est fini si le sien commence." Each approaches the table, drinks from the vase, and expresses his opinion. We have then seven means of banishing liberty from the world:

> C'est sa religion qui nous a perdus: abolissons la religion du Christ . . .
>
> Abolissons la science et la pensée; car la science veut connaitre ce qu'il n'est pas bon pour nous que l'homme sache, et la pensée est toujours prête à regimber contre la force.
>
> Qu'aucun bruit de dehors ne pénètre chez nous; il faut qu'aucun peuple n'entende la voix d'un autre peuple, de peur que si celui-là se plaint et remue celui-ci ne soit tenté de l'imiter.
>
> Divisons pour régner. De cette manière tous se haïront et ils ne songeront pas à s'unir contre nous.
>
> Le bourreau est le premier ministre d'un bon prince.
>
> Epuisons la force et l'énergie et le courage par la corruption; amollissons les hommes par la volupté.
>
> Il faut gagner les prêtres du Christ avec des biens, des honneurs, et de la puissance. Et ils commanderont au peuple de la part du Christ, de nous être soumis en tout quoique nous fassions, quoique nous ordonnions. Et le peuple les croira, et il obéira par conscience et notre pouvoir sera plus affermi qu'auparavant.

Despite the close resemblance to Mickiewicz, we cannot be at all sure that Lamennais is borrowing from the *Books*. In a part of *Affaires de Rome* entitled "Des maux de l'Eglise et de la societé," written in 1832, we find a similar passage expressing some of the same thoughts, although not in the same form.[49] Moreover, Sainte-Beuve in his review of

[49] *Affaires de Rome*, p. 228.

the *Paroles*[50] states that the utterances of the seven kings are taken literally from an Italian book recently published in Modena. He had certainly in mind *Dialoghetti sulle materie correnti nell'anno 1831.* Lamennais knew this booklet, wrote an article about it in the *Revue des deux mondes,* August 1, 1834 (reprinted in *Œuvres complètes,* XI, 173 ff.), and translated the last dialogue, which decribes the means to be used to support the shaking thrones; they are analogous to those of the kings in *Paroles.* This example shows how cautious one should be in dealing with so-called literary influences. It is perfectly possible that in this case (involving generalities and commonplaces) there are no influences at all, that Mickiewicz, Lamennais, and the anonymous author of *Dialoghetti* all wrote independently of each other.

There are differences in tone. What Mickiewicz expresses quietly in a few sentences becomes in Lamennais' interpretation a vision of horror and disgust. His whole nature, vehement and unbridled, capable only of immense love and immense hatred, manifests itself in these pages. Although there are common thoughts—contrast between royal power and liberty, the kings' fight against freedom of thinking, and the principle *divide et impera*—there is also one motif found in Lamennais which Mickiewicz did not introduce into his *Books,* that of bribing and corrupting the clergy, to compel them to falsify the doctrine of Christ and to adapt it to the aims of the "kings." Lamennais attacked not only the clergy, but the Pope himself; the autograph manuscript of the *Paroles* contains a passage (deleted by Sainte-Beuve in the first printing) in which the Pope signs a pact with the Russian Czar, embodiment of all tyranny and oppression.[51] Mickiewicz, in his later works, especially in his *Course of Slavic Literature* in the Collège de France (1840-44), took a similar attitude toward "l'Eglise officielle."

Let us follow further the thoughts of the two books:

Then the kings, renouncing Christ,[52] made ready new gods that were idols, and set them up in the sight of the people, and bade them bow down to them and fight for them.

And so the kings made an idol for the French and called it *honor*; and this was the same idol that in pagan times was called the golden calf.

Or Satan [writes Lamennais] qui est le roi des oppresseurs des nations, leur suggéra, pour affermir leur tyrannie, une ruse infernale.

Il leur dit: Prenez dans chaque famille les jeunes gens, les plus robustes, et donnez-leur des armes et exercez-les à les manier, et ils combattront pour vous contre leur pères et leur frères; car je leur persuaderai que c'est une action glorieuse. Je leur ferai deux idoles, qui s'appelleront *Honneur et Fidelité,* et une loi qui s'appellera Obéissance passive [XXXV].

---

[50] *Revue des deux mondes,* May 1, 1834, p. 353.

[51] See *Œuvres complètes,* Vol. XI. In the manuscript, pp. 98-99.

[52] "Maudit soit le Christ qui a ramené sur la terre la Liberté," says one of them in *Paroles,* chap. XIII.

Again we have an example of an independent elaboration of a borrowed motif. The premise is the same—the bringing forth of "idols" created purposely to keep the peoples in fetters. But Lamennais' attitude turns out to be quite "antimilitarist." He sees evil in the very institution of an army as conceived by the kings, as a tool for suppressing revolutions.

Mickiewicz enumerates other national idols: the Spaniards received from their rulers "political preponderance or influence," the English "sea power and commerce," the Germans "Brotsinn"—and all of them "the most abominable of all idols," self-interest. The idea of self-interest, as a major cause of the reign of evil in international, social, and personal relations, appears also in Lamennais' pamphlet: "Ce qui produit les discordes et les dissensions, ce qui engendre les procès qui scandalisent les gens de bien et ruinent les familles, c'est premièrement l'intérêt sordide, la passion insatiable d'acquérir et de posséder" (XXIX). But he adds immediately: "Une autre cause de dissensions interminables, ce sont les mauvaises lois."

Mickiewicz does not go beyond a general characterization of national idols and pays no attention to further consequences of this state of things. Lamennais, on the contrary, devotes to this problem a number of chapters, depicting with a social sense, proper to him, various kinds of evil emanating from the worship of self-interest. He treats sagaciously the beginning and the development of economic exploitation (of course, in poetical transcription) which becomes monstrous in capitalistic polity (chapter VIII), then the reasons for hatred and fights between one's fellow men. His wrath is, of course, directed against the propertied classes, and his faith that they will be crushed by the powerful will of the people is unshakable. For the moment, however, this "band of hypocrites" does not grant the people even the right to fight for better conditions of life, "une augmentation de ce salaire, afin que vous puissiez vivre, vous, vos femmes et vos enfants" (chapter XXI).

The horrible, anti-Christian work of the destruction of mankind carried out by the rulers of this world succeeds in finding "philosophical," theoretical justification. There are people who try to recognize this state of things as necessary and ideal. Says Mickiewicz: "And philosophers were found who strove to prove that the [Roman] Emperor [in calling himself God and proclaiming that there was no other law in the world except his will] did well." Lamennais asks:

> Qui se rassemble autour des puissants du monde? Qui approche d'eux? . . . Les riches et les flatteurs qui veulent le devenir, les ministres infâmes de leur plaisirs secrets, les baladins, les fous qui distraient leur conscience et les faux prophètes qui la trompent [XXXII].
>
> Il s'est rencontré de faux prophètes qui ont persuadé à quelques hommes que

tous les autres étaient nés pour eux; et ce que ceux-ci ont cru, les autres l'ont cru aussi sur la parole des faux prophètes [VI].

The final judgment and vengeance of the people will be terrible. Mickiewicz depicts it in a crude way in chapter XXIII. He speaks about French rulers and "men who call themselves wise"; they "shall lie between your people and foreign despotism as a bar of cold iron between the hammer and the anvil"—they "shall be beaten and the dross from them and the sparks from them shall fly to the ends of the earth . . ." "Ye have heard of famines such that mothers have eaten their children; but your hunger shall be more grievous, for I say unto you that ye shall cut off the ears of living fellow creatures, and your own ears, and roast them and eat them . . ." Lamennais predicts a similar fate for the "rulers." In a visionary way he describes them as excommunicated, forgotten, and haunted by fear (chapters XIV and XXIII). He comes back to the same vision in chapter XXIV, where some analogy with the words of Mickiewicz can be found: "On les verra [les rois, les riches et les puissants] errant sur les chemins, demander aux passants quelques haillons pour couvrir leur nudité, un peu de pain noir pour apaiser leur faim et je ne sais s'ils l'obtiendront."

We have presented above the common features of the negative parts of the *Books* and the *Paroles*, that is, criticism of the situation in which mankind finds itself. The positive parts are concerned with the question of what to do in order to hasten the coming of the dawn of liberty. This question is answered with a series of parables illustrating the authors' counsel.

Love must be made the reigning principle among men and peoples. Love will create fraternity among them, which will replace the existing fight "for a scrap of paper called a treaty . . . over a seaport, over a city, over a factory, over a bale of cotton, and over a sack of pepper."[53] Sacrifice and devotion will be substituted for egoism. Mickiewicz says in his *Books:*

> And the ruler of France said: We cannot ransom this innocent nation [Poland] by our blood or by our money, for my blood and my money belong to me, and the blood and money of my nation belong to my nation.
>
> And this ruler uttered the last blasphemy against Christ, for Christ taught that the blood of the Son of Man belongeth to all our brother men.

There is also a parable in chapter VIII about a fire which destroyed a whole city because of the selfishness of the inhabitants; and chapter XVIII opposes Polish ethics to that of other nations: "But your law is otherwise, for ye say: 'All that is ours is the Fatherland's; all that is our Fatherland's belongeth to the free peoples.' "

Lamennais writes:

---

[53] *Books of the Polish Pilgrims.*

Aimez-vous les uns les autres, et vous ne craindrez ni les grands, ni les princes, ni les rois. Ne dites point: Celui-là est d'un peuple, et moi je suis d'un autre peuple. Car tous les peuples ont eu sur la terre le même père qui est Dieu [IV. Analogous phrase in Mickiewicz: "And the nations forgot that they had sprung from one Father."]

Si l'on frappe un membre, tout le corps souffre. Vous êtes tous un même corps; on ne peut opprimer l'un de vous que tous ne soient opprimés [IV].

[Le Père célèste] les a unis en familles, et toutes les familles sont sœurs, il les a unis en nations et toutes les nations sont sœurs; et quiconque sépare les familles des familles, les nations des nations, divise ce que Dieu a uni: il fait l'œuvre de Satan [XIX].

This idea of the solidarity and brotherhood of all nations was not an empty phrase in the mouths of Mickiewicz and Lamennais. They proved it by deeds, Lamennais through his support of Poland, Belgium, and Ireland, Mickiewicz through the creation of Polish legions in 1848 to aid the Italian people against Austria, and in 1855 during the Crimean War to help the Turks.

Mutual love, however, is not enough. Men must unite for the common fight. Mickiewicz says:

In entering upon a council or deliberation, humble yourselves in your own eyes, for without humility there is no concord. For that reason we do not say to men, "Rise up to concord," but "Bow down to concord."

And he who wisheth to bind together the tops of trees must bend them down; bend therefore your understandings and they shall be bound together [XII—cf. the parable of the wolves, VIII].

Mickiewicz understands that unity and accord are achieved by renunciation and humility. He thus strikes at one of the weak points not only of the Polish émigrés but of any life in common, the eternal conflicts between the rights of individuals and the good of the community. Lamennais does not care for such subtleties. He treats the problem from a practical point of view. Unity and accord are required by the very interest of the cause. He shows this in a series of examples and parables. Among them we find a parable of a wolf (analogous to that of Mickiewicz) which attacks a flock of sheep and devours them one after another, because they are unable to resist together (chapter IV), and a parable of a lonely tree shaken by the wind and a lonely man exploited by the powerful (chapter VII).

Judge not that ye be not judged—this is another warning and slogan which Mickiewicz and Lamennais address to the nations. The Polish poet says in chapters X and XII: "Be gentle toward others, but stern toward yourself . . . Search not continually in the past for errors and sins . . . good people judge, beginning on the good side [because] it is easy to see faults but difficult to see merits . . . If there is a black spot on a picture or a hole in a picture, any stupid man whatsoever may descry it; but the merits of a picture only the skilled man seeth." As to the

Polish past Mickiewicz applied this principle very carefully, stressing almost exclusively its sunny sides. Even toward contemporary problems and men he tried to keep this point of view, forgetting sometimes that indulgence can easily turn into weakness. There is nothing similar in Lamennais. Indulgence and tolerance in matters of principle were alien to his nature. In some cases indulgence and forgiveness seemed to him to be treason. As to judging others, he utters this characteristic opinion:

> Quand vous voyez un homme conduit en prison ou au supplice, ne vous pressez pas de dire: Celui-là est un homme méchant, qui a commis un crime contre les hommes:
>
> Car peut-être est-ce un homme de bien, qui a voulu servir les hommes, et qui en est puni par leurs oppresseurs.
>
> Quand vous voyez un peuple chargé de fers et livré au bourreau, ne vous pressez pas de dire: Ce peuple est un peuple violent qui voulait troubler la paix de la terre:
>
> Car peut-être est-ce un peuple martyr, qui meurt pour le salut du genre humain [V].

This passage deals not so much with the problem of severe judgments in general as with destroying the ruling official ethics and creating a new one. Men and things must not be judged according to norms and laws of modern states and courts. What is considered by them to be a crime punishable by jail or death may be for the ethics of the future a high virtue. The morality of "oppressors" should be replaced by that of men fighting for liberation. The second part of the passage, dealing with a martyred nation, contains certainly an allusion to Poland and to the defeat of the 1830 uprising.

Mickiewicz speaks frequently in his *Books* of Poland's special position in the world, of her struggle for her own freedom and that of other peoples, of the Polish spirit of sacrifice. Referring to the partitions of Poland, he writes:

> For the Polish nation did not die: its body lieth in the grave, but its soul hath descended from the earth, that is from public life, to the abyss, that is to the private life of people who suffer slavery in their country and outside of their country, that it may see their sufferings.
>
> But on the third day the soul shall return to the body, and the Nation shall arise and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery.
>
> And already two days have gone. One ended with the first capture of Warsaw [during the Kosciuszko insurrection in 1794], and the second day ended with the second capture of Warsaw [in 1831], and the third day shall begin, but shall not end.
>
> And as after the resurrection of Christ blood sacrifices ceased in all the world, so after the resurrection of the Polish Nation wars shall cease in all Christendom.[54]

In this comparison of the death of Poland with the death of Christ Lamennais' idea of a "martyr people" which dies for the salvation of

[54] *Ibid.*

mankind is certainly implied. Does this mean that Lamennais adopted not only the general tendencies and some details of the *Books,* but also the special historiosophical and messianic ideas of Mickiewicz? This would not be strange, even if we take into account the more positive and realistic mind of Lamennais. We can find some confirmation of this supposition in the *Livre du peuple* (1837), where he writes: "Chacune d'elles [nations] suivant son génie, le lieu, le climat qu'elle habite a sa fonction particulière, que la Providence lui assigne pour le perfectionnement progressif de l'humanité. Loin de lui créer des entraves, toutes la doivent seconder, car elle travaille pour toutes en travaillant pour soi . . ."[55]

If Lamennais recognized in principle national missions established by Providence, he could recognize martyrdom and death for the sake of mankind as the mission of the Polish nation. This could be understood and justified in that the "death" of Poland could become a powerful means of "awakening" other nations, of contributing to their realization of the dangerous international situation and, consequently, of strengthening them in their fight for freedom. This was not the opinion of Lamennais alone. A vehement indignation against the "crime" of Poland's dismemberment spread through the liberal circles of all Europe, and the popularity of the Poles after 1831 was no less general.

Let us go back to the two works in question. When all the dreams are fulfilled, when both social conditions and the souls of men are transformed, then God's kingdom on earth will come into existence. What will it be like, as the two reformers conceive it? Of course, neither of them provides a detailed governmental or social system for the future. They both insist, however, on one of its basic conditions, liberty. Mickiewicz does not define liberty in the *Books,* but he states in one of his articles that "with the name of Poland is bound up the idea not only of freedom and equality, but of sacrifice for universal freedom and equality."[56]

Though Lamennais remarks at the end of his book that the true fatherland and happiness of man are not of this earth, his desire is to attain for the world as much liberty and happiness as possible. He enumerates (in a poetical way) most of the postulates: liberty of thought, word, association, etc. He does not, however, consider these an ultimate aim, but a step for attaining a still higher degree of culture and a closer approach to God.

La liberté luira sur vous, quand à force de courage et de persévérance, vous vous serez affranchis de toutes ces servitudes.

[55] See also Lamennais, "La Pologne," quoted in Paul Boncour's *Lamennais* (Paris, 1928), pp. 112-113.

[56] *O partji polskiej* (About the Polish Party), *Works,* VI, 9.

La liberté luira sur vous, quand vous aurez dit au fond de votre âme:
Nous voulons être libres; quand pour le devenir, vous serez prêts à sacrifier tout et à tout souffrir.
La liberté luira sur vous, lorsqu'au pied de la croix sur laquelle Christ mourut pour vous, vous aurez juré de mourir les uns pour les autres [XX].

We have here a formulation of three kinds of liberty and a sort of "graduation" of the concept. The first kind may be defined as external liberty—liberation from slavery; the second is inner liberty, something like the will to liberty; the third conceives of liberty as sacrifice for liberty, a concept congenial to Mickiewicz.

In general, it can be said that *Books of the Polish Pilgrims* and *Paroles d'un croyant* are close to each other both in genesis (with the limitations already noted) and in character. This was the result of a spiritual affinity between the authors and of literary influences. Affinity, combined with the "spirit of the epoch," was probably the more important. The influence of Mickiewicz on Lamennais is seen in the adaptation of the spirit and the style of the *Books* and of numerous individual motifs. There is, of course, no ordinary "imitation"; ideas and images taken from the Polish work are always independently reworked and originally interpreted. This appears especially in Lamennais' attitude toward social problems. Likewise Lamennais' style is his own and original, although it was to some extent shaped under the influence of Mickiewicz's Biblical prose.

It is noteworthy that Mickiewicz did not show great enthusiasm for *Paroles*. We learn this, not from his direct utterances, but from those of his friends with whom he discussed the work. One of them, J. B. Zaleski, quotes Mickiewicz as saying that in his book Lamennais, although a priest, bows to the "Moloch" more frequently than himself.[57] What Mickiewicz meant by "Moloch" is subject to conjecture. In a paragraph of the *Books* dealing with worshipers of various "idols," Mickiewicz says: "Their God who is called *la souveraineté du peuple*, is an envious god consuming like fire."[58] Since Moloch was precisely a god devouring his victims by fire, we may assume that Mickiewicz meant the principle of the sovereignty of the people in the revolutionary-democratic sense of Lamennais. Another friend of Mickiewicz, Armand Lévy, noted in his diary this opinion of the poet: "*Paroles d'un croyant* had great publicity, but it is too rhetorical a work to last. Lamennais has seen in the Church only its official side."[59] A similar opinion is reported by A. Chodźko: "L'abbé de Lamennais is inspired by intellect and that is the reason why he is not great. Only at times has he great moments, and then he speaks out of the spirit."[60]

[57] Władysław Mickiewicz, *Adam Mickiewicz*, II, 211.
[58] *Books*, ed. J. Kallenbach (first version) (Paris, 1905), p. 30.
[59] W. Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 379.
[60] *Ibid.*, III, 437-438.

These judgments, expressed at various periods of Mickiewicz's life (the first in 1834, the second in 1850, the third in 1847) are evidence of the state of mind that we have already mentioned: indifference toward social problems, aversion toward rationalism in any form, and attachment to the idea of the Catholic Church no matter what may be the official policy of the Vatican. This led him to a misinterpretation of Lamennais' "faculté maîtresse" and to an underestimation of his work.

Lamennais remained more objective and just toward Mickiewicz even during the latter's professorship at the Collège de France. He was opposed to Mickiewicz's doctrine of messianism and criticized it—according to a letter to Dumesnil[61]—but at the same time acknowledged its originality and showed understanding for "the great mind and the heroic soul" of the Polish poet.

With the *Books* and *Paroles* the spiritual relationship of Mickiewicz and Lamennais virtually ended. Their later lives and works show a gradual development of different elements of their personalities which were already visible in their earlier writings. Lamennais evolved more and more toward revolutionary, republican democracy. He liquidated his relation with Rome in one of his most impressive books, *Affaires de Rome* (1836-37), and devoted himself entirely to the cause of the people. All his writings henceforth (except for two philosophical works and a translation of the *Divine Comedy*) are devoted to this cause: *Le Livre du peuple* (1837), *Politique à l'usage du peuple* (1838), *De l'esclavage moderne* (1838), *Le Pays et le gouvernement* (1840), for which he was sentenced to a year in prison, *Du passé et de l'avenir du peuple* (1841), etc. He brought to this work all the most valuable traits of his character: absolute sincerity, unshakable faith in his principles, absolute sacrifice for the beloved cause, and uncompromising firmness in his convictions. He espoused democracy and developed its principles to the ultimate, apparently "unrealizable" consequences.

Mickiewicz around 1840 fell into mysticism, which pushed him further away from "earthly" problems, from political and social discussions and battles. A study of the differences between mystical and democratic world views as illustrated by the systems of Mickiewicz and Lamennais would be very interesting and instructive, but would go far beyond the scope of this article. Consequently, a few general remarks must suffice.

Mickiewicz acquired, in his mystical period, an unusual feeling of strength and self-confidence. An absolute faith in the individual as the creator of truth and moral certitude replaced the former criteria ac-

[61] *Ibid.*

cepted under the influence of Lamennais. "There is no way," he says, "of consulting general opinion, since we have to act every day." Truth cannot be conquered by correct reasoning only. It is not available to everyone, but only to those who by inner effort reach a high moral level. To them and not to the rationalistic "philosophers" is truth revealed. The way to it is not through thinking, but through acting.

The main dogma of Polish messianism is, according to Mickiewicz, the hierarchy of spirits. A more advanced spirit has a natural mission to be the guide of spirits of a lower level. Accordingly, the cult of heroes becomes the religion of messianism. They are the chosen leaders of the masses, who in themselves have no significance. Such a leadership can by no means be identified with despotism because despotism is not the power of one man, but power without love. The form of a government does not matter. Progress consists entirely in our inner approach to God, and the progress of humanity develops through revelation. "The people" does not necessarily mean workers and peasants—it means suffering and aspiring men who are free in spirit. Accordingly, liberty is an empty word when existing only in constitutions, in freedom of speech, association, etc.; it exists primarily "in spirit" and constitutes an "inner flame" which is the source of all other minor liberties. Equality is not equality of rights, laws, and codes; it is realized in its entirety only when the same sacred ointment is poured on everyone, when people work together for the same aim, are imbued with the same feeling. In Polish history it was realized in the Polish legion of Napoleon. Education cannot be achieved by books alone; it is connected with great events, with great traditions and examples. Material misery is the result of spiritual misery, if we take into account the influence of the spirit on the physical state of man.[62]

It is evident that such a philosophy is directly opposed to the principles of democracy in general and to the type advocated by Lamennais. Democracy believes in masses and instinctively distrusts individuals, especially those who preach a "mission." Mankind as a whole, and not the individual, no matter how great, is the creator of truth and its executor. Mankind develops according to eternal laws. Consequently, no decisive leading role can be attributed to individuals.[63] The only decisive factor is the masses and the cause which unites them and forms their strength. This cause must be defended by all, and it can be defended only through the spread of certain opinions and not by the inspiration of an individual. Mickiewicz preached the education of individuals, especially emphasizing "inner education" and preparation for leadership; democ-

[62] All these theories in *Lectures on Slavic Literature* (Poznań, 1850-51) and *Collaboration of Mickiewicz with Towiański* (Paris, 1877).

[63] See *Lettres à Montalembert*, pp. 157, 359; *Correspondance entre Lamennais et Vitrolles*, p. 291.

racy educates masses through the awakening of their collective conscience. It operates with exactly defined political, social, and economic postulates and is not concerned about the "inner" work of individuals, their goal of "sanctity." This is their private affair.[64] Such concepts as "people," "progress," "liberty," "equality" have here definite, concrete, "earthly" meaning. In his *Le Livre du peuple* Lamennais clearly distinguishes between "classes supérieures" and "peuple," considering the latter as the working class producing wealth for others.[65] In its hands alone is the future of mankind. Progress does not consist in individual inward elevation to God, but in the elevation of the world; this is achieved not by inspired leaders but by an evolution of mankind.[66] This evolution cannot go on without definite social and political reforms which must be fought for, because "la liberté se prend et n'est jamais volontairement donnée."[67] This fight must be organized, hence the necessity for political parties, which were disdained by Mickiewicz. Despotism is not "power without love," but power of one or more men over the mass, which should be ruled by itself. Liberty is first of all a political and social, not a metaphysical problem—although neither Lamennais nor any democrat can deny the importance of "inner liberty," of feeling oneself free.

All this does not mean that Mickiewicz and Lamennais, during the latter period of their lives, found themselves in opposite camps. On the contrary, in spite of basic differences, they had enough in common to maintain a similar attitude toward some pertinent political and moral problems. For instance, both greeted the French Revolution of 1848 with enthusiasm, believing it to be a turning point in history. Lamennais was elected to the Assemblée Constituante, where he joined the extreme left wing, and presented an "absolutely" democratic project of a new constitution embodying the principle of "souveraineté du peuple" in its most literal meaning. He preached the same opinions in his paper *Peuple constituant*.[68] Mickiewicz organized a Polish legion in Italy for the fight against Austria, and back in Paris became the editor-in-chief of *La Tribune des peuples*, a paper which advocated the defense of the revolution and the republic. Mickiewicz, however, saw in Louis Napoleon the embodiment of the "Napoleonic idea" (the idea of messianism, of great men endowed with a mission to direct peoples) and expected great deeds of him. Lamennais, and with him the majority of democratic

[64] Blaize, *Œuvres inédites de Lamennais* (Paris, 1866), p. 255.
[65] *Le Livre du peuple, passim.*
[66] *Du passé et de l'avenir du peuple*, pp. 122-123.
[67] *L'Avenir*, Apr. 7, 1831.
[68] Lamennais' role in preparing and directing the Revolution of 1848 is stressed by Claude Carcopino, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-211.

leaders, treated Louis Napoleon rather with distrust and spoke of him with disdain.[69]

In criticism of the official Church Mickiewicz and Lamennais approached each other, though at different times. Until 1840, his period of mysticism, Mickiewicz did not attack the Church in any way; Lamennais criticized the Church already in *Paroles* and especially in *Affaires de Rome,* not to speak of his private correspondence. Later he lost all interest in this matter, occupied as he was with other questions. Their criticism is directed both against the Church hierarchy, especially the higher clergy, and against certain dogmas. In their opinion the Church no longer represents the ideals of humanity. It has lost God's grace and spirit and become *official*, that is, a lifeless remnant fallen into routine. Consequently, the Church has lost its influence on the development of mankind, which is proceeding in its own, independent way. The Church does not even try to know and understand the spirit of modern Europe, the new social, political, and philosophical trends, the ideals of the "peoples" fighting for a fundamental transformation of the world. On the contrary, Rome is allied with reactionary governments, immersed in "diplomacy" and earthly interests. The clergy has abandoned its lofty mission and become obscurantist and materialistic, virtually anti-Christian.[70]

By what means then can the Church be saved? By a new "rebirth of Christianity," answer both Mickiewicz and Lamennais, by a total regeneration, a transformation according to the new spirit of the times.[71] The Church must be reconverted to the idea of Christianity confessed by all humanity.

Lamennais, as usual, is more radical. He simply rejects Catholicism and accepts Christianity as his faith.[72] Christianity is eternal, Catholicism only an external passing form of it.[73] The Catholic concept of a superior, irresponsible authority is in contrast with absolute liberty, the aim of the "peoples." Mickiewicz does not go so far, but he also opposes

[69] "Louis Bonaparte est une sorte d'idiot qui, à la tribune où il crut devoir monter, a excité la risée universelle de la Chambre." *Correspondance entre Lamennais et Vitrolles*, p. 447.

[70] Here are some impressions from Lamennais' stay in Rome: "On peut venir là pour y mourir, mais non pour vivre, car de vie à peine y a-t-il une ombre ... J'ai besoin d'air, de foi, d'amour, de tout ce qu'on cherche vainement au milieu de ces vieilles ruines, sur lequelles rampent, comme d'immondes reptiles, dans l'ombre et le silence, les plus viles passions humaines." Forgues, *Œuvres posthumes de Lamennais*, II, 235. In other letters we find such expressions as "idiote et méchante canaille," "le plus infame cloaque," etc. See *Lettres à Montalembert*, p. 58; Forgues, *op. cit.*, II, 251-252.

[71] See *Affaires de Rome*, pp. 26, 196, 195; *Lectures on Slavic Literature*, IV, 19, 26, 27.

[72] *Lettres à Montalembert*, p. 124.

[73] *Livre du peuple*, p. 153; Blaize, *op. cit.*, II, 181.

the Christianity of action, sacrifice, and strength to the Christianity of passivity, humility, and resignation, and the new, living Church to the Church of contemplation and death. These distinctions are quite in the spirit of Lamennais, with the difference that Mickiewicz substitutes the term "official Church" for "Catholicism." But the distinction itself implies the evolution of Catholicism, which is in opposition to the official doctrine. All the more opposed to it is the assertion that "not everything written by the Apostles derives from God's spirit. Only what Christ said is God's."[74]

Lamennais, in 1836, was already far advanced in skepticism. Later years brought a gradual weakening of his faith in some Catholic dogmas. In *Dicussions critiques* (1841) he explicitly denied the supernatural order, miracles, the fall of man and his salvation, the divinity of Christ, sacraments, etc. He died in complete accordance with his principles. His last will and testament is monumental in its simplicity and strength.[75]

Mickiewicz died in 1855 in Constantinople while organizing a Polish legion to fight against Czarist Russia. He never lost his faith in the divinity of the Catholic Church and never ceased to consider himself a devout and practicing Catholic, despite his opposition to the official policy of the Vatican.

Columbia University

[74] *Lectures on Slavic Literature*, IV, 57.

[75] "Je veux être enterré au milieu des pauvres et comme le sont les pauvres. On ne mettra rien sur ma fosse, pas même une simple pierre. Mon corps sera porté directement au cimetière, sans être présenté à aucune église. Je défends très expressément que l'on appose les scellés chez moi." E. Spuller, *Lamennais, étude d'histoire politique et religieuse* (Paris, 1892), p. 342.

THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE IN THE ESTIMATES OF EMILE GEBHART AND DILTHEY

ELIO GIANTURCO

THE RECENT, almost simultaneous, publication of two works dealing with the history of the concept "Renaissance," one by an American, Wallace K. Ferguson,[1] and the other by a Dutchman, Schulte Nordhold,[2] prompts me to call attention to the two most significant notices elicited by the publication of Burckhardt's *Kultur der Renaissance* in its original text (1860) and in its first French translation (1885). They are, respectively, by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and by Emile Gebhart (1839-1908). The Dilthey piece appeared in 1862.[3] The *compte rendu* by Gebhart was featured in 1885 in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, under the title "La Renaissance italienne et la philosophie de l'histoire."[4]

In their popularity in scholarly circles, the two pieces stand in inverse relation to the present rate of renown of their authors in the Anglo-Saxon cultural sphere. Dilthey enjoys considerable vogue, whereas Gebhart is all but forgotten, even by Romance scholars, except for his *compte rendu* of Burckhardt, which attracted the interest of Renaissance specialists in its time, still holds it, and is usually quoted by historians of the concept "Renaissance." Dilthey's review, on the contrary, has gone almost entirely unnoticed. This neglect may have been due originally to the fact that it was published anonymously; but, since it was reprinted in 1936 under Dilthey's name, there is no longer any reason for ignoring it.

A comparison of Gebhart and Dilthey, on the basis of their critiques of Burckhardt, not only gives an instructive insight into two distinctly dissimilar mental orientations, but offers an opportunity to probe the

[1] Wallace K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought* (Boston, 1948).

[2] H. Schulte Nordholt, *Het Beeld der Renaissance: een historiographische Studie* (Amsterdam, 1948).

[3] It is to be found in Vol. XI of the *Gesammelte Schriften* of Dilthey, entitled *Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins, Jugendaufsätze und Erinnerungen* (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 70-76.

[4] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, LXXXI (1885), 342-379. Reprinted, together with other studies on Machiavelli, Fra Salimbene, Cervantes, etc., in Emile Gebhart, *Etudes méridionales, La Renaissance italienne et la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1887).

strength of their hermeneutical powers and prefigures the subsequent development of Renaissance research.

It is undoubtedly a truism to state that Dilthey is not puzzled by the term *Kultur;* it is a ripe fruit which romantic and postromantic elaborations dropped in his lap. He accepts it as a datum, an intuitive representation of his consciousness; he inherits it from German historiographic and philosophical tradition. But to Gebhart the idea of *Kultur,* rooted in the last analysis in the concept of *Volksgeist,* is at first encounter unfamiliar. He notes that the term is poorly rendered by its presumptive equivalent "civilization"; he writes that by the expression *Kultur der Renaissance* Burckhardt intends to designate, not so much the intellectual acquirements or the material attainments of the Italians of that age, as the "état intime de la conscience." This remark shows that Gebhart grasped the "unity" in the Burckhardtian diversity. Nevertheless, the diversity also struck him forcibly. The *Kultur der Renaissance* is a labyrinthine work, perplexing, strewn with anfractuosities; here it is essential not to trust the first impression. Far from being a series of historical tableaux and psychological analyses, the work confronts us with a scientific explanation of a period and with a problem in historical philosophy.

"The possible ways and directions are many," says Burckhardt (graciously stepping aside for the foreseeable arrival of the anti-Burkhardtians), and Gebhart provisionally leaves the hint undeveloped. The immediate task is one of Diltheyan *Verstehen.*

> Il faut se rappeler à chaque page que l'on étudie un chapitre capital de la philosophie de l'histoire, et s'orienter sans cesse sur la doctrine de l'auteur. . .[5] [Burckhardt] n'écrit ni l'histoire générale de la Renaissance, ni celle de la littérature, ni celle des arts . . . Il dégage de l'observation des faits la cause qui les a produits, la direction et les caractères qu'elle leur a imposés: il nous fait saisir la loi d'un développement historique . . .[6]

The gaps noticeable in the *Kultur* in regard to literature and the arts are deliberate. As Burckhardt indicated, the *Kultur* is merely a section of a larger work on the Renaissance (a fact, I must add, only too frequently brushed aside by his critics). Dilthey informs us that it was Kugler's grandiose project of a work tracing "the typical aspects of the now emergent, now submerged, and continuously upthrusting creative forces of the nations of Europe as manifested in all domains of art" that Burckhardt took up again and was planning to put into execution. The *Kultur,* as Gebhart realizes, is "a torso."

Concerning Burckhardt's standard of assessment, the criterion—individualism—in the light of which he evaluates Renaissance civilization, Dilthey is much more radical in his critique than Gebhart. Gebhart does not question its rightness; he unreservedly endorses Burckhardt's per-

[5] *La Renaissance italienne et la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1887), p. 3.
[6] *Ibid.*

suasion that the perception of the *dignitas hominis,* "le sentiment que l'individu a repris de sa valeur propre," was not only the distinguishing trait of the Italian Renaissance, but also "la cause profonde de cette Renaissance."[7] Dilthey, on the other hand, emphasizes the problematic nature of the Burckhardtian criterion. As a consequence, he anticipates the results of that relativism which, in the post-Burckhardtian era, has endeavored to dissolve the conceptual synthesis which was Burckhardt's "myth" of the Italian Renaissance.

> When one wrenches oneself loose from the magic circle into which Burckhardt, through a word, an allusion, a turn of phrase, repeatedly spellbinds the reader, one realizes that it is precisely the specific significance of the Renaissance period that is *not* expressed by Burckhardt's scheme. His general concepts may with equal adequacy be applied to analogous cultural epochs: to post-Periclean Athens, for example, or to Rome during the transition period verging towards the Empire, or to the initial times of the imperial age.

In this passage, all the more significant because of its date—1862—the advent of the Nordstroms and the Boulangers *et alii omnes* is clearly prophesied. It may not be superfluous to recall that the trend of scholarship typified by Nordstrom and Boulanger blurs the boundaries between Middle Ages and Renaissance, asserts the presence in the Middle Ages of phenomena previously held typical of the Renaissance, and stresses traits in the Renaissance which prior researchers reputed to be characteristic of the Middle Ages. Preconditions for the affirmation of this trend of scholarship were, on the one hand, the elimination of Burckhardt's conception of individualism as physiognomically peculiar to the Italian Renaissance, and, on the other, the liquidation of the *vulgata opinio* which maintains that French literary creativeness underwent a catastrophic decline during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Gebhart did not live to see the emergence of views controverting that *vulgata opinio.* One of his chief intellectual convictions was that

> la France, *dont le Moyen Age s'est prolongé jusqu'au XVI^e siècle,* a vu, dès le XVI^e, le déclin de son génie: sa civilisation antérieure, si pleine de promesses, a tout à coup langui, comme frappée d'un mal secret. Cependant, dès le XII^e siècle, l'Italie avait rejeté peu à peu de ses épaules la chape pesante du passé, et déjà une aurore de Renaissance l'éclairait, quand le crépuscule des vieux âges semblait s'épaissir de plus en plus sur la France.[8]

With keen historical penetration, Gebhart notes that it is here that "nous touchons le point essentiel de la question préliminaire à la théorie de Burckhardt sur la Renaissance."[9]

Neither Gebhart nor Dilthey explores the history of the concept of

[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[9] *Ibid.*

"individualism" as a criterion of the Renaissance.[10] Dilthey, unlike Gebhart, points out Burckhardt's indebtedness to Ranke for his historiographic method, but is well aware of the differences that mark the intellectual orientations of the two.

> Ranke's interest was directed, in the main, to the rise of Spanish-Hapsburg power: he therefore pursued the inner history of Italy since, but no earlier than, the Counter-Reformation. In Ranke's portrayal, the period of the greatest blossoming of Italian culture—the Renaissance—appears only as ferment which stirs the general growth of civilization. No historian, in Ranke's time, was capable of envisaging the Renaissance as the factor forging the Italian national character, as the period of preparation for political independence.

For this view to appear, general historiography had to wait for Croce. The Risorgimento historians generally held the Renaissance in abomination; De Sanctis is truly representative in this respect. Burckhardt envisaged the Italian Renaissance only from the viewpoint of the forging of Italian national character, and not as the period of preparation for political independence.

In Gebhart's opinion, the freedom of the intellect and of the feelings which is at the cradle of the development of "modern" individualism in Italy antedates the Renaissance. That freedom accounts for the religious movement of the Peninsula since the thirteenth century, inasmuch as it was manifested to a greater extent, according to Gebhart, by Italian Christian religiosity than by the Italian city state. In this emphasis on the mediaeval "sentimental" religious background *qua* matrix of the Renaissance, Gebhart, who diverges from Burckhardt as to the positive dogmatic and credal conditions for the success of religious movements,[11] unmistakably anticipates Burdach.

It is unfortunate that Gebhart chose to characterize the conceptual framework, the pattern of key ideas which govern Burckhardt's *Kultur der Renaissance*, as a "philosophie de l'histoire." As a consequence of the grandiose associations clustering around this verbal stereotype, the contrast between the picturesque, almost tropical multiplicity of the *Kultur* and its counterpointing of "abstract" themes appeared to Gebhart still more intense and bewildering. Doubtless Burckhardt's great erudition contributes to the reader's puzzlement; but Dilthey has a subtler explanation of that antinomy between conceptual framework and overwhelming richness of concrete details:

> The greatest difficulty of the book lies in Burckhardt's peculiar oscillation between his tendency to trace phenomena back to general ideas, and his pronounced, constantly recurring disrelish for general notions . . . Burckhardt is too distrustful of

[10] See N. Nelson, "Individualism as a Criterion of the Renaissance," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, XXXII (1933), 316-334.

[11] *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, authorized translation from the 15th ed. by S. G. C. Middlemore (New York, 1935), p. 444.

philosophico-historical "construction." He confesses that the schemes of the philosophy of history may possibly demonstrate, by and large, the necessity of events which have deeply influenced the course of mankind; but he asserts that the individual, singular traits persistently elude the grasp of the historical philosopher.

Burckhardt's ingrained aversion to the philosophy of history (see his judgment of Schelling) has now become a byword and a commonplace among his biographers.[12] An important sign of Gebhart's interpretative penetration is his intuitive awareness that Burckhardt is in possession of a new *method* (he was one of the earliest and perhaps the greatest practitioner of *Kulturgeschichte*). "On doit se former à la logique et à la méthode du maître." That logic and method—we now know—are set forth in Burckhardt's preface to his *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*.[13] If this book had been available to Gebhart (it was first printed in 1898-1902), he would have been elated to find his conjectures confirmed. Dilthey, too, was alert to the new historiographic technique: "Burkhardt's general method ought to be of interest to all historians. In Germany, since Rueckert's portrayal of primitive German civilization, it is the first example of a consistently carried-out cultural treatment of history."

Both Gebhart and Dilthey recognized that one of Burckhardt's signal contributions is the dissociation of the concept of "Renaissance" from that of "humanism." They praised him for clearly delimiting the role which humanism plays in the shaping of Renaissance culture. Subsequent critics and historians have not always been able to think lucidly in these matters, and they have often made a hopeless jumble of the two concepts.

Dilthey contrasts Voigt and Burckhardt, to the complete advantage of the latter.

It is precisely because the two portrayals [that of Voigt and that of Burckhardt] coincide in many essential points, that the antithesis between them is all the more striking. The whole viewpoint of Voigt is, from the outset, that of a progressive resurrection of antique culture. But, in Voigt's book [G. Voigt, *Die Wiederbelebung des klassischen Altertums*, Berlin, 1859] the permanent significance of the movement *for Italy* is not even accorded a sidelong glance.

Burckhardt, on the other hand, concentrates his attention on what Voigt fails to bring out.

He views Renaissance culture essentially as a national culture. Above all . . . he aims to show that such culture, insofar as both its genesis and typical features are concerned, is, in its essence, purely Italian. Classical antiquity is merely a secondary factor in its texture.

Gebhart is no less firmly convinced of this. "C'est à l'âme italienne qu'il [i.e., Burckhardt] demande le secret de la Renaissance."[14] There is,

[12] See Eberhard Gothein, *Die Aufgaben der Kulturgeschichte* (1889).
[13] Ed. R. Marx (Leipzig, 1929), I, 3-5.
[14] *La Renaissance italienne et la philosophie de l'histoire*, p. 4.

in Gebhart's opinion, a causal link between the incompleteness with which Burckhardt carries out this "nativist," autochthonous viewpoint and his failure to substantiate the absolutely unbroken *continuum* of Italian civilization.

> Les différents groupes de faits qui lui servent à établir sa théorie sont très riches en exemples pour le XV^e^ et le premier quart du XVI^e^ siècle; plus clairsemés pour le XIV^e^ et les années qui suivent Léon X; très rares pour le XIII^e^ et l'âge de décadence contemporain du Concile de Trente. Ainsi, les points d'attache de la Renaissance, soit avec le Moyen Age, soit avec le milieu du XVI^e^ siècle, sont à peine visibles.[15]

A large part of Gebhart's *compte rendu* is devoted to the establishment of these *points d'attache*. The stricture voiced by him has become a commonplace of Burckhardtian criticism; but Gebhart was probably the first to formulate it.

Dilthey is not concerned with the problem of the continuity of individualism in Italian history because, as we have seen, he was skeptical of the validity of that very criterion. Here we touch the profound difference between Gebhart's and Dilthey's attitudes towards Burckhardt. Gebhart accepts, on trust, Burckhardt's "philosophie de l'histoire"; Dilthey, instead, blames him for juggling with general concepts, and goes to the extreme of stating that not even Hegel engaged in a more arbitrary game with abstractions than Burckhardt has frequently done.

According to Dilthey, this juggling with abstractions tends to obscure the real purpose of the *Kultur der Renaissance*. And the real purpose was that "nativism" which Gebhart also underscores, the demonstration,

> felicitously and irrefutably conducted, backed by an admirable wealth of detailed research, that the Italian Renaissance was an altogether spontaneous and indigenous development, the result of the Italian character and of conditions peculiar to Italy. Antiquity did nothing but contribute to the maturation, with extraordinary speed and vigor, of elements already inherent in the Italian disposition and circumstances; classical culture tinged those elements with its own spirit. Burckhardt's achievement consists in his setting forth the reasons, in detailing the inward interrelations of that spontaneous phenomenon, which for the first time is traced by him in all of its ramifications, with the keenest, most authentic historical sense.

Dilthey scents a baffling incertitude, a strange historical Pyrrhonism, an inability to devise general concepts closely fitting the specific reality which was the Italian Renaissance, in Burckhardt's account of the Renaissance attitude towards dramatic poetry and towards the Reformation. Gebhart refers to the first point,[16] but does not sufficiently investigate the latter. While Dilthey was deeply disturbed by the absence of a religious Reformation in sixteenth-century Italy, Gebhart, who was at-

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

tracted by the Renaissance more than by the Reformation, and by folk religiosity more than by *Dogmengeschichte,* was worried rather by the inverse problem.

Un grand problème domine l'histoire des arts et des lettres dans l'Allemagne moderne : pourquoi la Renaissance, qui apparait en Italie dans de XIII^e^ siècle, et qui s'y développe avec une profusion magnifique d'œuvres d'art au XV^e^ et au XVI^e^ siècle—tandis qu'emportée au loin par la civilisation italienne, elle éclatait tour à tour en France, en Angleterre, en Hollande, en Espagne—pourquoi la Renaissance a-t-elle été ajournée pour l'Allemagne jusqu'à la deuxième moitié du XVIII^e^ siècle, jusqu'à Lessing, Winckelmann, Goethe, et les écrivains de son école?[17]

In my opinion, Dilthey's statements concerning those pages of the *Kultur* in which Burckhardt gives his own explanation of the Italian failure to evolve great dramatic poetry and a religious Reformation unlock the ultimate depths of the two thinkers' *Weltanschauung.*

Both Italy's attitude towards dramatic poetry and towards the Reformation [writes Dilthey] are indicative of definite limitations of this "cultural form"—the Renaissance—, and have hitherto been considered as inherent in it. No hypotheses have been formulated as to the causes of the linkage between those two attitudes. But it is, to a certain degree, the immediate tact of the historian's perceptive faculty which should enable him to consider these far-reaching traits (which differentiate the Italian Renaissance from that of England and Germany) as rooted in the inward nature of that cultural "form." In regard to the first feature, Burckhardt almost wholly denies that it is essentially rooted in the character of the Renaissance: he grants the existence of the second, but surrounds it with many a skeptical qualification.

These words have a penumbra of obscurity about them; however, what Dilthey seems to mean is that Burckhardt is willing to grant the Renaissance "irreligiosity" of the Italians, but formulates reservations dictated by his knowledge of mediaeval "reform" movements.[18] The important things are not only those which Dilthey states, but those which he leaves unsaid. Was he, for example, in total agreement with Burckhardt's espousal of the opinion that the nonaccomplishment, in Italy, of a Reformation on the German pattern, depended on a lack of positive, i.e., dogmatically formulated, theological doctrines?[19]

Dilthey thinks that the internal dialectics of the concept "individualism" should logically have impelled Burckhardt, in elaborating it, to postulate results like the creation of a national drama and the establishment of a religious reform. Dilthey is willing to concede that Burckhardt, "in bringing up the problem of why Italy produced no Shake-

[17] E. Gebhart, "La Réforme et la Renaissance en Allemagne," *Revue Bleue,* VI (Dec. 5, 1868), 66.

[18] *The Civilization of the Renaissance,* edition cited, p. 445.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 444: "The Italian mind, we are told, never went farther than the denial of hierarchy, while the origin and the vigour of the German Reformation was due to its positive religious doctrines, most of all to the doctrines of justification by faith and of the inefficacy of good works."

speare and no Reformation, combats, perhaps rightly, the exaggerated separation which has recently become a fashion, between Romanic and Germanic civilization." This is an excellent remark. But, at the same time, he maintains that Burckhardt calls into question the real distinctions, blurs the boundaries between these two cultural forms, and creates a picture of the Renaissance which, according to Dilthey, is an arbitrary philosophical "construction." It is apparent that the problem Dilthey is driving at is the determination of the essential traits of the Renaissance and the Reformation (much subsequent research was spent on this problem by Dilthey himself, Troeltsch, Joachimsen, Wernle, Baron, etc.). Moreover, Dilthey's remarks about boundaries between Renaissance and Reformation, between Romanic and Germanic civilization, point to the great preoccupation of the nineteenth century with the autonomy of "cultural forms"—to that century's obsession with the concept of individuality and originality in all the domains of culture. The contrast between Dilthey and Burckhardt is based on their different conceptions of the Reformation, an event of supreme value, of incalculable significance, for Dilthey, while the *subintellecta opinio* of Burckhardt is not far from reflecting the Erasmian apprehension that "ubicumque regnet lutheranismus, ibi est literarum interitus." For a conspectus of Burckhardt's views on the causes and results of the Reformation, see K. Loewith, *Jacob Burckhardt, der Mensch inmitten der Geschichte* (Lucerne, 1936), pp. 219 ff.[20]

The question of the conclusion missing in Burckhardt's *Kultur*—perhaps the conclusion is there, but, if so, it is not at the end of the volume, but rather at the close of the chapter on "Morality," where Burckhardt says, "The fundamental vice of this [Italian] character was at the same time the condition of its greatness"—perplexes Gebhart, but not Dilthey. Gebhart wonders whether "la fin des vieilles croyances n'a point une relation étroite avec le dépérissement général de la civilisation, avec la ruine politique de l'Italie." This, as we all know, is the problem first formulated by Machiavelli; it is the very question which tormented the men of the Risorgimento (especially De Sanctis). "Le lecteur," writes Gebhart, "se pourra même poser une question que je ne crois point paradoxale: ce développement magnifique de l'individualité qui fut, pour la Renaissance, le principe même de la vie, n'a-t-il pas été, par ses propres excès, la loi mortelle du déclin?"[21]

Burckhardt had already settled this question in his mind before starting out to compose the *Kultur der Renaissance*. His conclusions were not far from those of Nietzsche, and totally unlike those of De Sanctis.

[20] See the recent rich book by Alfred von Martin, *Die Religion in Jacob Burckhardts Leben und Denken*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1947); review by J. P. Steffes in *Theologische Revue* (Leipzig, 1948), No. 2, cols. 98-100.

[21] *La Renaissance italienne*, p. 6.

He had been able to gaze at the Gorgon's eye of historical determinism without being transfixed by the horrors he saw therein imaged: the Renaissance could not have been brought about except at the price of political downfall, *alles rächt sich im Leben,* good and evil are inextricably blended, and the same principle which produced historical grandeur eventuated, in the unarrestable dialectics of history, in national ruin and political disintegration. Perhaps it was Burckhardt's reluctance to "ouvrir la main pleine de vérités" (to use Fontenelle's metaphor) which prevented him from giving "assez clairement la théorie de cette décadence."[22]

Washington, D.C.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 66: "Les derniers chapitres de Burckhardt sur la moralité, la religion et la superstition, font comprendre la décadence rapide de l'Italie, mais ne donnent pas assez clairement la théorie de cette décadence."

BOOK REVIEWS

FORSCHUNGSPROBLEME DER VERGLEICHENDEN LITERATURGESCHICHTE. Internationale Beiträge zur Tübinger Literaturhistoriker-Tagung September 1950. Mit einer Einführung herausgegeben von Kurt Wais. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1951. 188 p.

The lectures given at a recent meeting of German literary historians are collected in this volume. Most of the authors (all but three) are non-Germans invited to address a German audience. Inevitably such a miscellany is of uneven value, but it has its peculiar interest. The speakers and topics were well-selected and succeed in giving a wide sampling of the issues and problems of comparative literature.

The paper by Jacques Roos (Strasbourg) is a fervid exposition of Victor Hugo's political ideas, his hopes for a United States of Europe and of the world. Mr. Roos must have thought such a reminder of well-known events and ideals particularly salutary for his audience. Fritz Schalk's (Cologne) paper on Montesquieu and European traditions also expounds political philosophy. Montesquieu is praised as the upholder of the ideal of order and measure, humanity and freedom, and is set in the French political tradition, from Bodin to Rousseau. Mr. Schalk concludes with a contrast between French and English political philosophy in the eighteenth century. The "English" are criticized for irrational determinism, with references to Mandeville (an Anglicized Dutchman) and to two Scotchmen, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. The rationalistic Locke was, however, the most effective political thinker dominating eighteenth-century England up to the advent of Burke, an Irishman, who learned much from Montesquieu. Mr. Schalk's distinction seems to me false or, at least, exaggerated, but I would need much more space than is available here to argue a question to which whole books have been devoted, e.g., F. T. H. Fletcher's *Montesquieu and English Politics* (1939).

Herman Meyer's (Amsterdam) paper on the image of the Dutchman in German literature belongs to sociology. It is a very interesting and amusing account of the way conventional stereotyped ideas about a nation are influenced by poets and the exigencies of their polemical aims. While travelers brought home to Germany favorable and sympathetic accounts of Holland, the romantic writers (Brentano, Heine, etc.) created the image of the dull, commonplace, phlegmatic Dutchman, the ideal "Philister," with his tulips, canals, garden houses, windmills, cheese, butter, and china. While the case is deftly argued and persuasively stated, the importance of the German romantics for the rise of the caricature of the Dutchman seems to be overrated. What would Mr. Meyer do with Andrew Marvell's savagely grotesque *Character of Holland*, published in 1665, a good hundred years before the German image began to crystallize? Attention to English and French developments might have modified his conclusions.

We move into the serene atmosphere of old-type comparative studies with the papers of Schirmer, Santoli, and Carl Roos. Walter F. Schirmer (Bonn) retells the story of the relations between Goethe and Byron, without, however, adding anything to what has been said by J. G. Robertson or Fritz Strich. Vittorio Santoli (Florence) presents a sketch of German influences on Italian literature of the nineteenth century, a digest of the relevant part of his contribution to *Let-*

terature comparate, which has been reviewed in this journal (Vol. II, p. 85). Little is said, unfortunately, of the most important German influence, that of literary criticism and aesthetics. Professor Santoli, a close student of Friedrich Schlegel, would be eminently qualified to speak of the German relations of De Sanctis or Croce, which seem much more significant than imitations of Heine in Carducci or even echoes of Nietzsche in d'Annunzio.

Carl Roos (Copenhagen) presents a most instructive, well-documented account of the reception and penetration of the Danish ballads abroad. The focus is very properly on Germany; but the pages on England and Scotland might have been fuller if Mr. Roos had known two very detailed books by Sigurd B. Hustvedt: *Ballad Criticism in Scandinavia and Great Britain during the Eighteenth Century* (1916) and *Ballad Books and Ballad Men: Raids and Rescues in Britain, America and the Scandinavian North since 1800* (1930), both published by the Harvard University Press. By inadvertence, the name of the translator of the fullest collection in English of *Ancient Danish Ballads* (1860, 3 vols.), Richard Chandler Alexander Prior, is left out (p. 98) and he is strangely enough called a native Dane. Prior was born in 1809 at Corsham, Wiltshire, and studied at Wadham College, Oxford, graduating in 1826. He became an M.D. in 1837 and traveled widely in Austria, the Cape Colony, and elsewhere, following his botanical interests. His original name was Richard Chandler Alexander, to which he added Prior in 1859. He wrote also on plant names and croquet. He went to Norway, but apparently never visited Denmark. He died in London in 1902 at the age of 93.[1]

Two French professors came with papers on the baroque. This seems like carrying coal to Newcastle, but Germans should be interested that the French have also succumbed to the lure of the term and are rediscovering the rich literature in their own language between the Pléiade and the great standard classics. M. Raymond Lebègue (Paris) describes "le théâtre de démesure et d'horreur en Europe occidentale aux XVI^{e} et XVII^{e} siècles," giving examples of stage horrors from French and English plays. He rightly minimizes the possibility of mutual literary influences and is not convinced by the simple sociological explanation which points to the horrors of the time. But the final gesture toward the magic word "baroque" does little more than remove the problem by one step. Why the style arose is a question still unanswered even if we have described and defined it.

M. Charles Dédéyan (Paris) comments on "Position littéraire du baroque." He stresses the distinction between a profound early baroque, to which Shakespeare, Giordano Bruno, d'Aubigné, and others are assigned, and a later stereotyped, witty, and trivial baroque. As I argued several years ago (in *Journal of Aesthetics*, Dec. 1946), this wide extension of the term seems injudicious; but M. Dédéyan's paper appeals by its quotations and references rather than as a strict attempt at definition and delimitation.

Herbert Cysarz, formerly professor of German literature at the German University of Prague, speaks of the "world crisis in the novel of the major literatures" in his usual oracular, opaque, and bombastic style. But if one penetrates through the pretentious manner one comes away with a handful of titles of new German novels and an indiscriminate array of references to dozens of novelists from all over the world—from Sinclair Lewis to Norman Mailer, from Aldous Huxley to Joyce Cary. One gathers that Mr. Cysarz now admires Dostoevsky,

[1] See *Alumni Oxonienses, 1751-1886* (Oxford, 1888, III, 1154, and the identical obituaries in *British Medical Journal*, I (1903), 290, and *The Lancet*, I (1903), 339.

Kafka, and Thomas Wolfe, dislikes Mann and Hermann Hesse, and feels that the apocalyptic is the proper style for our age.

We are back in the sober light of theory when we read H. P. Teesing's (Amsterdam) reflections on literary periodization. His views are more fully developed in his excellent *Das Problem der Perioden in der Literaturgeschichte* (Groningen, 1949). In his lecture he argues against the usual idea of a complete parallelism between the arts and literature and between literature and society. He also emphasizes that the periods of one national literature do not necessarily coincide with those of another. He hints at the problem of the necessary sequence of periods and raises the question whether similar series could not be found in Oriental literatures which developed quite independently of the Western tradition. In a small space many crucial questions are raised and sensible answers suggested.

The three visitors from the Anglo-Saxon world had the needs of their audience most clearly in mind. L. A. Willoughby (London) presented a survey of books produced in England on questions of comparative literature, with emphasis on German-English literary relations. He pays particular tribute to the late J. G. Robertson and his inspiration. Victor Lange (Ithaca, N. Y.) selected items from American work on comparative literature which seemed likely to interest the German audience and gave some account of the "New Criticism" and developments in literary theory in this country. Miss Elizabeth Wilkinson (London) gave a very informative report on English aesthetics, with references to several American items. The emphasis is on the work of Edward Bullough, Thorburn, and Samuel Alexander. She discreetly criticizes the usual German worship of personal expression in literature and makes much of the new attention given to the medium of literature—language. Miss Wilkinson seems to be generalizing rather rashly when she asserts that these concepts are completely accepted in the Anglo-Saxon world. For instance, a recent reviewer in our pages labeled adherents of this view as "materialistic monists," since he sees language only as matter and not as symbolizing activity. At least in the United States, the views of the "New Critics" and related students of literary language and the aesthetic in literature are shared only by a minority, which has not convinced the majority primarily interested in antiquarianism, the history of ideas, and general culture.

Still, it is gratifying to see that the last-named speakers, with Mr. Wais agreeing in his introduction, emphasize that comparative literature would be a museum piece without criticism and aesthetics. I need hardly say that this is also my conviction.

R. W.

A POESÍA ÉPICA ITALIANA DO SÉCULO XVI NA LITERATURA PORTUGUESA. By Giuseppe Carlo Rossi. Lisbon: Oficinas Fernandes, 1944. 111 p.

En Italia y Portugal obtuvo gran desarrollo la creación del poema épico culto, de suerte que Ariosto, Tasso y Camões fueron los modelos europeos del género. Los italianos crearon dos modalidades de esta poesía: el estilo que interpreta (relativamente, como nota con acierto Rossi) el estilo del Renacimiento: esto es, el fijado por el *Orlando;* y el que representa el espíritu épico-religioso de la Contra-Reforma, o sea el de la *Gerusalemme.* Ambos obtuvieron nutridos grupos de seguidores y de comentadores. El estudio de la influencia de estos poemas en las literaturas europeas es un magno asunto de los investigadores del comparatismo: Rossi trata un aspecto del mismo, el referente a las letras

portuguesas. Este estudio se divide en dos partes: una, sobre la influencia de Ariosto (pp. 10-33), y otra, sobre la de Tasso (pp. 37-104).

La influencia de Ariosto es inferior a la de Tasso. La contextura religiosa de la *Gerusalemme* favoreció su influjo. Rossi, con la mención de la bibliografía del tema, indica algunos casos de reminiscencias en Camões y en Garrett. Las traducciones de Ariosto son del período romántico; de entre las completas cita con algún pormenor la de João Vieira Caldas (manuscrito inédito en la Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa). Luego de una alusión a la crítica sobre Ariosto, acaba esta parte con la muestra de algunas estrofas de los traductores.

El poema de Tasso, más sencillo en cuanto a fin y técnica que el de Ariosto, ejerció su influencia de manera más definida y decisiva, a veces presentado como modelo, y aun en ocasiones como contraste al de Camões, poema en el que la defensa de la Cristiandad iba unida a la exaltación del ideal nacional e imperial de los portugueses. Estudia Rossi las traducciones de las obras menores de Tasso (con mención de los sonetos a Camões y a Vasco da Gama), el *Aminta* (de intensa influencia ejercida directamente desde el italiano) y el gran poema, muy difundido, imitado y traducido a fines del siglo XVI y de todo el XVII, menos en el XVIII, con un intenso rebrote en el Romanticismo, unido a una pasional interpretación de la vida del poeta. También termina esta parte con una breve selección de ejemplos.

Rossi trata cada uno de los aspectos mencionados con una referencia general y breve de los textos portugueses. Realza con más interés la parte informativa de le contextura de la influencia o traducción, sin entrar en pormenores más que en algunos casos, que la parte de valoración poética. El propósito del estudio, declarado en la "Conclusão," ha sido ofrecer una orientación en este importante tema de los estudios del comparatismo. Posteriormente al libro de Rossi han aparecido otros trabajos, que si bien tratan parcial e indirectamente de este tema, conviene citarlos por las posibilidades que ofrecen a los estudiosos de la épica portuguesa. Se trata del libro de Hernani Cidade *A literatura autonomista sob os Filipes* (Lisboa, 1948), y de la crítica que de una parte del mismo ha escrito Eugenio Asensio con el título de "España en la épica filipina" en la *Revista de Filología española*, XXXIII (1949), 66-109.

FRANCISCO LÓPEZ ESTRADA

Universidad de Sevilla

LA REVUE DE CULTURE EUROPÉENNE. Directeur: F. Mélat; Rédacteur en chef: Sten Melry. 15 Rue J.-J. Rousseau, Paris Ier. Vol. I, No. 1, Juillet-Septembre, 1951.

The first number of *La Revue de culture européenne* is not only strongly comparative in its investigations of European culture but, as its rather militant Introduction underscores, is anxious to make all Europeans aware of the present threat from beyond the Iron Curtain to the philosophical concepts and political patterns inherited from Greece and Rome and to the spiritual and moral values bestowed upon us by Christianity.

The *pièce de résistance* of this issue is an article by Claude Isopescu on "La Culture italienne en France dans le second quart du XIXe siècle" (pp. 1-27), in which the noted Rumanian scholar surveys the impact of Italian literature (Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Tasso, Manzoni, and others), art, science, and language upon the period in question. Equally important is a triad of contributions published in commemoration of the centenary of the birth of Mihail Eminescu, Rumania's greatest poet: a well-done first French translation by Jean Elbé of *Hyperion*, one of Emi-

nescu's outstanding poems (pp. 47-61), and two scholarly articles, "Giraudoux et Eminescu" by Marcello Camilucci and "La Pensée religieuse d'un Musset moldave" by Frédéric Taillez, S. J. Among the remaining articles some continue this southeastern orientation (e.g., "Pièces françaises à sujet sud-est européen"), while others (e.g., "Un roman français du XVIII[e] siècle sur le Canada") emphasize the oneness of Western culture by reaching across the Atlantic.

Though the announcement of some articles to appear in subsequent numbers tends to confirm the impression that the Romance literatures will always be particularly well represented (e.g., "Lope de Vega et la culture européenne," "Chateaubriand et le Canada français," "Les premiers aperçus européens sur la littérature roumaine," etc.), we are assured that the Germanic bloc (or, to use the subtle distinction of the editor, "les apports des civilisations anglosaxonne et germanique") will be given its due share of attention. If *La Revue de culture européenne* endeavors to preserve a fair-minded balance among the valuable contributions of the Slavic, Germanic, and Romance literatures, it may succeed in its effort to work out "une synthèse de l'esprit du vieux continent," and in this important and constructive task it will surely be welcomed and supported by all men of good will.

W. P. F.

LA LETTERATURA COMPARATA NELLA STORIA E NELLA CRITICA. By Antonio Porta. Milano: C. Marzorati, 1951. 114 p.

Though Mr. Porta's enthusiasm for his chosen field and especially his spirited defense, in Chapter III, of the "Unità letteraria dell'Europa" are quite admirable, his verbose, nebulous, and rhetorical booklet is greatly inferior to Van Tieghem's calm, methodical, and scholarly outline of more or less the same subject. It is not that the majority of Mr. Porta's ideas are not sound and entirely acceptable; rather, it is the form of their presentation, the interpolation of extraneous matters, the predilection for abundant quotation from any Italian, French, German, Spanish, or English poet or scholar who may corroborate his statements, and the excessive emphasis on international politics, that leave the reader vaguely nonplussed and dissatisfied. Comparative literature, to be sure, is in itself a political creed—but we need not become too militantly aggressive in our professed cosmopolitanism; most of Mr. Porta's sideblows at Fascism, Nazism, and, to a lesser extent, Americanism might have been omitted.

The best chapter is the first, for it goes somewhat beyond Van Tieghem's outline of the growth of comparative studies and ideals during the past two centuries. Foreigners will particularly welcome Mr. Porta's praiseworthy and entirely natural efforts to underscore the contributions of Italy, from Vico to De Sanctis and Croce. In the second chapter, however, when discussing Croce's oscillating attitude towards comparative literature, Mr. Porta gets hopelessly bogged down in literary criticism *per se;* it is the chapter that has least to say about really comparative concepts. Rather than dwell on pure theories, it might have been better to emphasize Croce's great works, for instance on Italo-Spanish relations, which we happily count among the best books in our field and which belie his occasionally anti-comparative doctrines—or Mr. Porta might have said more about two other great Italian comparatists, Graf and Farinelli, whom he treats very shabbily indeed.

In Chapter IV, dealing with the teaching of comparative literature, Mr. Porta tends to get lost in exclusively pedagogical problems. Though we all face similar difficulties in trying to strengthen the cause of comparative literature in our universities, his words about specific obstacles in Italian institutions of higher learn-

ing will have little interest for non-Italians. It is, however, here and in his discussion of the spiritual unity of Europe that Mr. Porta's idealistic belief that comparative literature can provide modern youth with an inspiring political and cultural philosophy of life shines forth most beautifully.

This book must have been put together hurriedly, for it contains many errors which could easily have been avoided. Among them we may mention: the name of Mickiewicz is frequently misspelled; the *Revue de Littérature comparée* was founded not only by Hazard (p. 26) but also by Baldensperger; the *Mélanges d'histoire générale comparée (sic)* attributed to Hazard (p. 27) was really the Baldensperger *Festschrift;* the table of contents of Van Tieghem's *Histoire littéraire d'Europe et d'Amérique* is quoted faultily and incompletely. Equally careless is the statement that all three phases of German literature can serve comparative purposes—namely *althochdeutsch* (really?), *mitteldeutsch,* and *neualthochdeutsch (sic!).*

Americans in particular have reason to be dissatisfied with this book; for, though Mr. Porta claims to include America in all his considerations, he is confused about what little he knows of our doings. He mixes up the *Journal of Comparative Literature* of fifty years ago with our present journal; he also confuses the *Comparative Literature Newsletter* published by the National Council of Teachers of English (1940-47) with my own *Comparative Literature Newsletter* (1945-51). The only American university mentioned for its work in comparative literature is Columbia. Among the mystifying statements about our activities are the following: "La famosa Modern Languages Association di New York segnalava un vivace incremento di saggi, tesi, corsi, conferenze di carattere comparativo, finchè nel 1948 essa instituì sette sezioni di letteratura comparata distribuite nei diversi stati [!] ed unificati dalla Comparative Literature Section; un Modern Languages Meeting a Washington richiese ed ottenne la fondazione di una cattedra presso l'Università e propose di riprendere la pubblicazione della rivista Comparative Literature News-letters, interrotta nel 1940; inoltre fu promossa una concorde azione per ottenere tutti i riconoscimenti accademici e giuridici" (p. 100).

His absurd assertions about an alleged resumption of comparative studies in Sovietized Eastern Europe and a reaffirmation of its Western orientation (p. 101) are as biased as his elucidations about American comparatism on the preceding page are fragmentary and misleading. In this same fifth chapter on "Lo stato attuale degli studi comparati" which claims to include also Latin America, we do not find the names of such outstanding comparatists as Alfonso Reyes or Fidelino de Figueiredo. Such incompleteness, coupled with Mr. Porta's defense of Europe against America in Chapter III, explains our strong feeling of disappointment as we lay this book aside: "L'America vittoriosa non sa ancora istituire ordini davvero innovatori al suo stesso avvenire, nè largire la pace al mondo, che pur domina; alla egemonia economica non corrisponde uguale genialità umanamente creatrice; e la sua strapotenza, che finisce col negare la complessa totalità della vita e del destino umano, urta con altre concezioni ugualmente, anche se oppostamente, materialistiche, le quali svelano davanti a noi la spettrale realtà di un terzo conflitto mondiale; tecnica ed economia scatenate stanno prendendo micidiale sopravvento. Non quindi americanizzarsi, cioè divenire schiava unicamente dei valori pratici, né massa asservita ad anonimo divenire; essa deve restare Europa, libera da ortodossia di pensiero e d'intelligenza come pure dall'imperio del denaro, che vuol trasformare in oro, nuovo e più tragico Mida, realtà e destino, cosicchè si rinuncia ad essere per opulentemente vivere, in forma oppostamente ma ugualmente standard" (pp. 76-77).

The bibliography, finally, though it had to be very short and omit many works we might have wished to see included, nevertheless contains many titles (especially on p. 108) that are irrelevant for comparative work and should have been omitted. Among the mistakes, we might mention the fact that Baldensperger's article, "La Littérature comparée: le mot et la chose," did not appear in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 1921, but in the first issue of the *Revue de Littérature comparée* of the same year. The last sentence of the book is faulty and vague, and could easily have been corrected: "Si ha pure notizia di una bibliografia principe di letteratura comparata di Friederich Baldensperger (New York)."

W. P. F.

La Canción petrarquista en la lírica española del Siglo de Oro. Por E. Segura Covarsí. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1949. 333 p.

En su *Advertencia* (p. 5) el autor nos dice: "Con el estudio de la Canción petrarquista en la lírica española he intentado una doble finalidad: al mismo tiempo que preciso la evolución de esta composición métrica, creo señalar un método adecuado para esta clase de trabajos." Para cumplir con su primera finalidad el autor divide su libro en dos partes principales: I, Estudio histórico de la canción; II, La canción petrarquista en la lírica española del Siglo de Oro. Ia primera parte que pudiera llamarse teoría de la canción hace un recuento de las tesis expuestas hasta el presente acerca de sus orígenes y evolución posterior a través de los *estilnovistas*, Dante, Petrarca y demás autores que la cultivaron. Para su nacimiento que el autor dice "se remonta a los orígenes de la lírica"[1] y su entronque con la poesía trovadoresca, cita a tratadistas como Jeanroy, Monaci y Bertoni. El primer teorizante de la canción resulta ser en realidad Dante en su *De vulgari eloquentia* quien ya considera esta composición como "la forma lírica por excelencia, superior al soneto, la *ballata*, etc." (p. 36). El estudio de los paradigmas de las canciones de Petrarca que en general siguen de cerca la tradición *estilnovista* y dantesca, proporciona al autor el dato de que de las veintinueve canciones petrarquescas, veintiséis presentan paradigmas diferentes y cristalizan en forma definitiva la estructura de esta forma de composición poética. Los preceptistas y autores italianos irán fijando luego nuevos derroteros a la canción. Entre los teorizantes españoles figuran principalmente el licenciado Francisco Cascales con sus *Tablas poéticas*, Juan Díaz Rengifo con su *Arte poética española* y modernamente Andrés Bello y Eduardo Benot.

En la segunda parte que abarca propiamente el estudio que se ha propuesto el autor, encontramos una clasificación en dos grandes períodos en cuanto a la evolución de la canción. Uno de estos es el "período de iniciación" y el otro el "período de nacionalización" que corren respectivamente entre 1500-1550 y 1550-1600. El primer período queda sometido a su vez a una subdivisión entre "Petrarquistas" y "Tradicionalistas que derivan hacia el petrarquismo." No hay duda de que el autor ha querido encajar su clasificación cronológica dentro de las lindes señaladas por Pfandl en su *Historia de la literatura nacional española de la Edad de Oro*, haciéndola concordar con la terminología de Primer Renacimiento, Segundo Renacimiento y Período barroco (este último de 1600 a 1680). El autor parece querer así desviarse de la clasificación un tanto estrecha, según él, propuesta por Fucilla, y basada exclusivamente en fuentes, de dos generaciones de petrarquistas: la de los

[1] Para las últimas teorías sobre la lírica en romance, véase Dámaso Alonso, "Cancioncillas 'de amigo' mozárabes. (Primavera temprana de la lírica europea)," *RFE*, XXXIII (1949), 297-350.

que imitaron a Petrarca y a Ausías March y la de los que imitaron a los seguidores de Petrarca.[2] El criterio de clasificación del autor aceptable en cuanto hace referencia a la encondada lucha entre "tradicionalistas" e "italianizantes" que fue uno de los rasgos distintivos de la época y en cuanto muestra cómo los más tenaces opositores de la nueva escuela fueron derivando hacia ella, propone, sin embargo, una solución demasiado simplista y obedece sólo al anhelo de ajustarse a clasificaciones ya respetables y a presentar esquemas lógicos incompatibles con la realidad. Habría que fijar como comienzos de este movimiento italianizante el año de 1526, fecha del célebre encuentro entre Boscán y Navagero. Tampoco puede decirse que el período de iniciación termine en el año de 1550 o 1554 como quiere Fucilla con la publicación del *Cancionero General*, ya que entre los agrupados en este período, algunos como Acuña y Hurtado de Mendoza vivieron hasta casi fines del siglo. Es un hecho que los del período de nacionalización emplean ya de manera definitiva los metros italianos sin pensar siquiera en los tradicionales. Pero éstos, Fray Luis de León, Fernando de Herrera, Francisco de la Torre y Francisco de Figueroa coexisten en su período activo con algunos de los del primer grupo. La estricta clasificación cronológica no tiene, pues, bases muy firmes y habría que pensar más bien en tres subgrupos: uno de *iniciación* en que los metros italianos fueron incorporados al español (Boscán, Garcilaso), otro de *transición* en que los metros italianos convivían juntamente con los tradicionales (Acuña, Gutierre de Cetina, Hurtado de Mendoza, Silvestre, Gálvez de Montalvo, Baltasar Gil Polo, Montemayor, Lomas Cantoral, Pedro de Padilla, Barahona de Soto) y finalmente el de *nacionalización* con la aclimatación definitiva de los metros y paradigmas italianos.

El Sr. Segura Covarsí trata a espacio la producción poética de los autores mencionados en cuanto se refiere a la adaptación del metro de la canción. Sin embargo, a veces hace afirmaciones que están muy dentro del terreno de lo discutible. Ya no es posible, por ejemplo, negar en forma categórica la herencia hispánica de los *Cancioneros*, ni la influencia de Ausías March en poetas como Garcilaso[3] de quien dice el autor que "rehuye el alambicamiento conceptual de la poesía de los cancioneros" (p. 110).

Aunque el autor limita su estudio al problema exclusivo de la evolución del paradigma de la canción en España, el cotejo único con Petrarca no presenta un panorama exacto de la realidad mientras no se tenga en cuenta la influencia directa de los petrarquistas italianos en los petrarquistas españoles. Bien conocidas son las influencias de los preciosistas italianos, Cariteo, Tebaldeo, Aquilano, en la poesía de Pedro de Padilla,[4] o las de Bembo, Sannazaro y Tasso en Lomas Cantoral.[5] La antología de Lodovico Domenichi, *Rime diverse di molti eccellentissimi auttori nouvamente raccolte*, publicada en Venecia en 1545, juntamente con algunas otras de la época, parece haber sido fuente común de inspiración a muchos de estos poetas.[6] El mismo autor acepta en muchas ocasiones, en aparente contradicción con su tesis fundamental, la influencia de los petrarquistas italianos en los españoles. Dice, por ejemplo, hablando de Cetina: "Refiriéndonos ahora al aspecto métrico de

[2] J. G. Fucilla, "Two Generations of Petrarchism and Petrarchists in Spain," *Modern Philology*, XXVII (1930), 277-293.

[3] Vd. Rafael Lapesa, *La trayectoria poética de Garcilaso* (Madrid, 1948), pp. 42 y siguientes.

[4] J. G. Fucilla, "Pedro de Padilla and the Current of Italian Quattrocentist Preciosity," *PQ* (1938), 225-238.

[5] J. G. Fucilla, "Imitaciones italianas de Lomas Cantoral," *RFE*, XVII (1930), 155-167.

[6] Vd. Alfred Miles Withers, *The Sources of the Poetry of Gutierre de Cetina* (Philadelphia, 1923).

las canciones de Cetina, se observan ciertas irregularidades, que posiblemente guardan estrecha relación con los modelos italianos, que bien pudo haber imitado" (p. 117). Y al hablar de Lomas Cantoral: "Lomas Cantoral pertenece a este grupo de escritores que nosotros ahora estudiamos, y que presentan como característica general su predilección por los poetas italianos coetáneos . . ." (p. 146). Más adelante: "Así debió de ocurrir con algunos, como Barbato, Fiorentino, Caro, Amalteo, etc., etc., que sirvieron de modelo a los poetas españoles de este grupo . . ." (p. 150). De todas maneras, el autor, a pesar de reconocer la influencia evidente de los petrarquistas italianos en los españoles en el grupo que hemos llamado de transición, se abstiene en absoluto de estudiar la evolución del paradigma de la canción en los primeros y su probable efecto en la evolución de la canción en los últimos. Los apéndices, por ejemplo, que vienen al final del libro presentan paradigmas de los trovadores provenzales y franceses (p. 223), de los *estilnovistas* y Dante (p. 227), de las veintinueve canciones de Petrarca (p. 241) y de buen número de autores españoles de los siglos XVI y XVII (p. 247). Pero queda faltando en este cuadro el esquema de la Italia petrarquizante para una determinación más precisa de la realidad.

Ya que el Sr. Segura Covarsí se ocupó ante todo de un cotejo directo con las canciones de Petrarca, nos hubiera gustado saber las preferencias de poetas españoles por determinados paradigmas. La canción XIV de Petrarca, "Chiare, fresche e dolci acque," parece haber sido una de las más imitadas. Este dato quizá pudiese contribuir en alguna forma a iluminar el enmarañado complejo del petrarquismo en España. Pues, si bien, el estudio del aspecto métrico de la canción es de por sí valioso, no hay que olvidar que es tan sólo una de las múltiples facetas que se proponen a la consideración del movimiento petrarquista. El estudio exclusivo de paradigmas sin tener en cuenta temas, motivos, reiteraciones, imitación servil, originalidad, inspiración, retoricismo, adolece a la larga de falta de integración dentro del complejo de la creación poética. El caso de la canción es especialmente un ejemplo de ello, pues el paradigma como tal era un vehículo obligado para ciertos módulos de expresión del sentimiento amoroso de la época.[7]

El estudio del Sr. Segura Covarsí nos muestra así mismo la evolución de la canción a partir del período de "nacionalización." El autor parece hacer demasiado hincapié para explicar el proceso de evolución de la canción en España en el hecho de que los autores españoles se fueron olvidando de que la canción era una composición poética que debía adaptarse a una melodía musical. Sin embargo, es lo más seguro que el mismo Petrarca ya no estuviera pensando en la canción como motivo melódico, pues nada sabemos de que él las hubiera adaptado a la música si bien alguno de sus seguidores como Aquilano lo hizo. Creemos más bien que se trata de simple aclimatación de metros que fueron espontáneamente evolucionando con la voltuntad manifiesta en muchas ocasiones de aligerar la estructura poética y mostrar quizá arranques de originalidad. No hay duda de que la influencia de los clásicos latinos contribuyó poderosamente a este "aligeramiento" y que por contaminación se produjeron luego las *canciones aliradas*. Igual cosa sucedió en Italia con la *canción pindárica* cuyo representante fue Chiabrera y la *canción libre* de Alessandro Guidi.

Y es tiempo de referirnos a la segunda finalidad que el autor nos propuso en su Advertencia preliminar: "creo señalar un método adecuado para esta clase de trabajos." Sin embargo, es un poco difícil saber exactamente lo que el Sr. Segura nos quería decir con esto. Pues, si se refería a su procedimiento de cotejo, ya hemos

[7] Para algunos problemas relacionados con el petrarquismo en España, véase Dámaso Alonso, *Poesía española* (Madrid, 1950), p. 410.

visto como algo queda faltando para que las bases de su estudio sean totalmente sólidas.

La información que el autor nos proporciona en el presente libro es, de todas maneras, útil, y servirá para un estudio posterior más amplio de la métrica renacentista y del petrarquismo en España. Es de lamentar que el autor haya descuidado con frecuencia su propia sintaxis haciendo su prosa a veces oscura e incorrecta. Una concienzuda corrección de pruebas hubiese salvado así mismo errores en las notas bibliográficas.

GUSTAVO CORREA

Tulane University

MUSIC AND POETRY OF THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE. By Bruce Pattison. London: Methuen & Co., 1948. ix, 220 p.

This book sets out to demonstrate that the relationship between Elizabethan lyric verse and secular vocal music was "not only intimate but such as could have existed at no other time; that environment and tradition kept poets and musicians in close touch; that literary points of view helped to shape musical forms, and that the structure and content of lyric poetry owed much to music." There has been no previous full presentation of this thesis, which the author has adumbrated before, although many have granted it lip-service. The specialist, however, may greet it with some reserve. He is uncertain, because he cannot fully test the author's credentials, which are broader than his own, and he is wary, because he knows from experience that this particular field has a fatal attraction for the dilettante.

The first intention of this review is to dispel such reserve. The book is entirely professional, and more responsible in argument and tone than a great many studies of a less problematic nature. Dr. Pattison, who professes literature, is not only well-informed about music, but (much more rare) also urbane, perceptive, and maturely aware of the art, and grounded in its techniques of research. He neither hedges nor overstates; he has a firm sense of balance, a quiet enthusiasm, and a broad sympathy for the place of letters and music within the encompassing civilization. It is in fact a wonderfully temperate and clearheaded book, as far from Byzantium in its outlook as it is from Bloomsbury. If there is an air of simplicity about the presentation, that is because musical and literary jargon has been courteously avoided—without diluting the argument—precisely in order to make it available to the literary or musical specialist.

The argument is well arranged and supported. As preliminaries there are highly documented reviews of the importance of music in the Renaissance scale of values, and of the ancient tradition of the singing of poetry, which was maintained in England well into the seventeenth century. The community of the literary and musical professions, from early times but particularly in the late sixteenth century, is ably demonstrated, and a mass of fact is presented to show the contacts between the "New Poets" and Elizabethan musicians. Professor Pattison next examines carefully the musical forms: the Elizabethan solo-song prior to the madrigal, as practiced by William Byrd, the madrigal itself, and the lute-air of Dowland and Campion. He shows how literary considerations controlled their aspect; and in the next chapter, conversely, how music influenced the form and the matter of lyric verse. A brief and dense final chapter entitled "Divergence" maintains that in the seventeenth century the two arts drew apart. The professions themselves separated; and, while poets now sought to express complex meanings not easily matched

in music, musicians were developing indigenous forms not dependent on extra-musical models.

The value, indeed the necessity, of comparative studies of this kind and of this quality is something that this reviewer can speak of with assurance in connection with the madrigal. Pattison's chapter on the English madrigal supersedes all other published accounts, be they literary or musicological in orientation. Music historians have been puzzled that the English madrigal started as late as *ca.* 1590, by which time the Italian tradition was highly developed and had been known in England for decades. Pattison is absolutely right in pointing out that the madrigal, in whatever language, is possible only in connection with a certain kind of poetry, that this poetry took root in England with the New Poets of the 1580s, and that therefore the musical form could not have been assimilated by English composers before this time. Similar thinking may also clarify the beginnings of the lute-air, which arose rather suddenly around 1600 to eclipse the madrigal in popularity. At this time an equally abrupt literary reaction set in against the Petrarchistic poetry of the sonnet sequences and the madrigal prints. When Donne's poems began to be read, when sonnet sequences went out of fashion, and Jonson parodied Italianate conceits, the madrigal ceded to the simple lute-air with its more natural and more native lyric. *Semper Dowland semper dolens;* it was John Dowland who set the musical scene for Jacobean disenchantment.

The relationship between poetry and music is naturally rather different in the madrigal and the lute-air, though in each case close. The madrigal entered England in the same spirit as the New Poetry, but it was never a literary form of music even to the extent that the semipopular lute-air was. This might be brought out by contrasting the situations in England and Italy. In Italy the madrigal was always tied to the most serious literary efforts: to Bembo and the revival of Petrarchism, to Ariosto, Sannazaro, Tasso, and Marini. The English madrigal, on the other hand, was in general associated with poetry of a much more trivial tone. It is remarkable, for instance, that next to no English sonnets, even by Sidney, were used as madrigal lyrics, while all Italian madrigalists set sonnets as a matter of course, and William Byrd set at least eight—to music which was archaic by madrigalesque standards. Pattison says that, compared to the madrigalists, Byrd was an "unliterary" musician, meaning presumably that his musical style was little influenced by the words he set. In another sense Byrd was more literary than they; he took great care to select fine and serious poetry for his songs (though his taste may be thought sententious and old-fashioned). So did Dowland and Campion, but not the madrigalists. Analysis of Pattison's data reveals that as a matter of fact scarcely any contacts have been traced between actual madrigalists and the New Poets. These poets never accepted the madrigal as did their Italian colleagues. And, musically, the Elizabethan madrigal is less serious, on the whole, and less literary than the Italian tradition on which it was modeled.

The implications of Pattison's final point are broad, and require a certain amount of clarification. For on some level "divergence" had surely set in long before the seventeenth century. Necessarily this brings up the aesthetic of the art-song in relation to the aesthetics of poetry and music, however wise it may have been to have avoided so difficult a question in a book of this kind. Some admirable Elizabethan lyrics were obviously written with complete disregard, in certain respects, for any likely musical setting. As an example, consider one which Yvor Winters has recently mentioned as technically one of the most brilliant poems in the language, "Fine knacks for ladies, cheap, choice, brave and new!"[1] He remarks

[1] *Hudson Review,* IV (1951), 433-447.

that this first line juxtaposes three almost equally strong syllables by means of an iamb and a spondee, producing the illusion of an English molossus; and that the first line of stanza 3, "Within this pack, pins, points, laces, and gloves," actually juxtaposes four such accents. The first line of stanza 2, however, "Great gifts are guiles and look for gifts again," is metrically unremarkable. The poetic effect of contrast between these lines can only be coarsened in a strophic musical setting, which the poet no doubt anticipated (and perhaps in this case provided himself). It was not even possible for Dowland to preserve the declamation; stanza 1 had to be distorted if the others were to be kept tolerable. In the most essential sense, Professor Winters may be justified in *reading* the verse as though he didn't know that any music for it existed.

But Professor Pattison's book was not written as a contribution to criticism but to literary and musical history, and must be read as such. The work is original, authoritative, and full, reasonable throughout and highly suggestive. A final word of praise is appropriate for the amount of new information, new correlations, and new insights, presented quietly enough to escape the notice of those who have not worked in a similar area.

JOSEPH KERMAN

University of California, Berkeley